Michael Spence

Job Market Signaling

1. Introduction, 355. — 2. Hiring as investment under uncertainty, 356. — 3. Applicant signaling, 358. — 4. Informational feedback and the definition of equilibrium, 359. — 5. Properties of informational equilibria: an example, 361. — 6. The informational impact of indices, 368. — Conclusions, 374.

Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition

Deals with a study which investigated the effects of fixed costs and monopolistic competition on the selection of products and product characteristics in a set of interacting markets. Price discrimination; Impact of monopolistic competition on complementary products; Approaches to the problems of substitute products. (Из Ebsco)

COST REDUCTION, COMPETITION, AND INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE'

In many markets, firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs. Sometimes the cost-reducing investments operate directly on costs. In many instances, they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply. Therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction. In fact, if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer (in the way that Lancaster pioneered), then product development often is just cost reduction.

Insurance, Information, and Individual Action

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses some intricacies and difficulties that arise in the real world operation of contingent claims markets. Insurance contracts are the most readily observable and perhaps the most important example of contingent claims markets in action. The purpose of insurance is to protect risk-averse individuals from suffering the full consequences of those actions on the part of nature that affect them unfavorably. Individuals have different incomes in different states of nature and may face different prices. Perfect insurance transfers income between states of nature, preserving marginal cost pricing when the income is spent. With an imperfect measurement of the states of nature, income transfers are conditional on what is observed rather than on the state of nature. Alternatively, one could alter prices to provide insurance.

The optimal control of pollution

Pollution we define to be any stock or flow of physical substances which impairs man’s capacity to enjoy life. So defined, pollution is a pervasive phenomenon. Physical garbage, air and water pollution, soil exhaustion via excessive use, D.D.T., radiation, and the running down of any natural resource faster than it can rejuvenate itself (if it can rejuvenate itself), are all problems of pollution in this extended sense. By operating at such an all-inclusive level we may miss some of the interesting aspects of particular pollutants. We hope to gain in return by illuminating the conceptual similarities among apparently diverse problems. From the time of Professor Pigou, economists have regarded pollution as a problem of externalities. It is not our purpose to suggest that his view of the problem is in error. On the other hand, it is increasingly evident that the traditional remedies proposed for simple cases of market failure may be inadequate to achieve desirable outcomes where matters of pollution are involved. Efforts to deal with these complex and intractable matters may require some form of centralized coordination and control. An approach beyond the usual externalities analysis seems called for. The framework of control theory provides us with insights on the use of mechanisms to direct patterns of consumption and production. The optimal control of pollution may require curtailing certain types of consumption, limiting the use of some productive processes and perhaps even restricting the growth of population. There are strong intertemporal aspects of the pollution problem. They reinforce the relevance of the dynamic approach of control theory. Before proceeding to a formal model, we shall mention three important distinctions that relate to the economic effects of pollutants. The first is whether the pollutant has its major impact on consumption, on production,

Television Programming, Monopolistic Competition, and Welfare

Introduction, 103.—Sources of bias in program selection, 106.—Numbers of programs and audience sizes in equilibrium, 114.—Summary of results and policy, 122.

Symposium: The Economics of Information: Informational Aspects of Market Structure: An Introduction

Types of signaling mechanisms, 593.—Contingent contracts, 593.—Exogenously costly signals, 595.—Conclusions, 597.

Nonlinear prices and welfare

Focuses on the comparison of price and quantity rationing in terms of their capacities to allocate scarce goods. Effect of the price system on income redistribution; Correlation of quantity rationing with nonlinear price schedule; Factors attributing the quantity of rationing. (Из Ebsco)

Competition in Salaries, Credentials, and Signaling Prerequisites for Jobs

I. Introduction, 51. — II. The choice of behavioral hypothesis, 53. — III. Assumptions, 54. — IV. Analysis of equilibria, 55. — V. Comparison with the passive-response equilibria, 63. — VI. Specialized firms, 63. — VII. Equilibria with complementary factors, 66. — VIII. Concluding remarks, 72. — Appendix A: Summary of the passive-response model, 73. — Appendix B: The elimination of dominated, passive equilibria, 73.