Miles Kahler

Network Analysis for International Relations

International relations research has regarded networks as a particular mode of organization, distinguished from markets or state hierarchies. In contrast, network analysis permits the investigation and measurement of network structures -- emergent properties of persistent patterns of relations among agents that can define, enable, and constrain those agents. Network analysis offers both a toolkit for identifying and measuring the structural properties of networks and a set of theories, typically drawn from contexts outside international relations, that relate structures to outcomes. Network analysis challenges conventional views of power in international relations by defining network power in three different ways: access, brokerage, and exit options. Two issues are particularly important to international relations: the ability of actors to increase their power by enhancing and exploiting their network positions, and the fungibility of network power. The value of network analysis in international relations has been demonstrated in precise description of international networks, investigation of network effects on key international outcomes, testing of existing network theory in the context of international relations, and development of new sources of data. Partial or faulty incorporation of network analysis, however, risks trivial conclusions, unproven assertions, and measures without meaning. A three-part agenda is proposed for future application of network analysis to international relations: import the toolkit to deepen research on international networks; test existing network theories in the domain of international relations; and test international relations theories using the tools of network analysis.

Introduction: Legalization and World Politics

In many issue-areas, the world is witnessing a move to law. As the century turned, governments and individuals faced the following international legal actions. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that Britains ban on homosexuals in the armed forces violates the right to privacy, contravening Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia indicted Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic during a NATO bombing campaign to force Yugoslav forces out of Kosovo. Milosevic remains in place in Belgrade, but Austrian police, bearing a secret indictment from the International Criminal Tribunal, arrested a Bosnian Serb general who was attending a conference in Vienna. In economic affairs the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body found in favor of the United States and against the European Union (EU) regarding European discrimination against certain Latin American banana exporters. A U.S. district court upheld the constitutionality of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) against claims that its dispute-resolution provisions violated U. S. sovereignty. In a notable environmental judgment, the new Law of the Sea Tribunal ordered the Japanese to cease all fishing for southern bluefin tuna for the rest of the year.

Governance in a global economy : political authority in transition

List of Contributors vii Acknowledgments xiii Chapter 1: Globalization and Governance by Miles Kahler and David A. Lake 1 Part 1. Globalization and Changing Locations of Governance Chapter 2: The Leverage of Economic Theories: Explaining Governance in an Internationalized Industry by Lisa L. Martin 33 Chapter 3: Political Integration and Disintegration in the Global Economy by Michael J. Hiscox 60 Chapter 4: Globalization and Fiscal Decentralization by Geoffrey Garrett and Jonathan Rodden 87 Chapter 5: Globalization and Demands for Regional Autonomy in Europe by Pieter Van Houten 110 Chapter 6: Monetary Governance in a World of Regional Currencies by Benjamin J. Cohen 136 Chapter 7: Governing Global Financial Markets: International Responses to the Hedge-Fund Problem by Barry Eichengreen 168 Chapter 8: Public and Private Governance in Setting International Standards by Walter Mattli 199 Chapter 9: Globalization and Industry Self-Regulation by Virginia Haufler 226 Part 2. Convergence in National Governance Chapter 10: International Capital Mobility and National Policy Divergence by Ronald Rogowski 255 Chapter 11: Globalization and Policy Diffusion: Explaining Three Decades of Liberalization by Beth A. Simmons and Zachary Elkins 275 Chapter 12: Corporate Governance: Global Markets, National Politics by Peter Gourevitch 305 Chapter 13: Globalization, Institutions, and Convergence: Fiscal Adjustment in Europe by Kathleen R. McNamara 332 Part 3. Democratic Deficits and the Problem of Accountability Chapter 14: Democracy, Accountability, and Rights in Supranational Governance by James A. Caporaso 361 Chapter 15: Redefining Accountability for Global Governance Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 386 Chapter 16: Globalization and Changing Patterns of Political Authority by Miles Kahler and David A. Lake 412 References 439 Index 481

Multilateralism with small and large numbers

Multilateralism, international governance of the “many,†was defined by the United States after 1945 in terms of certain principles, particularly opposition to bilateral and discriminatory arrangements that were believed to enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase international conflict. Postwar multilateralism also expressed an impulse to universality (John Ruggies “generalized organizing principles†) that implied relatively low barriers to participation in these arrangements. A ticket of admission was always required, whether acceding to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or joining the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Nevertheless, the price of that ticket was not set so high that less powerful or less wealthy states could not hope to participate.

Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case

The Asia-Pacific region offers an example of low legalization of regional institutions and perhaps an explicit aversion to legalization. An examination of three key regional institutions—ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), and the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum)—confirms a regional process of institution building without legalization. Recent developments in these institutions permit some discrimination among competing explanations for low legalization. On the one hand, ASEAN has embraced a legalized dispute-settlement mechanism; Asian governments have also employed legalized global institutions. On the other hand, the ARF and APEC continue to resist clear-cut legal obligations and third-party dispute resolution. This pattern suggests that legalization is best viewed as driven by the demands of economic integration and as a strategic response by governments in particular institutional settings. These explanations undermine alternatives based on domestic legal culture and uniformly high sovereignty costs. The Asian economic crisis has reopened a debate over regional institutions, which may fix on legalization as part of a new regional institutional design.

Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization

The intersection of law and politics provides tentative answers for two questions: First, why, among the variety of institutional forms available to governments, are legalized institutions preferred in some contexts and not in others? Second, what are the consequences of legalization? Explanations for variation in legalization are directed to the supply of legalized institutions, grounded in the preferences of the most powerful states. Those preferences are shaped, in turn, by domestic political demands for legalization as well as unanticipated domestic political dynamics that can increase legalization over time. Domestic political demands for legalization have increased as a result of international economic integration; the effects of democratization have been more ambiguous. Outside the industrialized democracies, the intersection of supply and demand is often different: supply of legalized institutions is lower and sovereignty costs are often higher. The authors in this special issue examine three important consequences of legalization: its effects on government compliance with international agreements, its impact on the evolution of international norms, and the conditions under which it will harden and spread. In each case, domestic political links are central to the effects of legalization. International agreements and institutions that are legalized, compared with those that are not, seem to be more deeply rooted in domestic politics: their existence often draws on both anticipated and unanticipated actions by domestic actors; their consequences are shaped by domestic characteristics and constituencies.

Rising powers and global governance: negotiating change in a resilient status quo

Economic convergence of the large emerging economies (Brazil, China and India) on the incumbent industrialized economic powers has produced divergent predictions: rising powers are viewed as challengers of existing global governance or nascent supporters of the status quo. The preferences of rising powers, as revealed in global economic negotiations and international security regimes, indicate that they are moderate reformers that seek greater influence within existing forums and also attempt to safeguard their policy-making autonomy. Even if their preferences change, the translation of growing economic weight into usable capabilities is not automatic. Domestic political constraints often make the mobilization of capabilities difficult in international bargaining. Strategies of collective action, whether South-South or regional, have not yet produced a consistent increase in bargaining power at the global level. The counter-strategies of delay and cooptation implemented by the incumbent powers have maintained incumbent influence and enhanced the legitimacy of existing global governance institutions. Risks of conflict remain along three negotiating divides: system friction, distributional conflict and institutional efficiency. Institutional innovations such as greater transparency, institutional flexibility and construction of informal transnational networks may provide modest insurance against a weakening of global governance and its institutions.

Economic security in an era of globalization: definition and provision

Abstract Globalization has undermined the traditional definition of economic security that centered on economic vulnerability to other states. At the same time, globalization has produced a redefinition of economic security in light of the risks posed by cross-border networks of non-state actors and by the economic volatility of the new global environment. The relationship between economic globalization and undesirable economic and political outcomes must be specified precisely and assessed carefully, however. Judgements about economic security must weigh the effects of increased volatility introduced by globalization against the benefits of improved economic performance in the longer run. Institutions can offset economic insecurity through the provision of insurance, shoring up policy credibility, and guiding adaptation to the new environment. National institutions will remain central to the provision of economic security under conditions of globalization. Regional and global institutions can complement one another (and national institutions) in their alleviation of the new economic insecurity. Although some regional institutions drifted in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, new regional alternatives have emerged that promise to stake out new modalities of economic security.

Asia and the Reform of Global Governance

Asias growing economic weight in the world economy is unlikely to produce substantial changes in global economic governance. National economic capabilities are not easily translated into influence over governance outcomes or institutions. Governments must deploy strategies of engagement with key institutions; incumbent powers will attempt counterstrategies. Coalition-building within and outside the region confronts substantial obstacles that reduce Asias bargaining leverage. Asian preferences over institutional design and policies are unlikely to diverge from the status quo. A more pessimistic scenario includes resistance to global surveillance, spillover from other issue-areas, and defensive regionalism that undermines global institutions.

Organization and Cooperation: International Institutions and Policy Coordination

Systems of policy coordination since 1945 may be classified as rule-governed systems relying on decentralized national decisions (a stylized Bretton Woods system) or discretionary bargaining in which coordination decisions are taken collectively at the international level (e.g. world economic summits). The European Monetary System combines elements of these two models. National attachments to rules cannot be explained solely by the strength of international institutions. A discretionary bargaining model of coordination is more likely to be successful when national leaders share a policy diagnosis that both cuts across economic issue areas and divides their own domestic political coalitions and governments. International organizations may facilitate policy coordination under a rule-based system through provision of resources to ease adjustment costs and rule clarification, and in a discretionary bargaining system by brokering, providing information and model building.