Michael J. Lenox

Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program

Industry self-regulation, the voluntary association of firms to control their collective action, has been proposed as a complement to government regulation. Proponents argue that the establishment of such structures may institutionalize environmental improvement, while critics suggest that without explicit sanctions such structures will fall victim to opportunistic behavior. In a study of the Chemical Manufacturer Association’s Responsible Care program we investigate the predictions of these two contradictory perspectives. Our findings highlight the potential for opportunism to overcome the isomorphic pressures of even powerful self-regulatory institutions and suggest that effective industry self-regulation is difficult to maintain without explicit sanctions.

Exploring the Locus of Profitable Pollution Reduction

In this paper, we explore the locus of profitable pollution reduction. We propose that managers underestimate the full value of some means of pollution reduction and so under exploit these means. Based on evidence from previous studies, we argue that waste prevention often provides unexpected innovation offsets, and that onsite waste treatment often provides unexpected cost. We use statistical methods to test the direction and significance of the relationship between the various means of pollution reduction and profitability. We find strong evidence that waste prevention leads to financial gain, but we find no evidence that firms profit from reducing pollution by other means. Indeed, we find evidence that the bene fits of waste prevention alone are responsible for the observed association between lower emissions and profitability.

Interdependency, Competition, and the Distribution of Firm and Industry Profits

Coordination of interdependencies among firms productive activities has been advanced as a promising explanation for sustained heterogeneity in capabilities among firms. In this paper, we extend this line of research to determine the industry structures and patterns of expected firm profits for the case when difficulty optimizing interdependent activities does, in fact, generate and sustain capability heterogeneity among firms. We combine a widely used agent-based model where firms search to discover sets of activities that complement one another (reducing overall costs or raising product quality) with traditional economic models of competition among profit-maximizing firms. The agent-based model produces a distribution of performance (interpreted as variable cost or product quality) among firms and the competition models determine resulting industry outcomes including patterns of entry, exit, and profits. The integration of economic models of competition among firms with an agent-based model of search for improvement by firms reveals a rich relationship between interdependencies in production functions and industry structure, firm profits, and industry average profitability.

Interdependency, Competition, and Industry Dynamics

Asystematic understanding of industry dynamics is critical to strategy research because individual firm performance dynamics both reflect and affect change at the industry level. Descriptive research on industry dynamics has identified a dominant pattern where prices fall, output rises, and the number of firms rises and then falls over time. Several models have been advanced to explain these patterns, with a particular focus on explaining why a shakeout in the number of firms occurs. In the most prominent models, shakeout is generated by rising realized heterogeneity among firms that either is assumed to be unrecognized but determined ex ante or is generated by stochastic innovation outcomes coupled with convex adjustment costs and scale advantages in innovation and learning. In this paper, we develop an alternative model where heterogeneity develops among firms over time (leading to a shakeout) because firms must make choices about highly interdependent productive activities where the ideal combinations cannot be easily deduced or imitated. By combining two established models (a Cournot model of competition with an NK model of interdependency in production activities), we are able to advance an alternative explanation for the observed patterns of industry behavior, including shakeout. We show that variation in the potential for interdependency in activities among industries is able to explain varying levels of shakeout as well as differing patterns of entry and exit among industries. Notably, the model generates several empirical predictions not apparent in past research and several that directly conflict with the results of prominent alternative models of industry dynamics. Specifically, we show that when the potential for interdependency within an industry is low, entry slows down and incumbent survival is all but assured, whereas in industries where the potential for interdependencies is high, shakeouts are severe and the rates of entry and exit remain high over longer time periods, with decreasing survival rates for incumbents.

The Role of Private Decentralized Institutions in Sustaining Industry Self-Regulation

An emerging body of institutional scholarship emphasizes the role played by private decentralized institutions in facilitating collective action among organizations. However, these institutions often suffer from free riding and opportunism. This may lead firms to exit the institution and eventually cause its collapse. In this paper, we explore how private decentralized institutions may be sustained despite these problems. We focus on one form of private decentralized institution---trade association--sponsored industry self-regulatory programs. We advance two alternative hypotheses to explain the sustained existence of industry self-regulatory institutions: (a) Firms participate to gain a participation-contingent benefit, and (b) firms participate to maintain a generally beneficial institution. Using a 10-year panel of data from the chemical industry, we find evidence consistent with the latter hypothesis for at least one prominent example of self-regulation. Our findings have implications for both specific models of industry self-regulation and general theories of collective action.

Organizational Design, Information Transfer, and the Acquisition of Rent-Producing Resources

Within the resource-based view of the firm, a dynamic story has emerged in which the knowledge accumulated over the history of a firm and embedded in organizational routines and structures influences the firms ability to recognize the value of new resources and capabilities. This paper explores the possibility of firms to select organizational designs that increase the likelihood that they will recognize and value rent-producing resources and capabilities. A computational model is developed to study the tension between an organizations desire to explore its environment for new capabilities and the organizations need to exploit existing capabilities. Support is provided for the proposition that integration, both externally and internally, is an important source of dynamic capability. The model provides greater insight into the tradeoffs between these two forms of integration and suggests when one form may be preferred over another. In particular, evidence is provided that in uncertain environments, the ability to explore possible alternatives is critical while in more certain environments, the ability to transfer information internally is paramount.