Michael Hubbard
University of Birmingham
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Featured researches published by Michael Hubbard.
World Development | 1999
Deryke Belshaw; Peter Lawrence; Michael Hubbard
Abstract Ugandas economic reform program has been widely regarded as a success story for structural adjustment. Nevertheless, a large trade deficit persists, shored up by inflows of aid and private remittances. The poor performance of the agricultural tradables sector is presented as the key explanation for this trade imbalance. Two main reasons for this poor performance are found to be the failure to liberalize producer prices quickly and the failure to overcome early institutional resistance to reforms of marketing arrangements. Ugandas recovery is therefore much less impressive than it appears and the sustainability of the now heavily aid-dependent economy must remain in serious doubt.
Public Management Review | 2013
Cheng Chen; Michael Hubbard; Chun-Sung Liao
Abstract This article explores the dynamic and the results of efforts by citizens to resist the costs passed onto them by public–private partnerships for infrastructure, through examining citizen engagement in two problematic projects in Taiwan and China. In both cases, the design and procurement phase focused on the government–investor relation, with no obvious opportunity for citizen voice and costs were displaced onto users. In the operational phase, citizen protest (voice) was more effective in resisting costs in Taiwan where the institutional environment was more open and responsive; in the China case, availability of alternative roads (choice) was crucial in resisting costs.
Habitat International | 2001
Michael Hubbard; Gideon Onumah
Abstract The case is made for improving food supply and distribution (FSD) in developing cities, particularly to benefit the poor. The case rests on evidence of increasing urbanisation of the poor, frequent conflicts between traders and city authorities, badly planned markets and urban agriculture, increasing congestion and poor roads. Ways to improve urban FSD are suggested, with examples of good practice. A leading role for city authorities is indicated. Fulfilling this role requires abilities which many developing city authorities currently lack, including pursuing cross-departmental policies. Evidence for the case is not complete: in particular, empirical studies are needed of the extent to which good practice in urban planning and management improves food access and quality and reduces prices.
Policy and Society | 2012
Cheng Chen; Michael Hubbard
Abstract This article examines the power relations between the government, the private sector and citizens/users, which underlie the risk allocation process in public private partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure. It argues that the institutional environment and resource dependency determine power relations, and hence risk allocation. The approach is applied to analyse risk allocation in a PPP toll road in Zhejiang province, China. The analysis reveals the dynamic of power relations among the parties. The findings show how the party with more power (in this case, the local government) was able to shift costs to the weaker parties (in this case, the users and the private sector). The implication of the study is that more effective courts and greater accountability of government to citizens are required to enhance the governance of such PPPs in China.
Public Administration and Development | 1999
Michael Hubbard; Simon Delay; Nick Devas
The literature suggests that management contracts for public services work best when payment to the contractor is performance-related and when there is minimal involvement by government in daily management. However, as this case study of Mozambique illustrates, neither of these principles can be straightforwardly applied in management contracts for organizational reform in a developing country. First, establishing successful performance-related payment is difficult in a contract with multiple objectives and poor information. The value in setting up performance-related payment appears to be more in focusing the objectives of the contract than in improving the contractors performance. Second, a virtually ‘hands on’ role is required for the government agency supervising the contract, in the numerous political, legal and staffing issues which arise. The capacity of the agency to carry out this function is critical to the performance of the contract. It faces the challenge of completing the reorganization, sustaining initial achievements and running the new system economically. There are grounds for guarded optimism. Copyright
Food Policy | 1995
Michael Hubbard
Abstract This paper outlines the conditions under which contracting of different types succeeds in the provision of public services to agriculture. It observes that performance contracting has been widely attempted in adjusting countries but generally with little success, since it is demanding of resources, flexibility and motivation in government under conditions where these are scarce. Examples are drawn from agricultural marketing. Given the largely private nature of the services to agriculture currently provided by the state, the long-term reform strategy should be market development. Contracting out and management contracting may have a role in this strategy, particularly in better managed adjusting economies.
Food Policy | 1995
Peter Lewa; Michael Hubbard
Abstract The political aspects of reform have been underplayed in structural adjustment programmes. The problematic and inconsistent implementation of Kenyas Cereal Sector Reform Programme (CSRP), it is argued here, is substantially the result of failing to manage the politics of reform. Good political management of the reform process would have included ensuring a clear understanding by interest groups of the likely consequences of liberalisation, and full involvement of the President and Cabinet from the outset in order to create an ongoing reform culture.
Food Policy | 1992
Michael Hubbard; Nicoletta Merlo; Simon Maxwell; Enzo Caputo
Abstract This article examines the work of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), formed by the governments of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, in striving to improve food security through regional cooperation. The potential benefits of cooperation are noted, alongside the obstacles to their realization. IGADDs strategy is described in detail, and the steps being taken to implement it are discussed.
Archive | 2003
Michael Hubbard; Marisol Smith; Frank Ellis; Gideon Onumah; Andrew Shepherd; Peter Lewa; Renu Kohli
For most of the twentieth century, particularly after the 1930s depression, governments worldwide intervened substantially in both input and output markets for agriculture, in some countries excluding private firms altogether. Seed, feed, fertiliser, pesticides, finance and advice were provided by state organisations or with state subsidies. Fixed asset investment (e.g. land purchase and development — dams, roads, fences) was often similarly assisted. Crop purchase was often carried out by widely distributed state depots offering standard prices across a whole country (pan-territorial pricing). Grain stocks were accumulated by the state in order to set and stabilise consumer prices. Large bureaucracies were set up to administer public agricultural services, imposing much budgetary cost — particularly for price stabilisation, mostly grains. The main purpose was to achieve self-sufficiency in food staples or to promote exports of agricultural commodities.
Development Policy Review | 2015
Sulaiman Aris; Michael Hubbard
The OECDs Paris Declaration (2005) discouraged donor project implementation units (PIUs) which are not integrated into government. But little is known about the behaviour and effects of PIUs integrated into government. Are they efficient? Do they support country systems? This article responds to these questions using research comparing two streams of implementation of schools investments in Malaysias Eighth Plan 2001–2005, one via government alone and the other via a World Bank PIU integrated into government. It emphasises the conflicts which can exist within country systems, and how these affect the choices which a donor faces in seeking efficient implementation of a project while supporting country systems.