Michael L. Ross

What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War

Since the late 1990s, there has been a flood of research on natural resources and civil war. This article reviews 14 recent cross-national econometric studies, and many qualitative studies, that cast light on the relationship between natural resources and civil war. It suggests that collectively they imply four underlying regularities: first, oil increases the likelihood of conflict, particularly separatist conflict; second, ‘lootable’ commodities like gemstones and drugs do not make conflict more likely to begin, but they tend to lengthen existing conflicts; third, there is no apparent link between legal agricultural commodities and civil war; and finally, the association between primary commodities - a broad category that includes both oil and agricultural goods - and the onset of civil war is not robust. The first section discusses the evidence for these four regularities and examines some theoretical arguments that could explain them. The second section suggests that some of the remaining inconsistencies among the econometric studies may be caused by differences in the ways they code civil wars and cope with missing data. The third section highlights some further aspects of the resource-civil war relationship that remain poorly understood.

How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases

Recent studies have found that natural resources and civil war are highly correlated. Yet the causal mechanisms behind the correlation are not well understood, in part because data on civil wars is scarce and of poor quality. In this article I examine thirteen recent civil wars to explore the mechanisms behind the resource-conflict correlation. I describe seven hypotheses about how resources may influence a conflict, specify the observable implications of each, and report which mechanisms can be observed in a sample of thirteen civil wars in which natural resources were “most likely†to have played a role. I find that two of the most widely cited causal mechanisms do not appear to be valid; that oil, nonfuel minerals, and drugs are causally linked to conflict, but legal agricultural commodities are not; and that resource wealth and civil war are linked by a variety of mechanisms, including several that others had not identified.For their comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Paul Collier, J. R. Deshazo, Pierre Englebert, Barbara Geddes, Anke Hoeffler, Macartan Humphreys, Philippe Le Billon, Roy Licklider, Dan Posner, Ken Shultz, and Libby Wood.

Oil, Islam, and Women

Women have made less progress toward gender equality in the Middle East than in any other region. Many observers claim this is due to the regions Islamic traditions. I suggest that oil, not Islam, is at fault; and that oil production also explains why women lag behind in many other countries. Oil production reduces the number of women in the labor force, which in turn reduces their political influence. As a result, oil-producing states are left with atypically strong patriarchal norms, laws, and political institutions. I support this argument with global data on oil production, female work patterns, and female political representation, and by comparing oil-rich Algeria to oil-poor Morocco and Tunisia. This argument has implications for the study of the Middle East, Islamic culture, and the resource curse.

Does Taxation Lead to Representation

Does their need for greater tax revenue force governments to democratize? Most research on contemporary democratization says little about the effects of taxation. Yet there are good reasons to believe that taxation led to representation in the past: representative government first came about in early modern Europe when monarchs were compelled to relinquish some of their authority to parliamentary institutions, in exchange for the ability to raise new taxes; similarly, the war for independence in the United States began as a rebellion against British taxes. Some scholars argue that a comparable process is occurring today: the need to raise taxes forces authoritarian governments to democratize. These claims have never been carefully tested. In this article, the ‘taxation leads to representation’ argument is explored and tested using pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 countries between 1971 and 1997. One version of the argument appears to be valid, while another does not. These findings are important both for scholars who wish to understand the causes of democracy, and for policy makers who wish to promote it.

The big oil change: a closer look at the Haber-Menaldo analysis

The claim that oil wealth tends to block democratic transitions has recently been challenged by Haber and Menaldo, who use historical data going back to 1800 and conclude there is no “resource curse.” We revisit their data and models, and show they might be correct for the period before the 1970s, but since about 1980, there has been a pronounced resource curse. We argue that oil wealth only became a hindrance to democratic transitions after the transformative events of the 1970s, which enabled developing country governments to capture the oil rents that were previously siphoned off by foreign-owned firms. We also explain why the Haber–Menaldo study failed to identify this: partly because the authors draw invalid inferences from their data and partly because they assume that the relationship between oil wealth and democracy has not changed for the past 200 years.

