Michiko Sakaki

Gender differences in reward-related decision processing under stress

Recent research indicates gender differences in the impact of stress on decision behavior, but little is known about the brain mechanisms involved in these gender-specific stress effects. The current study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to determine whether induced stress resulted in gender-specific patterns of brain activation during a decision task involving monetary reward. Specifically, we manipulated physiological stress levels using a cold pressor task, prior to a risky decision making task. Healthy men (n = 24, 12 stressed) and women (n = 23, 11 stressed) completed the decision task after either cold pressor stress or a control task during the period of cortisol response to the cold pressor. Gender differences in behavior were present in stressed participants but not controls, such that stress led to greater reward collection and faster decision speed in males but less reward collection and slower decision speed in females. A gender-by-stress interaction was observed for the dorsal striatum and anterior insula. With cold stress, activation in these regions was increased in males but decreased in females. The findings of this study indicate that the impact of stress on reward-related decision processing differs depending on gender.

Age Differences in Brain Activity during Emotion Processing: Reflections of Age-Related Decline or Increased Emotion Regulation?

Despite the fact that physical health and cognitive abilities decline with aging, the ability to regulate emotion remains stable and in some aspects improves across the adult life span. Older adults also show a positivity effect in their attention and memory, with diminished processing of negative stimuli relative to positive stimuli compared with younger adults. The current paper reviews functional magnetic resonance imaging studies investigating age-related differences in emotional processing and discusses how this evidence relates to two opposing theoretical accounts of older adults’ positivity effect. The aging-brain model [Cacioppo et al. in: Social Neuroscience: Toward Understanding the Underpinnings of the Social Mind. New York, Oxford University Press, 2011] proposes that older adults’ positivity effect is a consequence of age-related decline in the amygdala, whereas the cognitive control hypothesis [Kryla-Lighthall and Mather in: Handbook of Theories of Aging, ed 2. New York, Springer, 2009; Mather and Carstensen: Trends Cogn Sci 2005;9:496–502; Mather and Knight: Psychol Aging 2005;20:554–570] argues that the positivity effect is a result of older adults’ greater focus on regulating emotion. Based on evidence for structural and functional preservation of the amygdala in older adults and findings that older adults show greater prefrontal cortex activity than younger adults while engaging in emotion-processing tasks, we argue that the cognitive control hypothesis is a more likely explanation for older adults’ positivity effect than the aging-brain model.

Beyond arousal and valence: the importance of the biological versus social relevance of emotional stimuli.

The present study addressed the hypothesis that emotional stimuli relevant to survival or reproduction (biologically emotional stimuli) automatically affect cognitive processing (e.g., attention, memory), while those relevant to social life (socially emotional stimuli) require elaborative processing to modulate attention and memory. Results of our behavioral studies showed that (1) biologically emotional images hold attention more strongly than do socially emotional images, (2) memory for biologically emotional images was enhanced even with limited cognitive resources, but (3) memory for socially emotional images was enhanced only when people had sufficient cognitive resources at encoding. Neither images’ subjective arousal nor their valence modulated these patterns. A subsequent functional magnetic resonance imaging study revealed that biologically emotional images induced stronger activity in the visual cortex and greater functional connectivity between the amygdala and visual cortex than did socially emotional images. These results suggest that the interconnection between the amygdala and visual cortex supports enhanced attention allocation to biological stimuli. In contrast, socially emotional images evoked greater activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and yielded stronger functional connectivity between the amygdala and MPFC than did biological images. Thus, it appears that emotional processing of social stimuli involves elaborative processing requiring frontal lobe activity.

Emotion Strengthens High-Priority Memory Traces but Weakens Low-Priority Memory Traces

When people encounter emotional events, their memory for those events is typically enhanced. But it has been unclear how emotionally arousing events influence memory for preceding information. Does emotional arousal induce retrograde amnesia or retrograde enhancement? The current study revealed that this depends on the top-down goal relevance of the preceding information. Across three studies, we found that emotional arousal induced by one image facilitated memory for the preceding neutral item when people prioritized that neutral item. In contrast, an emotionally arousing image impaired memory for the preceding neutral item when people did not prioritize that neutral item. Emotional arousal elicited by both negative and positive pictures showed this pattern of enhancing or impairing memory for the preceding stimulus depending on its priority. These results indicate that emotional arousal amplifies the effects of top-down priority in memory formation.

Emotional arousal amplifies the effects of biased competition in the brain

The arousal-biased competition model predicts that arousal increases the gain on neural competition between stimuli representations. Thus, the model predicts that arousal simultaneously enhances processing of salient stimuli and impairs processing of relatively less-salient stimuli. We tested this model with a simple dot-probe task. On each trial, participants were simultaneously exposed to one face image as a salient cue stimulus and one place image as a non-salient stimulus. A border around the face cue location further increased its bottom-up saliency. Before these visual stimuli were shown, one of two tones played: one that predicted a shock (increasing arousal) or one that did not. An arousal-by-saliency interaction in category-specific brain regions (fusiform face area for salient faces and parahippocampal place area for non-salient places) indicated that brain activation associated with processing the salient stimulus was enhanced under arousal whereas activation associated with processing the non-salient stimulus was suppressed under arousal. This is the first functional magnetic resonance imaging study to demonstrate that arousal can enhance information processing for prioritized stimuli while simultaneously impairing processing of non-prioritized stimuli. Thus, it goes beyond previous research to show that arousal does not uniformly enhance perceptual processing, but instead does so selectively in ways that optimizes attention to highly salient stimuli.

