Michael Wreen

May the force be with you

This paper is a critical assessment of argumentum ad baculum, or appeal to force. Its principal contention is that, contrary to common opinion, there is no general fallacy of ad baculum. Most real-life ad baculums are, in fact, fairly strong. A basic logical form for reconstructed ad baculums is proposed, and a number of heterodoxical conclusions are also advanced and argued for. They include that ad baculum is not necessarily a prudential argument, that ad baculum need not involve force, violence, or threats, and that one can argue ad baculum to oneself. The starting point of the paper, however, is a critical evaluation of three ad baculums from the exercise sets of Irving Copis well-known Introduction to Logic.

Medical futility and physician discretion

Some patients have no chance of surviving if not treated, but very little chance if treated. A number of medical ethicists and physicians have argued that treatment in such cases is medically futile and a matter of physician discretion. This paper critically examines that position. According to Howard Brody and others, a judgment of medical futility is a purely technical matter, which physicians are uniquely qualified to make. Although Brody later retracted these claims, he held to the view that physicians need not consult the patient or his family to determine their values before deciding not to treat. This is because professional integrity dictates that treatment should not be undertaken. The argument for this claim is that medicine is a profession and a social practice, and thus capable of breaches of professional integrity. Underlying professional integrity are two moral principles, one concerning harm, the other fraud. According to Brody both point to the fact that when the odds of survival are very low treatment is a violation of professional integrity. The details of this skeletal argument are exposed and explained, and the full argument is criticised. On a number of counts, it is found wanting. If anything, professional integrity points to the opposite conclusion.

The definition of euthanasia.

Recent philosophical work on euthanasia has concentrated on moral rather than conceptual issues, but some interest has been taken in the definition of euthanasia, and still more will be in this paper if nowhere else. Besides exploring the many ins and outs of the concept, and providing necessary and sufficient conditions for its application, I hope, in the long run here, to lend a helping hand to those whose main concern is moral issues. It cannot hurt, I figure, and it frequently can help, to know precisely what you are talking about. Rather than critically reviewing the many defective definitions that can be found in the literature a task accomplished in bits and pieces by a number of others anyway I shall be advancing, and partially explaining, my own definition in section I. Then, in the two sections that follow, I would like to take a close look at a carefully worked-out definition that has recently been proffered far and away the most carefully workedout definition in the literature. My main purpose in scrutinizing it, though, is not to criticize it, but to further clarify, explain, and defend my own definition. That accomplished, in sections IV-VI the definition I think correct will be assayed for valuational ores that lie within, if any such there be, and explanations of at least some of the valuational concepts that emerge in the course of the analysis will be attempted.

Nihilism, Relativism, and Engelhardt

This paper is a critical analysis of Tristram Engelhardts attempts to avoid unrestricted nihilism and relativism. The focus of attention is his recent book, The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford University Press, 1996). No substantive or “content-full” bioethics (e.g., that of Roman Catholicism or the Samurai) has an intersubjectively verifiable and universally binding foundation, Engelhardt thinks, for unaided secular reason cannot show that any particular substantive morality (or moral code) is correct. He thus seems to be committed to either nihilism or relativism. The first is the view that there is not even one true or valid moral code, and the second is the view that there is a plurality of true or valid moral codes. However, Engelhardt rejects both nihilism and relativism, at least in unrestricted form. Strictly speaking, he himself is a universalist, someone who believes that there is a single true moral code. Two argumentative strategies are employed by him to fend off unconstrained nihilism and relativism. The first argues that although all attempts to establish a content-full morality on the basis of secular reason fail, secular reason can still establish a content-less, purely procedural morality. Although not content-full and incapable of providing positive direction in life, much less a meaning of life, such a morality does limit the range of relativism and nihilism. The second argues that there is a single true, content-full morality. Grace and revelation, however, are needed to make it available to us; secular reason alone is not up to the task. This second line of argument is not pursued in The Foundations at any length, but it does crop up at times, and if it is sound, nihilism and relativism can be much more thoroughly routed than the first line of argument has it.Engelhardts position and argumentative strategies are exposed at length and accorded a detailed critical examination. In the end, it is concluded that neither strategy will do, and that Engelhardt is probably committed to some form of relativism.