United Nations Voting Patterns

HANNA NEWCOMBE and ALAN G. NEWCOMBE are coeditors of Peace Research Abstracts Journal and Peace Research Reviews Journal for the Canadian Peace Research Institute, Oakville, Ontario, Canada. MICHAEL Ross was a student at the University of Toronto, Ontario, and spent a summer at the Canadian Peace Research Institute. The authors are grateful to Charles Wrigley, Michigan State University, for permitting them to use his data cards on the General Assembly voting record; to the University of Toronto Institute for Computer Research for allowing them free use of the computer; to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, and Arnold Simoni, Toronto, for financial support; to Michael Silbert and William Wyman for help with computer programming; to Norman Alcock and William Eckhardt, Canadian Peace Research Institute, for some calculations and many valuable suggestions; and to Virginia Young, Canadian Peace Research Institute, for typing.

On winnowing: The impact of scarcity on allocators' evaluations of candidates for a resource ☆

Abstract It was hypothesized that allocators unwittingly forge a relation between the availability of a resource and the worthiness of the applicants for that resource. In a simulation of an academic job search, graduate students were instructed to hire either 2 or 6 of 12 excellent candidates. Subjects spoke into a tape recordor reporting their initial reactions to each of the candidates vitae, then made their hiring decisions, and rated the desirability of each of the candidates. Next, they were told they could now hire more of the applicants if they wished to do so. In a control condition, subjects were treated identically to experimental subjects in all aspects of the procedure but one—they did not anticipate and were not required to make hiring decisions. Instead, they rank ordered the applicants in terms of quality with the knowledge that “their department” wished to hire either 2 or 6 people. As hypothesized, subjects anticipating 2 appointments made fewer positive comments about the candidates on the audiotapes than did those anticipating 6 appointments; subjects in the experimental condition evaluated the candidates they hired more favorably than subjects in the control condition evaluated their own top-ranked candidates; subjects who were initially required to hire 2 candidates continued to employ fewer applicants than those who initially hired 6 when external hiring constraints were removed. The implications of the data for the review process in academic psychology journals were discussed.

Does Oil Wealth Hurt Women? A Reply to Caraway, Charrad, Kang, and Norris

I am grateful to the editors of Politics & Gender for organizing this exchange. I agree with many of the points raised by Teri Caraway, Mounira Charrad, and Alice Kang, but disagree sharply with Pippa Norris.

Announcement, Credibility, and Turnout in Popular Rebellions

The dynamics of popular rebellions against authoritarian governments are examined by focusing on how the publics beliefs about the durability of an authoritarian government may have a self-fulfilling quality. This self-fulfilling quality gives both government and opposition leaders an incentive to make exaggerated “announcements” about the likelihood of a rebellion in the near future. Yet if their predictions are too far off, they will lose credibility, and their future announcements will carry less weight. The case of Indonesia, where the governments loss of credibility and the oppositions ability to exploit this weakness led to a popular uprising in 1998, is examined. A computational model consisting of a government, an opposition, and a population of citizens with heterogeneous preferences is developed to explore how announcements by the opposition and the government can influence the likelihood of rebellion. Results suggest that when the governments credibility is high, the opposition can do little to inspire rebellions; however, a small loss of credibility, if capitalized on by the opposition, markedly boosts the chances of a rebellion. When the publics underlying preferences are polarized, the likelihood of a rebellion drops sharply.

Mineral Wealth and Budget Transparency

How does a country’s mineral wealth affect the transparency of the government’s budget? Among democracies, a country’s mineral wealth is not convincingly related to the transparency of its government. But among autocracies, greater oil wealth is correlated with less fiscal transparency, while greater non-fuel mineral wealth is paradoxically associated with greater transparency. Explaining this pattern is a challenge: there is no prima facie evidence that it is driven by either membership in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, or by the need to attract foreign investment. There is some evidence that among autocracies, oil reduces transparency because it helps dictators stay in power.