John S. Duffield

Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism

During the past decade, a growing number of scholars have turned to cultural approaches to account for the foreign and security policies of states. Surprisingly, however, these scholars have devoted little attention to the concept that boasts the most venerable tradition in the field of political science, that of political culture, as a possible source of state behavior. This neglect is unjustified. Like other cultural variables, political culture promises to explain phenomena that are enigmatic from the perspective of leading noncultural theories, such as neorealism. Yet it applies to a broader range of cases than do the many alternative cultural concepts, such as strategic culture and organizational culture, that have been employed. I begin by describing an important puzzle in the international relations literature that suggests the need to consider culture as a variable: the failure of neorealism to predict German security policy after unification. I then assess the various cultural approaches used in recent years to explain state behavior. After noting the similarities in these approaches, I discuss the important differences that mark them and identify the reasons for the greater utility of political culture. Finally, I illustrate the explanatory power of the political culture approach by applying it to the case of German security policy since 1990.

International regimes and alliance behavior: explaining NATO conventional force levels

With the end of the cold war, the military posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has entered a period of profound change. Prior to the recent dramatic political events in Europe, however, NATO conventional force levels in the Central Region had been remarkably stable for some three decades. This article seeks to explain this record of stability in terms of three widely used theories of international relations. It argues that balance-of-power theory and public goods theory cannot alone provide a satisfactory account. Rather, these traditional approaches for understanding alliance behavior must be supplemented by regime theory, which emphasizes the constraining effects of enduring institutional factors even in the face of structural change. Specifically, it shows how an international regime has influenced the provision of conventional forces in the Central Region by alliance members. More generally, this analysis seeks to contribute to the literature on international regimes in three ways. First, it demonstrates that regimes do matter by providing an example of their importance for explaining state behavior and international outcomes. Second, it extends regime theory to relations among military allies. Third, it elaborates a comprehensive model for understanding why states actually comply with regime injunctions. The model stresses both the ways in which regimes effectively modify the international environment within which states operate, altering the costs and benefits associated with different courses of action, and the ways in which participating states may internalize regime norms and rules, thereby making compliance increasingly automatic.

The Limits of “Rational Design”

“The Rational Design of International Institutions” (special issue of IO , Autumn 2001) makes a significant contribution to the theoretical literature on international institutions. It is important, however, to recognize the limits of both the Rational Design project in its current form and the conclusions that can be drawn from the special issue about the projects usefulness and validity. This article evaluates the project on its own terms, as a rationalist attempt to explain variation in international institutions. I identify three significant sets of limitations: those of the scope of the project, those of the analytical framework, and those of the efforts that are made to evaluate the framework through empirical analysis. Although the first set of limitations is largely a matter of choice, the last two raise questions about how much of an advance the special issue in fact represents. Nevertheless, these shortcomings are not absolute—they can be remedied through further theoretical and empirical research.

NATO's Functions after the Cold War

When the cold war ended in Europe, many observers expected that NATOs demise would soon follow. Even if the alliance did not disappear altogether, it would become an empty shell, no longer performing any useful functions. In its place would emerge either a largely institution-free anarchy characterized by much looser, shifting alliances and a significantly greater risk of conflict1 or possibly other European security institutions that were better suited to the needs of the post-cold war environment. Contrary to such expectations, however, NATO has not become moribund. Indeed, it remains the leading security organization in Europe, even as the initial flurry of post-cold war institution building winds down. As a result, few analysts now expect the alliance to wither away soon. This article seeks to clarify the reasons for NATOs continued vitality. It argues that initial analyses of the alliances future omitted several crucial considerations: the persistence of external threats sufficient to help justify NATOs preservation, its potential for acquiring

Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies

Michael Desch’s survey and critique of the new cultural literature in security studies is a welcome addition to the debate about the potential contributions of this research program to the problem of explaining state behavior in the realm of international relations.1 At a minimum, his article should prompt culturalists to make greater efforts to deane their terms as well as to clarify what they have in common and how their individual approaches differ. Nevertheless, Desch’s analysis is marred by six oaws that undermine his contention that “the best case that can be made for these new cultural theories is that they are sometimes useful as a supplement to realist theories” (p. 142). First, Desch mischaracterizes the issues at stake in the debate between realism and culturalism. He repeatedly describes the crucial question as “whether these new theories merely supplement realist theories or actually threaten to supplant them” (pp. 141, pp. 143, 144). This dichotomous characterization, however, needlessly oversimpliaes and distorts the debate, because one can easily imagine a variety of other possible relationships between culturalism and realism. One equally plausible alternative is that neither approach is in any sense superior, but that both may be indispensable to any fully satisfactory understanding of security affairs. Second, Desch employs a double standard in assessing the relative merits of cultural and realist approaches, one that necessarily skews the outcome in favor of realism. He argues that “to make the case that cultural theories should supplant realist theories, the new culturalists would have to demonstrate that their theories outperform realist theories in ‘hard cases’ for cultural theories” (p. 144). If we are to have conadence in

