Michael E. O'Hanlon

Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan

After a decade of intense focus on Iraq and North Korea, the U.S. defense planning community needs to devote more attention to possible war in the Taiwan Strait. The ChinaTaiwan relationship is structurally unstable and potentially explosive. China (also known as the People’s Republic of China, or PRC) insists that Taiwan is a part of its territory, whereas Taiwan refuses to be ruled by Beijing. Although Taiwan’s new president, Chen Shui-bian, has stated that he will avoid declaring independence from the PRC, his Democratic Progressive Party has long called for just such a declaration of independence. Chen himself is willing to forgo one only because he believes that Taiwan is already sovereign.1 Beijing has welcomed President Chen’s restraint and has even offered to view Taiwan as an equal partner (rather than as a local renegade government) in negotiations on Taiwan’s future. But China also issued a recent white paper threatening that it will not wait for reuniacation indeanitely, stating that Chen must publicly renounce his party’s stand on independence and explicitly reafarm the “one China” principle, and reminding the international community that China reserves the right to use force against Taiwan to “safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity.”2 Chinese ofacials recognize that their military will not excel until their economy develops further—a conclusion that would seem to counsel strategic patience on Beijing’s part.3 They understand, however, that Taiwan is improving its own armed forces, and note

A Flawed Masterpiece

THROUGHOUT most of the twentieth century, the U.S. armed forces were seen as an overmuscled giant, able to win wars through brute strength but often lacking in daring and cleverness. This basic strategy worked during the two world wars, making the United States relatively tough to challenge. But it failed in Vietnam, produced mediocre results in Korea, and worked in the Persian Gulf War largely because the terrain was ideally suited to American strengths. What a difference a new century makes. Operation Enduring Freedom has been, for the most part, a masterpiece of military creativity and finesse. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) head General Tommy Franks, and Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet devised a plan for using limited but well-chosen types of American power in conjunction with the Afghan opposition to defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda. Secretary of State Colin Powell helped persuade Pakistan to sever its ties with the Taliban, work with Afghanistans Northern Alliance, provide the bases and overflight rights needed by U.S. forces, and contribute to the general war effort. Besides pushing his national security team to develop an innovative and decisive war-fighting strategy, President George W. Bush rallied the American people behind the war effort and established a close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, making it far easier for the United States to work militarily in Central Asia. The U.S. effort to overthrow the Taliban deprived

The humanitarian transformation: expanding global intervention capacity

Although the threat of mass casualty terrorism has altered strategic priorities in the United States, the global community as a whole faces many of the same problems that it faced in the 1990s: civil wars; failed or failing states; and other humanitarian disasters around the world. The Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, and their difficult aftermaths, show the overlap between humanitarian and geostrategic interests. These interventions also demonstrate that demanding military stabilisation missions will be required as much for the ‘war on terrorism’ as for traditional peacekeeping. Civil conflicts still shape regional and global politics and development, and in many cases are still preventable or at least stoppable. Moreover, trends in demographics, economics, the global weapons market and international politics suggest that they are unlikely to diminish much further on their own. 1 Several hundred thousand people a year continue to lose their lives directly to war as well as to war-related famine and disease. Almost 90% of the dead are innocent non-combatants. A growing percentage of combatants are now child soldiers, in some wars as high as 60%. 2 But these wars have other costs as well. They provide terrorist groups with havens, as in Afghanistan, and with motivating causes, as in the Middle East and South Asia. Moreover, they not only help keep Africa and other parts of the developing world mired in misery, economic stagnation, and disease, but in a world of globalisation, have implications for public health across the planet. There is also a political cost. The continuation of these wars starkly undercuts the common Western argument that democracies protect and promote human rights. In a world essentially

Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea

Coupling carrots that actually entice with tough demands to address North Koreas nuclear program, reduce its conventional forces, and reform its outdated economic system can begin to transform one of the worlds most troubled and dangerous regions. Heres how.

