Michael J. Trebilcock

Information-Based Principles for Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy

In this paper we review the changes in economic theory that have taken place since current consumer protection regimes were first developed in the 1960s and 70s. We draw from this evolution in economic theory the basic principle that information, and the complex ways in which information works both in the marketplace and in regulatory regimes, should form the core of a set of principles for rethinking consumer protection policy. We go on to propose a number of such information-based principles as a guide for the redesign of consumer protection policy to deal with an increasingly global and complex consumer marketplace.

The relationship between law and development: Optimists versus skeptics

Over the past two decades there has been a resurgence of interest, on the part of both academics and practitioners, in using law to promote development in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, and Asia. The level of academic interest in the topic is reflected in the publication of three recent books on law and development by prominent American scholars: Thomas Carothers (ed.), PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, Kenneth Dam, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, and David Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds.), THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL. In this Essay we suggest that these books (or at least some contributions to them) reflect insensitivity to the ambiguities surrounding the relationship between legal reform and development. We show that there is ongoing debate about fundamental questions such as whether law is an important factor in determining social or economic outcomes in developing societies given the existence of informal methods of social control; whether there are insurmountable economic, political or culture obstacles to effective legal reform; as well as, assuming effective legal reform is feasible, what types of reforms are conducive to development and what types of actors ought to implement them. We argue that although there are some reasons for optimism about the potential impact of legal reforms upon development, the relevant empirical literature is inconclusive on many important issues and counsels caution about the wisdom of continuing to invest substantial resources in promoting legal reform in developing countries without further research that clarifies these issues.

The economics of nuclear accident law

Statutes restrict the application of common tort law to accidents at nuclear power plants in Canada, the U.S., and other countries. The statutes transfer to the operator of a nuclear plant liability that would otherwise be placed on input suppliers and in return limit the liability of the operator. This essay addresses the impact on safety incentives of nuclear accident law, with broader implications for the design of incentive systems that combine regulation and liability rules.

The Choice of Governing Instrument

The nature of the constraints under which policy makers choose instruments for advancing political, economic, and social goals, and the factors that determine the degree of substitutability among instruments, are enduring and vital questions for policy makers the world over. This book length study of the choice of governing instrument investigates systematically the following issues: (1) the factors that induce state intervention in social and economic affairs; (2) the perspectives of the central classes of actors in the political process, including politicians, bureaucrats, regulators, interest groups, and the media, on the choice of governing instruments; (3) whether governing instruments are, or at least should be, chosen on the basis of relative technical efficiency; (4) the alternative hypotheses there are as to the calculus of instrument choice; (5) the institutional characteristics of some of the central classes of instruments with a view to identifying those characteristics that are likely to be influential in instrument choice. Among the instruments considered are government-sponsored studies, tax and expenditure instruments, public ownership, and various forms of regulation. The study concludes with some implications of our analysis for regulatory reform writ large.

Rule of Law Reform and Development

This important book addresses a number of key issues regarding the relationship between the rule of law and development. It presents a deep and insightful inquiry into the current orthodoxy that the rule of law is the panacea for the world’s problems. The authors chart the precarious progress of law reforms both in overall terms and in specific policy areas such as the judiciary, the police, tax administration and access to justice, among others. They accept that the rule of law is necessarily tied to the success of development, although they propose a set of procedural values to enlighten this institutional approach. The authors also recognize that states face difficulties in implementing this institutional structures and identify the probable impediments, before proposing a rethink of law reform strategies and offering some conclusions about the role of the international community in the rule of law reform.

Path Dependence, Development, and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform

In the past decade, an institutional perspective on development has become increasingly prominent in development thinking. However, the reform experience thus far suggests that if institutions indeed matter for development, we still do not have a firm understanding of how to transforms dysfunctional institutions. Drawing on concrete examples of rule of law and property rights reforms, we argue that path dependence theory can shed some light on past failures and provide guidance for future reforms.

State-Owned Enterprises in Less Developed Countries: Privatization and Alternative Reform Strategies

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have typically played a much larger role in the economies of developing countries than developed countries. However, empirical evidence on the economic performance of SOEs generally yields negative results and suggests that SOEs are a major tax on the economies of developing countries reflected in the large operating subsidies required to sustain them. These inefficiencies seem in part attributable to ownership effects and partly to lack of competition effects. Empirical evidence on the effect of privatization of state-owned enterprises in both developed and developing countries suggests that this is often likely to lead to major improvement in economic performance. However, where privatization is not politically feasible, SOE reform alternatives such as management contracts, performance contracts, and greater exposure to competition may, in some contexts, enhance SOE performance, although typically they are second-best policy options to privatization.

Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships in the Developing World: Lessons from Recent Experience

Abstract Seeking to address inefficient and costly infrastructure delivery, governments over the past two decades have turned to public–private partnerships (PPPs) to build and operate infrastructure. The key characteristic of PPPs is the outsourcing and ‘bundling’ of project delivery components (for example, design, build, finance, operate), structured to incentivise the builder-operator to incorporate long-term operating cost considerations in the design and construction phases of a project and reduce coordination costs. This article reviews the benefits and drawbacks of PPPs and the experience to date, focusing in particular on developing economies. Relative to traditional procurement, PPPs are complex, and require governments to anticipate and plan for contingencies and conduct monitoring and enforcement of long-term contracts. We argue that institutional capacity is a key determinant of PPP success and in mitigating potentially welfare-reducing contract renegotiations evident in the Latin American experience.

Property Rights and Development: The Contingent Case for Formalization

The conventional wisdom among economists and development scholars is that strong formal property rights are a necessary pre-condition for economic growth. By way of a thorough analysis of the theoretical and empirical literature relating to property rights and economic development, this paper questions this wisdom and argues instead for a more nuanced and context-dependent approach to the understanding of the relationship between property rights and development. This first part of this paper argues that in certain cases, the costs of a creating a formal property rights regime outweigh the benefits derived from that regime. The second part argues that property rights regime cannot be viewed as isolated institutions which are independent from other social institutions, but rather that the success of a formal property rights regime is contingent upon the successful operation of a number of other institutions. Finally, the third part examines the process of transition from an informal to a formal property rights regime and argues that the appropriate model for facilitating that transition crucially depends on the reason for the perpetuation of the informal regime.

Rethinking the welfare state : the prospects for government by voucher

1. Introduction 2. The Case for Vouchers 3. Food Stamps 4. Low Income Housing 5. Legal Aid 6. Health Care 7. Primary and Secondary Education 8. Post-Secondary Education 9. Labour Market Training 10. Early Childhood Education 11. Conclusion