Mihail Chiru

Practice and payment: Determinants of candidate list position in European Parliament elections

This article fills a gap in the literature by explaining list composition and placement of candidates in closed PR (proportional representation) settings. Focusing on the case of Romania in the European elections of June 2009, we rely on an original data set including the sociodemographics, career history and wealth of all 215 candidates from the Romanian parties’ parliamentary lists. The results of our rank-ordered logistic regression indicate that at both the national and the party level the political competitors favour previous political experience and wealth of the candidates in establishing their final list order. Marginal effects of support from successful local branches, gender, age and education are also visible for various political parties.

Determinants of legislative voting loyalty under different electoral systems: Evidence from Romania

Previous research has found mixed evidence regarding the change of parliamentary voting behaviour following electoral reforms. But scholars have not analysed whether the mechanisms by which voting loyalty is elicited matter differently in such cases. Our article fills this gap by investigating the individual variation in voting loyalty across two legislative terms, using a sample of 26 high-stakes roll-call votes. Romania constitutes an ideal setting for such a study due to its recent shift from closed-list proportional representation to single-member districts. Multivariate ordinary least squares models (including all Members of Parliament and including only incumbents) test for the effect of parliamentary experience, party membership duration, parliamentary office, party hopping and district magnitude, while also accounting for demotion and a number of socio-demographic controls. Results indicate that socialisation is less important for Members of Parliament’s voting behaviour after reform, whereas signalling through voting dissent prior to party switching becomes more relevant.

Keeping the Doors Closed: Leadership Selection in Post-Communist Romania

This article is the first systematic exploration of the leadership selection process in the Romanian party system. We use process-tracing and qualitative tools, using data from party statutes and documents of the national conventions. We focus on the parliamentary political parties throughout the entire post-communist period. The analysis shows that nothing has changed at the level of centralization of decision, and inclusiveness with the members’ involvement remaining marginal in all parties. The competitiveness of the internal elections presents a more diverse and dynamic picture. We propose a novel typology for cross-case comparisons that illustrates the association between informal decentralization and increased competitiveness. Second, we advance explanations for the persistence of the “exclusiveness” status quo that take into account intraorganizational, institutional, and exogenous factors.

When voter loyalty fails: party performance and corruption in Bulgaria and Romania

This article identifies the determinants of party loyalty while making a distinction between government and opposition voters within an electoral cycle in the two most recent European Union members (Bulgaria and Romania). Both countries are characterized by the perception of widespread corruption and a general distrust of politicians that are likely to hinder the development of strong ties between citizens and parties. We test the explanatory potential of both traditional and revisionist theories of partisanship, suggesting that perceptions of corruption should be treated as equal to evaluations of actual performance. The statistical analysis of comparative study of electoral systems survey data emphasizes the salience of party performance evaluations for party loyalty. Corruption perceptions are significant predictors of loyalty in the Bulgarian case. Voters in both countries assess critically the performance of their preferred party whether it was part of the government or in opposition. A significant difference arises between government and opposition voters with regard to the predictive potential of identification conceptualized as closeness to a party.

State Resources and Pocket Money: Shortcuts for Party Funding in Romania

This paper is the first systematic attempt to map the evolution of legal regulations concerning campaign finance in post-communist Romania and to link them with corruption practices parties have been engaged in, over the last decade. Our document analysis reveals a general increase in the complexity of the legal framework regulating campaign spending with a positive impact on reducing corruption. Still, many flaws remain which have been intensely exploited by the political parties. Using empirical data, we make an attempt to illustrate the different ways in which the Romanian parties have developed tools to indirectly obtain (and use) state resources for their own electoral purposes. These practices include: partisan tailored transfers of money from the government to own constituencies prior to elections; relying on large-scale patronage to reward party sponsors and activists; as well as making state agencies contribute indirectly to campaign funds under the guise of innocent workshops.