Star Wars Strikes Back

Star Wars the movie may have enjoyed a comeback this year. But inside the defense community, Star Wars never left us. Unfortunately, neither have the polemics surrounding it; missile defense remains as controversial as ever. That may not have mattered much in the past, when missile-defense technology was too immature to make deployment practical. But there could soon be real consequences if the debate remains mired in ideology. To understand the arguments and the stakes involved, a few definitions are essential. Ballistic missile defenses fall into two main categories: theater and national, designed to intercept short-range and long-range missiles, respectively. The United States now deploys a version of theater missile defense (tmd)?the Patriot?but does not yet operate more advanced tmd systems or a national missile defense (nmd) of any kind. Tmd and nmd use similar technologies: satellite-based infrared sensors that detect and track missile launches, radar that follows incoming threats and guides interceptors to them, and the interceptor missiles themselves. Eventually both may also include airborne and space-based lasers?although such devices remain early in the laboratory stage today (a point recently reaffirmed by the Pentagons chief scientist and its director of testing). But the similarities between tmd and nmd end there. For while tmd enjoys wide support in the American policy debate, nmd (or strategic defense) remains hotly contentious.

Making Foreign Aid Work

Foreign aid is facing difficult times. Even some aid practitioners have called its effectiveness into question. While aid has had success in humanitarian relief, family planning, and reducing infant mortality, its record in promoting economic growth has been mixed. Economic growth is not the sole objective of U.S. foreign aid, and it may be the least important goal for policymakers concerned with security, short term solvency, human rights, or democracy. But the effects of aid on growth can be measured empirically, and growth is a necessary condi tion for meeting most of the broad objectives of aid. While aid has succeeded in promoting growth in some countries, in many others it has failed or even been counterproductive. A number of countries, many in sub-Saharan Africa, are poorer than when they began receiving aid several decades ago. Donors have often subsidized unsound economic policies. In such situations, foreign aid has perpet uated poor policies and weak economic performance. The solution is not to end or even reduce aid flows, but for donors to allocate resources more selectively. In the 1960s and 1970s, aid was driven primarily by the security con cerns of the Cold War, with an underlying focus on reducing poverty. During the debt crisis of the 1980s, the rationale for aid shifted to

Getting Serious About Iraq

Philip H. Gordon, Martin Indyk and Michael E. O’Hanlon are Senior Fellows in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC. Gordon is Director of Brookings’ Center on the United States and France and Indyk Director of Brookings’ Saban Center for Middle East Policy. Parts of this article draw on Philip Gordon and Michael O’Hanlon, ‘les defis de l’apres-Saddam’, which appeared in the summer issue of Politique internationale.

Toward Reconciliation in Afghanistan

How can we make sense of where the United States is in Afghanistan today? A poor country, wracked by 30 years of civil war, finds itself at the mercy of insurgents, terrorists, and narco-traffickers. NATO’s economy-of-force operation there has attempted to help build a nation with very few resources. Yet, overall levels of violence remain relatively modest by comparison with other violent lands such as the Congo, Iraq, and even Mexico. Economic growth is significant and certain quality of life indicators are improving, though from a very low base. The United States is committed to Afghanistan and over the course of 2009 will roughly double its troop strength there. The international community is also seriously committed, with a number of key countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom fighting hard and applying solid principles of counterinsurgency. Based in part on a December 2008 trip to Afghanistan with the Canadian military, I came away with the impression that the situation in Afghanistan was fairly bad, but the prospects for the future are reasonably good, at least relative to the standards and expectations of the Afghan people. Since prevailing in counterinsurgency is largely about sustaining the support of the indigenous population, this is a hopeful sign. Moreover, the incoming Obama administration has made its commitment to this war clear, presumably ensuring that U.S. political support for the mission will endure for a considerable period. The year 2009 is likely to be bloody as the additional U.S. forces establish themselves in the country. Will the additional troops, however, bring about a turning point in the war? In other words, will the extra forces enable the United States and its

Is the Media Being Fair in Iraq

Using original data to systematically assess individual outlets and the media overall, the authors conclude that broad criticism of the U.S. media is often badly overstated.

Missile Defense after the ABM Treaty

As of mid‐June, the U.S. is free to develop, test, and deploy missile defenses in any fashion it sees fit. Yet, the administration has been short on details about the kind of defense it would build. What system is Washington likely to deploy? What should it?