Michael G. Huelshoff

Analysis of federal incentives used to stimulate energy consumption

Conclusions of an analysis which identifies and quantifies Federal incentives that have increased the consumption of coal, oil, natural gas, and electricity are summarized. Data on estimated cost of incentives used to stimulate energy consumption by incentive type and energy source are tabulated for coal, oil, gas, and electricity. It is suggested that the examination of past incentives can be useful in developing guidelines and limits for the use of incentives to stimulate consumption of solar energy. (MCW)

Is Germany a ‘good European’? German compliance with EU Law

It is often asserted that Germany has assimilated the norms and identity of European integration. In this essay, we test this proposition. After reviewing the literature on German EU policy, we argue that a good place to test whether Germany has become a ‘good European’ is in compliance with EU law. An unbiased test of the ‘good European’ hypothesis requires that we examine a body of patterned behavior that is highly constrained or constituted by a set of recognized and accepted norms, both procedural and substantive. We argue that the mutually constitutive nature of norms, identity, and interests finds expression in the highly developed EU legal system. The evolution and legitimacy of EU law meet the criteria for identity formation (and interest construction) for its member states as specified in the literature. An examination of over 1,600 infringement cases (where the Commission sues a member for failing to comply with EU law) between 1962 and 1999 finds that the Germans are average in violation of EU law – no better than the British, Belgians, French, Irish, or Portuguese, and significantly worse than the Danes, Dutch, and Luxembourgers. Thus, we conclude that these data do not support an assertion that Germany is any more ‘European’ than most other members.

European Integration after the SEA: The Case of the Social Charter

Neo-functionalist and intergovemmentalist theories of regional integration have been reasserted in recent analyses of European Community (EC) politics. This essay examines the ability of hypotheses drawn from these theories to clarify the politics leading to the 1989 Social Charter in the EC. It is found that a linkage politics model, based in part upon neo- functionalism and intergovernmentalism but which also emphasizes the impact of interest group organization on regional bargaining, best explains this case. The essay concludes with suggestions for reformulations of regional integration theory.

Electoral Systems, Ethnic Cleavages, and Experience with Democracy

Recent studies show that the effects of electoral systems and ethnic cleavages on the number of parties in emerging democracies differ from those effects observed in more established democracies. Building on recent arguments maintaining that the quality of democracy improves with experience, we argue the reason for the differences in the findings between established and emerging democracies is that the effects of these variables on the number of parties differ according to a country’s experience with elections. To test this argument, we analyse party system fragmentation in 89 established and emerging democracies and the conditioning effects experience with elections have on the effects of district magnitude, ethnic cleavages and variables relating to the presidential party system. The results show that the effects of institutional and social cleavage variables differ substantially between emerging and established democracies, but these effects begin to approximate those seen in more established democracies with additional experience with elections.

Will EMU Come as Intended and on Time

My task is to predict whether or when European monetary union (EMU) will be realised, and to explore Germany’s role in the drive to implement the Maastricht’s Treaty’s programme to create a single European currency. Positivism tells us that prediction is the other side of the coin labelled explanation — if you can do one, you can do the other. Yet social science’s record of predicting events is notoriously poor. Furthermore, as Eichengreen reminds us, ‘there are no precedents for Europe’s current course, in which countries with histories of monetary sovereignty and long-standing central banks establish a common central bank accountable to them jointly with control of their national monetary policies, including the power to issue a common currency’.1 Hence we have no cases, large or small, to draw upon as we anticipate the path of monetary union over the next few years. I shall nevertheless attempt to chart the likely developments in monetary union through the last year of the 1990s and into the next century. In doing so, I shall liberally apply the standard set of equivocating tools of social science, including ‘ceteris paribus’, ‘straight-line projection’ and the like.