Mira Ariel

Referring and Accessibility.

The analysis of referring expressions can be divided into two branches for our purposes. The first includes theories of definite descriptions and proper names. The key to the riddle of the appropriate use of such expressions, it was thought, is the notion of presupposition: existence and/or uniqueness. Indeed, this was the question that dominated the literature for many years, starting with the early philosophical analyses of Frege (1982), Russell (1919) and Strawson (1956, 1964), and ending with the much later pragmatically oriented linguistic analyses, such as Liberman (1973), Kempson (1975), Prince (1978, 1981b), Gazdar (1979), McCawley (1979), Hawkins (1974, 1984) and even Loftus (1972, 1974, 1975), although this last approach is more psychological. The second branch of research totally neglected the question of presupposition. Non-syntactic/semantic theories of anaphoric expressions, pronouns especially, were psychologically oriented, and hence saw the issue to be accounted for quite differently. In fact, the objective of these theories has been to elucidate processing procedures by examining anaphoric expressions, rather than to make claims about anaphoric expressions as such.

The function of accessibility in a theory of grammar

Abstract Ariel (1985, 1988) has argued that discourse anaphora is determined by reference to the notion of accessibility in memory storage. Under the assumption that mental representations (specifically those of NPs) are accessible to addressees in varying degrees, the claim is that speakers choose between referring expressions so as to mark such accessibility differences for the addressees convenience. Thus, different referring expressions (e.g., definite descriptions, demonstrative pronouns, pronouns) mark different degrees of accessibility. Definite descriptions mark relatively low accessibility, demonstrative pronouns and pronouns mark relatively higher degrees of accessibility. The linguistic coding of degrees of accessibility is claimed to derive from three universal principles: Informativity, Rigidity and Attenuation, such that more informative, less ambiguous and more highly pronounced, longer forms retrieve less accessible referents. This article argues that precisely the same mechanism is responsible for the distribution of sentential anaphoric expressions. I focus on Hebrew zero/pronoun choices, which are realised in a variety of forms and inflectional morphemes. The conclusion is that both intuitive grammaticality judgments and distributional patterns in texts corroborate the accessibility claim. Thus, the richly informative, rigid and fully articulated 1st and 2nd person pronouns mark relatively low accessibility. The present tense inflection, which is uninformative, ambiguous and attenuated, marks an extremely high degree of accessibility. Other markers are used for a variety of intermediate degrees of accessibility.

Pragmatics and Grammar

1. Introduction: grammar, pragmatics and whats between them Part I. Drawing the Grammar/Pragmatics Divide: 2. Distinguishing the grammatical and the extragrammatical: referential expressions 3. Distinguishing codes, explicated, implicated and truth-compatible inferences Part II. Crossing the Extralinguistic-Linguistic Divide: 4. Grammar, pragmatics and arbitrariness 5. All paths lead to the salient discourse pattern 6. The rise (and potential fall) of reflexive pronouns Part III. Bringing Grammar and Pragmatics Back Together: 7. Grammar/pragmatics interfaces.

Accessibility Marking: Discourse Functions, Discourse Profiles, and Processing Cues.

When accounting for the usage of some linguistic form, one can refer to its discourse profile, all concomitant features frequently co-occurring with that form in discourse, or abstract a more general claim about its discourse function, referring only to the necessary and sufficient conditions for the proper occurrence of the form. This article discusses discourse profile and discourse function approaches to referring expressions in linguistic and psycholinguistic research. Focusing on English prenominal possessive noun phrases (NPs, e.g., my career), I argue that although their (prototypical) discourse profile is amenable to clearly defined automatic processing or production cues, and to explaining potential grammaticizations, only their discourse functions can account for all the forms actually attested in discourse. I conclude that both types of accounts are linguistically relevant, and I propose that psycholinguists devise experiments to test the three hypotheses outlined (discourse profiles, discourse functions, and a combination of discourse profiles and discourse functions).

The demise of a unique concept of literal meaning

Literal meaning has been defined as linguistic meaning, i.e., as nonfigurative, coded, fully compositional, context-invariant, explicit, and truth conditional (Katz, Jerrold J., 1977. Propositional structure and illocutionary force. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell). Nonliteral meaning is seen as its counterpart, i.e., as extralinguistic, figurative, indirect, inferred, noncompositional, context-dependent, and cancelable. I argue that the requirements made on literal meaning conflict with each other (e.g., coded vs. truth condtional; figurative vs. coded; inferred vs. literal). I then propose to replace the one concept of literal meaning with three concepts of minimal meanings. Each, I argue, reflects a different respect in which a meaning can be minimal. A meaning can be minimal because it is coded, compositional, and contextinvariant—the linguistic meaning. A meaning can be minimal because psycholinguistically it is the one foremost on our mind—Giora’s (Giora, Rachel, 1997. Understanding figurative and literal language: The graded salience hypothesis. Cognitive Linguistics 8: 183–206.) salient meaning. And a meaning can be minimal because it is the privileged interactional interpretation communicated, namely what the speaker is seen as bound by, what constitutes her relevant contribution to the discourse (Ariel, Mira, 2002. Privileged interactional interpretations. Journal of Pragmatics, in press). # 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