Relativism, Absolutism, and Tolerance

: A common view is that relativism requires tolerance. We argue that there is no deductive relation between relativism and tolerance, but also that relativism is not incompatible with tolerance. Next we note that there is no standard inductive relation between relativism and tolerance—no inductive enumeration, argument to the best explanation, or causal argument links the two. Two inductive arguments of a different sort that link them are then exposed and criticized at length. The first considers relativism from the objective point of view ‘of the universe’, the second from the subjective point of view of the relativist herself. Both arguments fail. There is similarly no deductive relation between absolutism and tolerance—neither entails the other—and no inductive connection of any sort links the two. We conclude that tolerance, whether unlimited or restricted, is independent of both relativism and absolutism. A metaethical theory that says only that there is one true or valid ethical code, or that there is a plurality of equally true or valid ethical codes, tells us nothing about whether we should be tolerant, much less how tolerant we should be.

Look Before You Leap

This paper is a critical analysis of three theories of fallacy, those of Ralph Johnson, of Jaakko Hintikka, and of Robert Fogelin and Timothy Duggan. Although the theories are very different from one another, all oppose the traditional, non‐dialectical view of a fallacy as a mistaken inference. The theories are exposed and explained in detail, and then subjected to critical examination. For a variety of reasons, all are found seriously wanting. The mistakes of each suggest that it is better to stay with the traditional view, at least if suitably refined and qualified.

Proper Names and the Necessity of Identity Statements

An identity statement flanked on both sides with proper names is necessarily true, Saul Kripke thinks, if its true at all. Thus, contrary to the received view – or at least what was, prior to Kripke, the received view – a statement like(A) Hesperus is Phosphorusis necessarily true if, as certainly seems to the the case, its true at all. The received view is that (A) is true but only contingently true, while(B) Hesperus is Hesperuswhich is also true, of course, is necesarily true. Epistemologically, however, both the tradition and Kripke have it that (A) is a posteriori and (B) a priori.There are tensions in Kripkes views concerning (A), though, and ultimately in the views of anyone who holds that (A) is necessary. In this paper I draw attention to some of them and advance an argument for thinking that (A) is contingent.

A Feeling Disputation

This, the latest volume in The Douglas Walton Encyclopedia of Argumentation —well, its starting to look like that, anyway—is primarily concerned with four purported fallacies that involve an appeal to emotion: ad populum, ad misericordiam, ad baculum , and ad hominem. In very rough outline, the layout of the book is this. After some preliminary remarks about the four fallacies in the first chapter, and some remarks about the theoretical framework he will be working with in the second, Walton devotes a chapter apiece to each of the four in the order indicated above. A seventh chapter focuses on “borderline cases,” in which more than one of the so-called fallacies is involved, and an eighth summarizes and refines the findings of earlier chapters. As is obvious, The Place of Emotion is well organized; and, as would be a safe inference for anyone acquainted with any of Waltons work, it is written in a readily accessible and unpretentious style: a plain style, in the best sense of the term. Walton has something to say, and its virtually impossible to miss it—and that independently of the fact that this book, like a number of his others, is somewhat repetitive. The Place of Emotion is one of those rare books that a specialist in a field would find of interest, but that could also be taught in an undergraduate course.

My Kind of Person

Philosophical pleasure canes in about as many shapes and sizes as personal computers do, but one of the keenest pleasures, at least to my way of thinking, is having an article or book actually convince an intelligent reader of an important truth (or at least supposed truth) not previous1y believed. That, however, is as rare as it is satisfying, and anyone who thinks it his/her due dreams, as Spinoza says, with his/her eyes open. P,robably next best is to be taken seriously and read carefully by SUcl1 an intelligent reader, but to be disagreed with nonetheless. And from Evelyn Pluhar, I am happy to say--or happy enough to say--I have been awarded not the brass ring but the tin facsimile of same.

J. Skelly wright and refusal of treatment

This article is a critical analysis of Judge J. Skelly Wrights “Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College.” Wrights paper concerns the refusal of a Mrs. Jones to allow a blood transfusion needed to save her life and Wrights decision, based on a number of social, medical, legal, religious, and psychological facts, to permit the transfusion. The presentation is a close paraphrase of Wrights own case write-up. Critical expositions of five arguments explicitly advanced by Wright for his decision to allow a transfusion are given, as are attempts to track down other justifying reasons he may have had for his decision.