Mikhail Myagkov

The trail of votes in Russia's 1999 Duma and 2000 presidential elections

Abstract Russias array of political parties, based largely on Moscow-centered personalities with presidential aspirations rather than coherent policy programs, continued its seemingly directionless evolution in 1999 with the appearance of two new ‘parties’—Otechestvo and Edinstvo—each designed primarily to facilitate presidential aspirations. In contrast and despite wrenching economic changes, Russia from 1991 through 1996, at least, offers the picture of a surprisingly stable electorate in which the flow of votes across elections from one party or candidate to the next follows a coherent and not altogether unpredictable pattern. Aggregate election returns suggests that this pattern persisted through the 1999 Duma balloting to the 2000 presidential election. The KPRF, as well as Yabloko, won nearly as many votes in 1999 as in 1996, while the votes lost by Our Home Is Russia, the LDPR, Lebeds allies in 1996, and a bevy of other small and not altogether anti-reform parties nearly account for Otechestvo and Edinstvo totals. Here, however, we offer a close examination of official rayon-level election returns from both 1999 and 2000 and conclude that this picture of stability masks the importance we ought to attribute to the influence of regional governors and their abilities to direct the votes of their electorates in a nearly wholesale fashion. We argue, moreover, that this conclusion is important to the matter of reforming Russias institutions so as to encourage a coherent party system. Specifically, rather than focus on electoral institutional reform, we argue that the principal culprit in explaining the failure of a coherent party system to materialize is the influence of Russias super-presidentialism.

Metastasised Fraud in Russia's 2008 Presidential Election

DESPITE THE IMPORTANCE OF DIRECT OBSERVATION of elections in ensuring that a vote is free and fair, there are inherent difficulties associated with relying on this method for rendering a judgment as to a vote’s legitimacy. Aside from the impracticality of having any one organisation monitor tens of thousands of polling stations and thousands of backrooms in which votes are counted and tabulated, the observers themselves often have political agendas that leave their conclusions up to debate and interpretation. This was especially true about Russia’s most recent 2008 contest that saw Dmitri Medvedev, as Vladimir Putin’s hand-picked successor, defeat all opponents with an overwhelming 71.25% of the vote. The observer mission of the somewhat misnamed Commonwealth of Independent States concluded that the election was ‘free, open and transparent’ while the Shanghai Cooperation Association (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) deemed the vote ‘in line with international standards’. The OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) failed to send an observer mission when restrictions placed on it by the Kremlin precluded any meaningful oversight. Meanwhile the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) reported that no major fraud occurred despite its earlier December pre-election critique of the organisation of the 2007 Russian parliamentary vote. On the other side of the coin, Gennady Zyuganov, the perennial standard-bearer of Russia’s Communist Party (Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsiya, KPRF), asserted that ‘falsification of the results to achieve the required percentage

Are the Communists Dying Out in Russia

Many predicted that the strength of the Communist Party in Russia would wane as the elderly pensioners who disproportionately supported the party died off. Contrary to this prediction, the findings of our analysis indicate that voters who reached retirement age during the past decade were even more supportive of the communists than the cohort of pensioners who preceded them. We believe this occurred because it was workers approaching retirement, not pensioners per se, who were disproportionately injured by the transition to a more market-oriented economy. Like pensioners they lost savings, but in many cases they also lost their jobs. They also had little opportunity to learn the new skills that the Russian economy increasingly calls for. There is as yet no indication that the communists have begun to die out.

The value of sociality

Purpose – This paper aims to study the value of sociality. Recent experimental evidence has brought to light that the assumptions of the Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky do not hold in the proposed substantive domain of “sociality”. In particular, the desire to be a part of the social environment, i.e. the environment where individuals make decisions among their peers, is not contingent on the framing. Evolutionary psychologists suggest that humans are “social animals” for adaptive reasons. However, entering a social relationship is inherently risky. Therefore, it is extremely important to know how much people value “sociality”, when the social outcomes are valued more than material outcomes and what kinds of adaptations people use. Design/methodology/approach – We develop a new theory and propose the general utility function that features “sociality” component. We test the theory in the laboratory experiments carried out in several countries. Findings – Our results suggest that when stakes are low...

Ukraine 2010: Were Tymoshenko's Cries of Fraud Anything More Than Smoke?

What evidence is there that Ukraine has made a successful transition to a competitive political system embodying free and fair elections? Several indicators of fraud developed and used previously to assess elections elsewhere are applied to official precinct-level returns of Ukraines 2010 presidential contest. Asking if either candidate benefitted from any significant number of suspicious votes or final tallies, the findings are compared to the third round of Ukraines 2004 presidential vote to assess the free and fair nature of Viktor Yanukovichs 2010 victory over Yulia Tymoshenko. The analysis illustrates how elections can be studied to seek objective assessment of a states democratic legitimacy.

