Michael Kandiah

The conservative party and the 1945 general election

The Conservative Party went into the 1945 election with a number of liabilities: its organisation had atrophied, and it had not developed a coherent set of policies during the war. Its election campaign failed at all levels and it did not convince the electorate, which was deeply concerned about post‐war reconstruction, that it would follow through in its promises. However, the scale of the partys defeat was exaggerated by the electoral system and the post‐war world proved to be highly conducive to its rejuvenation.

Yes Minister and Yes Prime Minister (1): Sir Antony Jay, CVO

The process of government decision making in contemporary Britain and the impact of the civil service on policy are unusual topics for television comedy. Yes Minister and Yes Prime Minister remain unique ‐ and extremely funny ‐explorations of these themes. Dr Kandiahs interviews of the two scriptwriters, Sir Antony Jay and Jonathan Lynn, reveal the priorities, sources and agendas that shaped the plotlines.

The heath government

This witness seminar on the Conservative government of Edward Heath, 1970–74, was held at the Institute of Historical Research (IHR), London, on 14 February 1994. It was chaired by Dr Anthony Seldon and introduced by Dr Stuart Ball (University of Leicester). Those participating were Sir Campbell Adamson (Director General of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), 1969–76), Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (Heaths Principal Private Secretary), Christopher Chataway (Minister for Post and Telecommunications from 1970–72 and then a minister in the Department of Trade and Industry, 1972–74), Sir Frank Cooper (Deputy Secretary, Civil Service Department, 1970–73, and then Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office from 1973), Lord Croham (Permanent Secretary at the Treasury), Sir Terence Higgins (Minister of State at the Treasury, 1970–72, and then Financial Secretary, 1972–74), Lord Howe of Aberavon (Solicitor General, 1970–72, and then Minister for Trade and Consumer Affairs, 1972–74), ...

Epilogue: The Rise of ‘The Queen’

This draws together the threads explored in the previous chapters, and examines the conclusions which can be drawn from these, as understood in the context of the Queen’s long reign as part of a consideration of the survival chances of the Windsor dynasty. The consciousness of the royal family, particularly the Queen herself, of being strongly associated with a Windsor approach to the monarchy as an institution is assessed, because of her very visibility. The implications of these factors for the future of the dynasty, and the institution, are also suggested. Issues such as the potential power still possessed by the monarchy via the royal prerogative are highlighted as matters for further investigation, but in the light of future events as these develop, including the potential issues which will necessarily arise surrounding any future Windsor accessions.

The Ultimate Windsor Ceremonials: Coronations and Investitures

Coronations and investitures are revisited to reflect on how, politically and in terms of representation in the public life of the nation, the Windsors negotiated with political figures and the media to achieve a relevance and support for their continuing role. There was a will to make monarchy more accessible through such occasions, and questions are asked about how far this succeeded, and how important the monarchical role was perceived to be by the political elites of the day as well as by the media industry. The willingness of the Windsors to utilise advances in media technology in relation to such events, as part of their modernisation, is also considered. This chapter will ask how far public celebratory ceremonials were changed in ways that has made them particularly ‘Windsor’, and the extent to which it was the royal family that drove change.

'At the top table': British elites’ perceptions of the UK’s international position, 1950-91

Since the end of the Second World War, Britain’s global status has been a subject of intense debate. When the former US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, famously stated in 1962 that ‘Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role’,1 he was suggesting the country should scale back its expectations of a world position, not rely upon a relationship with the US to project power and, importantly, reconcile itself to being just another major European state. Echoes of such views can be found in the pronouncements of French President Charles de Gaulle when he vetoed UK entry to the European Economic Community, in 1963 and again in 1967. The General believed that Britain was too close to Washington, not sufficiently European in outlook and too interested in maintaining a global presence. Over the decades such views have been repeated by others right down to the present day and, in all likelihood, will continue for some time to come. But, what did the British elite — politicians, policy-makers, civil servants and diplomats — think of this debate? This chapter will examine the question by utilising group oral testimonies, called ‘witness seminars’, of those who were at the heart of the UK policy-making elite as collected by the Institute of Contemporary British History (ICBH). The chapter will focus on three distinct but closely interrelated themes which consistently and identifiably run through the testimonies in these seminars: the internal debates about the UK’s global position; Anglo-American relations; and relations with Europe.

Conference report: War Crimes - Retrospectives and prospects, February 19-21, 2009

Report of a Conference held at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in 2009, published in the IALS News section of Amicus Curiae - Journal of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies. The Journal is produced by the Society for Advanced Legal Studies at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London.

Commonwealth International Financial Arrangements and Britain’s First Application to Join the EEC

If the United Kingdom had joined the European Economic Community following its first application in 1961 it was highly probable that many Commonwealth countries would have experienced, in the short term at least, a disruption in their international financial arrangements: in the way they paid for their trade with other countries, and particularly in the way they accessed capital on the world markets. However, this issue was wilfully ignored by the British government, which chose to concentrate on issues relating to Commonwealth preferences and tariffs. It is not surprising, therefore, that this issue has scarcely been discussed in the academic literature on the British application to join the EEC.1