Why is there no APTO? Why is there no OSCAP?: Asia-Pacific security institutions in comparative perspective

Since the end of the Cold War, the security of the Asia-Pacific region has been the subject of considerable scholarly attention. One reason for this interest is the area’s heightened strategic significance, which is itself due in no small part to the rapid economic growth that many of the countries in the region enjoyed in the 1980s and 1990s. At the same time, the post-Cold War international politics of the Asia-Pacific have been relatively dynamic and unsettled, especially in comparison with Europe. The break up of the Soviet Union and subsequent turmoil in Russia, the rise of China, the strategic retrenchment of the US, uncertainty about Japan, and other developments have all raised questions about the future trajectory of security relations in the region. Of particular interest to a number of scholars has been the evolving constellation of international security institutions in the Asia-Pacific. One can discern two especially notable sets of recent developments. On the one hand, many long-standing mutual security arrangements have undergone significant changes, ranging from dissolution to revitalization. On the other hand, the last decade has seen efforts to fashion all new international security structures, most importantly the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), that, many hope, will be able to address the novel security challenges presented by the post-Cold War era. Despite this recent flurry of activity, however, one cannot help but be struck by the relatively limited nature of the formal institutional security architecture to be found in the Asia-Pacific region throughout the post-war era, at least in comparison, once again, with the Euro-Atlantic. Although both areas have been criss-crossed by large numbers of security ties, those of the Euro-Atlantic have generally been characterized by greater multilateralism, elaboration, and formalization than have those of the AsiaPacific. Such differences have been emblematic, moreover, of both externally-oriented collective defence ties and inclusive collective security

Transatlantic Relations after the Cold War: Theory, Evidence, and the Future

This essay employs international relations theory to illuminate post–Cold War transatlantic relations and vice versa. What do these two important subjects, one theoretical and one practical, have to say about each other? The essay is divided into three parts. The first part introduces three leading theoretical perspectives on international relations—the realist, the liberal, and what I term the transformational—and asks how each approach would expect U.S.-European relations to evolve after the Cold War. The second part evaluates the usefulness of each perspective for accounting for the actual pattern of transatlantic relations since 1990. To what degree do the events of the past decade lend support to each of the three perspectives? In the third part, I draw on the preceding analysis to reflect upon the likely future course of transatlantic relations and to offer general prescriptions for their successful management in the next decade and beyond.

The Return of Energy Insecurity in the Developed Democracies

During the past decade, concerns about energy security have reached levels not witnessed in the developed democracies since the 1970s and early 1980s. In good part because of such concerns, each of the largest of these countries – Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States – has conducted a major review of energy policy, initiated significant policy changes, or both. Also like the 1970s, recent years have seen a variety of proposals for international cooperation to promote energy security. This is where the similarities with the past largely end, however. In contrast to the earlier period, when the principal sources of concern in these countries were high oil prices and uncertain oil supplies, recent worries about energy security have been much more diverse. This paper describes these differences and explores their implications. It argues that the disparities in todays energy security concerns and policy preferences in the major developed democracies are due in part to the divergent policies pursued in response to the oil shocks of the 1970s. It also argues that the present differences will make meaningful cooperation by these countries to promote energy security, which was never easy in the past, yet more difficult.

Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture

Introduction. 1. Convention force posture and alliance behavior 2. Constructing NATOs conventional force posture, 1949-1952 3. The New Look and NATOs conventional force posture, 1953-1955 4. NATO retreats from massive retaliation, 1956-1960 5. To the adoption of flexible response, 1961-1968 6. Implementing flexible response, 1969-1989 7. Explaining the evolution of NATOs conventional force posture, 1949-1989 Epilogue: the transformation of NATOs conventional force posture.

The Evolution of NATO's Strategy of Flexible Response: A Reinterpretation

(1991). The Evolution of NATOs Strategy of Flexible Response: A Reinterpretation. Security Studies: Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 132-156.