Type I error inflation in the traditional by-participant analysis to metamemory accuracy: a generalized mixed-effects model perspective.

In order to examine metacognitive accuracy (i.e., the relationship between metacognitive judgment and memory performance), researchers often rely on by-participant analysis, where metacognitive accuracy (e.g., resolution, as measured by the gamma coefficient or signal detection measures) is computed for each participant and the computed values are entered into group-level statistical tests such as the t test. In the current work, we argue that the by-participant analysis, regardless of the accuracy measurements used, would produce a substantial inflation of Type I error rates when a random item effect is present. A mixed-effects model is proposed as a way to effectively address the issue, and our simulation studies examining Type I error rates indeed showed superior performance of mixed-effects model analysis as compared to the conventional by-participant analysis. We also present real data applications to illustrate further strengths of mixed-effects model analysis. Our findings imply that caution is needed when using the by-participant analysis, and recommend the mixed-effects model analysis.

Semantic self-knowledge and episodic self-knowledge: Independent or interrelated representations?

In this study of the structure of self-knowledge, we examined priming effects for the recall of personal episodes in order to investigate whether abstract trait knowledge and personal episodes are independent mental representations. We found that accessing similar abstract representations of traits facilitated a faster recall of related personal episodes than did accessing irrelevant abstract representations of traits (Experiments 1 and 2), reading a nonword prime (Experiments 2 and 3), accessing knowledge of ones mother (Experiment 3), or accessing semantic knowledge (Experiment 3). Contrary to previous findings, which indicated that abstract trait knowledge is represented independently of related personal episodes (e.g., Klein & Loftus, 1993; Tulving, 1993), our results suggest that abstract trait knowledge is associated with personal episodes, and therefore that semantic self-knowledge is associated with episodic self-knowledge in long-term self-knowledge.

Differential brain activity during emotional versus nonemotional reversal learning

The ability to change an established stimulus–behavior association based on feedback is critical for adaptive social behaviors. This ability has been examined in reversal learning tasks, where participants first learn a stimulus–response association (e.g., select a particular object to get a reward) and then need to alter their response when reinforcement contingencies change. Although substantial evidence demonstrates that the OFC is a critical region for reversal learning, previous studies have not distinguished reversal learning for emotional associations from neutral associations. The current study examined whether OFC plays similar roles in emotional versus neutral reversal learning. The OFC showed greater activity during reversals of stimulus–outcome associations for negative outcomes than for neutral outcomes. Similar OFC activity was also observed during reversals involving positive outcomes. Furthermore, OFC activity is more inversely correlated with amygdala activity during negative reversals than during neutral reversals. Overall, our results indicate that the OFC is more activated by emotional than neutral reversal learning and that OFCs interactions with the amygdala are greater for negative than neutral reversal learning.

Differential Interference Effects of Negative Emotional States on Subsequent Semantic and Perceptual Processing

Past studies have revealed that encountering negative events interferes with cognitive processing of subsequent stimuli. The present study investigates whether negative events affect semantic and perceptual processing differently. Presentation of negative pictures produced slower reaction times than neutral or positive pictures in tasks that require semantic processing, such as natural or man-made judgments about drawings of objects, commonness judgments about objects, and categorical judgments about pairs of words. In contrast, negative picture presentation did not slow down judgments in subsequent perceptual processing (e.g., color judgments about words, size judgments about objects). The subjective arousal level of negative pictures did not modulate the interference effects on semantic or perceptual processing. These findings indicate that encountering negative emotional events interferes with semantic processing of subsequent stimuli more strongly than perceptual processing, and that not all types of subsequent cognitive processing are impaired by negative events.

Thinking about a limited future enhances the positivity of younger and older adults’ recall: support for socioemotional selectivity theory

Compared with younger adults, older adults have a relative preference to attend to and remember positive over negative information. This is known as the “positivity effect,” and researchers have typically evoked socioemotional selectivity theory to explain it. According to socioemotional selectivity theory, as people get older they begin to perceive their time left in life as more limited. These reduced time horizons prompt older adults to prioritize achieving emotional gratification and thus exhibit increased positivity in attention and recall. Although this is the most commonly cited explanation of the positivity effect, there is currently a lack of clear experimental evidence demonstrating a link between time horizons and positivity. The goal of the current research was to address this issue. In two separate experiments, we asked participants to complete a writing activity, which directed them to think of time as being either limited or expansive (Experiments 1 and 2) or did not orient them to think about time in a particular manner (Experiment 2). Participants were then shown a series of emotional pictures, which they subsequently tried to recall. Results from both studies showed that regardless of chronological age, thinking about a limited future enhanced the relative positivity of participants’ recall. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 2 showed that this effect was not driven by changes in mood. Thus, the fact that older adults’ recall is typically more positive than younger adults’ recall may index naturally shifting time horizons and goals with age.