Mike Mochizuki

Japan's shifting strategy toward the rise of China

Abstract After examining different theoretical expectations of how Japan might respond strategically to the rise of China, this article analyzes the evolution of Japans policy toward China from 1972 to 2006. It argues that Japan has shifted away from the ‘friendship diplomacy’ paradigm to a mixed strategy that involves both positive engagement and realistic balancing to hedge against the potential threats that China may pose in the future. Japan is engaged in a vigorous domestic debate about China policy that centers around four options: cooperative engagement with a soft hedge, competitive engagement with a hard hedge, balancing and containment, and strategic accommodation. The current mixed strategy of engagement and hedging is consistent with different theoretical traditions such as offensive realism, defensive realism, and liberalism. Future developments such as Japan–China interactive effects, shifts in the military power balance, and changes in US strategy, however, could steer Japan to make choices that point in a certain theoretical direction as opposed to others.

Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea

Coupling carrots that actually entice with tough demands to address North Koreas nuclear program, reduce its conventional forces, and reform its outdated economic system can begin to transform one of the worlds most troubled and dangerous regions. Heres how.

Japan under Abe: toward Moderation or Nationalism?

In July 2013, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner, the Kōmeitō, scored an impressive victory in the House of Councilors elections. Out of the 121 contested seats, the LDP won 65 and the Kōmeitō 11. With this victory, the LDP–Kōmeitō ruling coalition now controls 135 out of 242 seats (about 55 percent) in the upper house. This win follows the December 2012 triumph in the House of Representatives election, which brought Shinzō Abe and the LDP back to power by taking 294 out of 480 seats. Prime Minister Abe deserves much credit for this twin victory. After his disappointing first tenure as prime minister in 2006–07, he learned from his mistakes and decided to focus on the economy for this term. Soon after assuming the prime ministership again in December 2012, Abe implemented a bold and risky plan to revive the Japanese economy by radically expanding the money supply and boosting spending. This had the immediate effect of depreciating the yen and raising stock prices. With the terms of trade improving for Japanese exporters, the economic mood in Japan lifted. Abe also exercised restraint in dealing with a territorial dispute with China. In September 2012, Japan’s central government—led by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda— purchased three of the Senkaku Islands to prevent then-Tokyo Governor Shintarō Ishihara from buying them on behalf of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Although Noda had sought to thwart the nationalist governor from making provocative moves on the islands, China protested the purchase as altering the administrative status quo of the islands, which it claims as part of the Diaoyu Islands, and dispatched official vessels for regular patrols near them. While remaining firm about Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and supporting active coast guard patrols to counter Chinese intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters, Prime Minister Abe refrained from escalating the conflict

Japan: Still An Exceptional U.S. Ally

After months of contentious debate, Japan’s parliament, called the Diet, in mid-September 2015 finally passed the Shinzo Abe government’s package of eleven bills on security. This legislation, along with the revised U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines of April 2015, will transform the legal and institutional framework for Japanese defense policy and U.S.–Japan security relations. Japanese proponents of this transformation have argued the changes are necessary to make bilateral security cooperation more seamless to respond effectively to new regional and global security challenges and to contribute more proactively to international security affairs. Opponents, however, have charged that the legislation illegitimately hollows out Article 9 of Japan’s constitution—which outlaws war as a means to settle international disputes—and could embroil Japan in misguided wars launched by the United States. Chinese and Korean critics of the legislation have echoed these criticisms by claiming that Japan is now remilitarizing. From a historical perspective, the bills’ passage is part of an incremental process, beginning in the 1980s, of relaxing the self-imposed constraints on Japanese defense policy. Some have referred to this process as Japan’s normalization as a security actor. To be sure, Japan has a relatively large defense budget, and its defense policy has changed profoundly over the last three decades. But what is often ignored is how Japan’s “normalization” compares with the defense policies of similar states in the U.S. alliance network. After all, understanding “normal” requires a comparison with other states. Although the latest changes are indeed