Impact of Short Social Training on Prosocial Behaviors: An fMRI Study

Efficient brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) are in need of knowledge about the human brain and how it interacts, plays games, and socializes with other brains. A breakthrough can be achieved by revealing the microfoundations of sociality, an additional component of the utility function reflecting the value of contributing to group success derived from social identity. Building upon our previous behavioral work, we conduct a series of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments (N = 10 in the Pilot Study and N = 15 in the Main Study) to measure whether and how sociality alters the functional activation of and connectivity between specific systems in the brain. The overarching hypothesis of this study is that sociality, even in a minimal form, serves as a natural mechanism of sustainable cooperation by fostering interaction between brain regions associated with social cognition and those related to value calculation. We use group-based manipulations to induce varying levels of sociality and compare behavior in two social dilemmas: Prisoner’s Dilemma and variations of Ultimatum Game. We find that activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus, a region previously associated with cognitive control and modulation of the valuation system, is correlated with activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) to a greater degree when participants make economic decisions in a game with an acquaintance, high sociality condition, compared to a game with a random individual, low sociality condition. These initial results suggest a specific biological mechanism through which sociality facilitates cooperation, fairness and provision of public goods at the cost of individual gain. Future research should examine neural dynamics in the brain during the computation of utility in the context of strategic games that involve social interaction for a larger sample of subjects.

Sociality as a Natural Mechanism of Public Goods Provision

In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been offered to explain patterns of human behavior in social environments. In particular, these patterns include ‘prosocial’ ones, such as fairness, cooperation, and collective good provision. Psychologists suggest that these prosocial behaviors are driven not by miscalculations, but by salience of social identity, in-group favoritism, emotion, or evolutionary adaptations. This paper imports psychology scholarship into an economic model and results in a sustainable solution to collective action problems without any external enforcement mechanisms. This natural mechanism of public goods provision is created, analyzed, and observed in a controlled laboratory environment using experimental techniques.

The socialization effect on decision making in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An eye-tracking study

We used a mobile eye-tracking system (in the form of glasses) to study the characteristics of visual perception in decision making in the Prisoners Dilemma game. In each experiment, one of the 12 participants was equipped with eye-tracking glasses. The experiment was conducted in three stages: an anonymous Individual Game stage against a randomly chosen partner (one of the 12 other participants of the experiment); a Socialization stage, in which the participants were divided into two groups; and a Group Game stage, in which the participants played with partners in the groups. After each round, the respondent received information about his or her personal score in the last round and the overall winner of the game at the moment. The study proves that eye-tracking systems can be used for studying the process of decision making and forecasting. The total viewing time and the time of fixation on areas corresponding to noncooperative decisions is related to the participants’ overall level of cooperation. The increase in the total viewing time and the time of fixation on the areas of noncooperative choice is due to a preference for noncooperative decisions and a decrease in the overall level of cooperation. The number of fixations on the group attributes is associated with group identity, but does not necessarily lead to cooperative behavior.

Sociality as a defensive response to the threat of loss

Abstract Laboratory research studying behavior in the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game is consistent with the commonplace perception that social exchange is risky. Although they often do cooperate, people also often defect. Thus, the decision to enter a PD game with a stranger, about whom one has no good basis for predicting behavior, is a bet on cooperation. Many investigators have explored a range of cognitive processes and individual differences putatively bearing on the choice to enter such games, but few have asked how people perceive, assess, and respond to social risk in general. That is what we ask here. From the well known finding that people are risk-averse in the domain of gains and risk-tolerant in the domain of losses, we predict that, with game incentives constant, people will be more willing to enter social relationships when game payoffs are framed as losses than when they are framed as gains. We tested this prediction in a student population playing PD games. Results strongly supported the prediction, suggesting that human sociality may have evolved more as a defensive response to the possibility of loss than as an opportunistic attempt to capture gain.

From rationality to cooperativeness: The totally mixed Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

In this research, the social behavior of the participants in a Prisoners Dilemma laboratory game is explained on the basis of the quantal response equilibrium concept and the representation of the game in Markov strategies. In previous research, we demonstrated that social interaction during the experiment has a positive influence on cooperation, trust, and gratefulness. This research shows that the quantal response equilibrium concept agrees only with the results of experiments on cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma prior to social interaction. However, quantal response equilibrium does not explain of participants’ behavior after social interaction. As an alternative theoretical approach, an examination was conducted of iterated Prisoners Dilemma game in Markov strategies. We built a totally mixed Nash equilibrium in this game; the equilibrium agrees with the results of the experiments both before and after social interaction.