Taking the Short Route Political Parties, Funding Regulations, and State Resources in Romania

This article illustrates how the growing complexity of regulations regarding party funding in post-communist Romania is paralleled by practices employed by political parties in their attempt to gain increased access to state resources. Our document analysis indicate that political parties managed to exploit the weaknesses of the increasingly complex legislative framework. A cyclical process takes places: parties use the existing flaws in the legislation on party funding to indirectly obtain and exploit state resources for their (electoral) purposes, an improved law tackling those shortcomings is passed, but political parties are able to identify other flaws and use them to gain financial benefits. To make the case, we assess comparatively the evolution of legislative provisions and practices employed by political parties over two decades.

Multiple Candidacies and the Role of the Lowest Electoral Tier for Individualized Campaigning

The effects of mixed electoral systems on politicians’ incentives and work in the legislature are most often studied in isolation from the possibly mediating role of campaign behavior. The tier in which a candidate runs might determine a particular style and content of campaigning, more or less party centered and more or less constituency oriented, which in turn could shape how the elected politician will perceive her mandate and act upon it. But what type of campaigning prevails when candidacy in multiple tiers is the rule and the majoritarian element is the dominant component of the mixed electoral system? The present study draws on a survey of 431 candidates in the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary elections and uses linear, logistic regressions and marginal effects to estimate the effect of the above-mentioned electoral system characteristics as well as of organizational and career attributes on campaign norm, constituency-related agenda, and independent campaigning. What appears to matter the most for the degree of campaign individualization is the lowest electoral tier in which the candidate runs, irrespective of her electoral security. The study also reveals the significant effects of two dimensions previously ignored by the literature: the level of nomination and the local politics profile (years of experience and the prospect of holding a dual mandate).

Let’s not risk too much: the selection of party leaders in Romania

1. The Selection of Party Leaders in Contemporary Parliamentary Democracies William P. Cross and Jean-Benoit Pilet 2. The Selection of Party Leaders in the UK Tim Bale and Paul Webb 3. The Selection of Party Leaders in Belgium Jean-Benoit Pilet and Bram Wauters 4. Unanimous, By Acclamation? Party Leadership Selection in Norway Elin Haugsgjerd Allern and Rune Karlsen 5. The Selection of Party Leaders in Austria: Channeling Ambition Effectively Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik and Wolfgang C. Muller 6. Party Leader Selection in Germany Klaus Detterbeck and Ingo Rohlfing 7. The Selection of Party Leaders in Italy Giulia Sandri, Antonella Seddone and Fulvio Venturino 8. The Selection of Party Leaders in Spain Oscar Barbera, Juan Rodriguez-Teruel, Astrid Barrio, and Montse Baras 9. The Selection of Party Leaders in Portugal Marco Lisi and Andre Freire 10. Lets Not Risk Too Much: The Selection of Party Leaders in Romania Mihail Chiru and Sergiu Gherghina 11. Stable Leadership in the Context of Party Change: The Hungarian Case Gabriella Ilonszki and Reka Varnagy 12. Selecting Party Leaders in Israel Ofer Kenig and Gideon Rahat 13. Party Leadership in Canada William P. Cross 14. Leadership Selection in Australia Anika Gauja 15. The Selection of Party Leaders in Comparative Perspective Jean-Benoit Pilet and William P. Cross

The Value of Legislative Versus Electoral Experience and Gender in Explaining Candidate List Placement in Closed-List PR

Candidates’ political qualities and personal characteristics reflect what priorities political parties have when they nominate for viable seats. The limited research on the link between candidate characteristics and ranking on closed lists is an important hiatus in understanding legislative recruitment since in closed list PR nomination to top positions on viable lists virtually guarantees election. We address the issue by analyzing longitudinally the determinants of candidate list placement in Romania, an intriguing case given its low proportion of reelected incumbents and women MPs. Our findings indicate that while male candidates are placed higher up on the lists than women, the positive effect of incumbency is larger for female than male incumbents.

Standing for Reelection Under Different Rules: Evidence from the Romanian Legislature

Perceptions of a political career and the importance given to the parliamentary office drive the desire to seek reelection, but the strength of these factors varies by type of electoral system.