THE DISCOURSE FUNCTIONS OF GIVEN INFORMATION

Givenness is a very crucial discourse notion. Apart from being the condition of use imposed on quite a few linguistic forms (definite NPs, presuppositions, anaphoric expressions, gaps, etc.), it can be correlated with specific discourse functions. Giveness markers indicate to the addressee that he has to retrieve some information from memory. Moreover, these markers are specialized as to memory type, so that addressee is instructed where to search for the entity. However, we cannot claim one unique function for all Given material. Specifically, Given NPs are used to form successful acts of referring. Given VPs create local cohesive ties. Given clauses guide the addressee as to the relevance of the main assertion it is attached to. Whole Given utterances are presented in order to persuade the addressee to accept other speakers assertions.

Privileged interactional interpretations

Abstract I have elsewhere argued ( Ariel, 2002 ) against the assumption that we can identify one literal meaning per sentence. Instead, I have suggested that there are (at least) three types of minimal meanings, each differently motivated. One implicit motivation behind the classical definition of literal meaning (Grices ‘what is said’) is a wish to capture the core content of sentences. I here examine discourse in order to characterize this type of minimal meaning, which I term ‘privileged interactional interpretation’. Privileged interactional interpretations constitute what the speaker is taken to be truthfully or sincerely committed to. Crucially, they also constitute the speakers relevant contribution to the discourse. I argue that Sperber and Wilsons (1986b/1995) explicatures (linguistic meanings enriched up to full propositionality) are commonly perceived as privileged interactional interpretations, but not invariably so. Interlocutors pick both less enriched meanings (enriched but incomplete propositions, irrelevant unenriched linguistic meanings) and more enriched meanings (particularized and generalized conversational implicatures) as their privileged interactional interpretations. Thus, no single formula of meaning representation (be it linguistic meaning, ‘what is said’, explicature, implicature, conveyed meaning) can define a privileged interactional interpretation appropriate for all occasions.

Retrieving propositions from context: Why and how

Abstract Retrieving from context is an essential part of discourse interpretation. According to Relevance theory, it is a precondition on the establishment of utterance Relevance. This paper analyzes the system of marking syntactically independent propositions as background for other, usually adjacent utterances. The propositions thus modified are those which are assumed to be accessible to the addressee, and are presented in order to support an original proposition.

Revisiting the typology of pragmatic interpretations

Abstract Pragmatic inferences are essential to understanding speakers’ communicative intentions. I here revisit the typology of pragmatic inferences and minimally revise it by incorporating into it additional distinctions. Inspired by Recanati’s (1991 [1989]) availability principle, I develop Bach’s (1994b) indirect-quote test into a battery of faithful-report tests, distinguishing between inferences on discoursal grounds. The result is that what were initially analyzed as conversational implicatures by Grice are split not only into the relevance-theoretic (Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]) explicated and implicated inferences but also into strong implicatures, background assumptions (Searle 1978), and truth-compatible inferences (Ariel 2004). In addition, Grice’s (1989) “as if to say” representations, which I define as provisional explicatures, are restricted to what I term two-tier uses (as in ironic and playful uses, but not in “normal” nonliterality cases).

Centering, accessibility and the next mention

Producing and interpreting natural language, reference included, relies on linguistic codes and pragmatic inferences. Can’t have one without the other. Moreover, the classical Gricean view, whereby inferences only come in late to “clean up” after grammar has done its duty, has given way to a view where addressees are constantly engaged in predicting what’s ahead. The role of this pragmatic work in reference is the focus of Kehler and Rohde’s research. Kehler and Rohde propose a complementary division of labor between coherence-based prior predictions regarding next-mention subjects and a linguistic account for the referring expressions chosen for these subjects. They argue that neither a coherencebased theory (Hobbs, 1979 and onwards), nor a linguistic theory (they discuss Centering theory, Grosz et al., 1995) can do it alone. I couldn’t agree more. Still, accepting Kehler and Rohde’s division of labor, my goal here is to propose that unlike Accessibility theory (Ariel, 1990, 2001 inter alia), Centering theory is not complex enough to account for referential forms (1), and similarly, that the Hobbsian coherence predictions are not enough to account for next-subject mention biases (2). A study of natural discourse is needed before we can establish next-mention predictions (3).