Mohan Matthen

Seeing, Doing, and Knowing

Seeing, doing, and knowing , Seeing, doing, and knowing , کتابخانه دیجیتال و فن آوری اطلاعات دانشگاه امام صادق(ع)

Hearing impairment and cognitive energy: the Framework for Understanding Effortful Listening (FUEL)

The Fifth Eriksholm Workshop on “Hearing Impairment and Cognitive Energy” was convened to develop a consensus among interdisciplinary experts about what is known on the topic, gaps in knowledge, the use of terminology, priorities for future research, and implications for practice. The general term cognitive energy was chosen to facilitate the broadest possible discussion of the topic. It goes back to Titchener (1908) who described the effects of attention on perception; he used the term psychic energy for the notion that limited mental resources can be flexibly allocated among perceptual and mental activities. The workshop focused on three main areas: (1) theories, models, concepts, definitions, and frameworks; (2) methods and measures; and (3) knowledge translation. We defined effort as the deliberate allocation of mental resources to overcome obstacles in goal pursuit when carrying out a task, with listening effort applying more specifically when tasks involve listening. We adapted Kahneman’s seminal (1973) Capacity Model of Attention to listening and proposed a heuristically useful Framework for Understanding Effortful Listening (FUEL). Our FUEL incorporates the well-known relationship between cognitive demand and the supply of cognitive capacity that is the foundation of cognitive theories of attention. Our FUEL also incorporates a motivation dimension based on complementary theories of motivational intensity, adaptive gain control, and optimal performance, fatigue, and pleasure. Using a three-dimensional illustration, we highlight how listening effort depends not only on hearing difficulties and task demands but also on the listener’s motivation to expend mental effort in the challenging situations of everyday life.

Selection and causation

We have argued elsewhere that natural selection is not a cause of evolution, and that a resolution‐of‐forces (or vector addition) model does not provide us with a proper understanding of how natural selection combines with other evolutionary influences. These propositions have come in for criticism recently, and here we clarify and defend them. We do so within the broad framework of our own ‘hierarchical realization model’ of how evolutionary influences combine.

Taxonomy, Polymorphism, and History: An Introduction to Population Structure Theory*

Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) theory suggests that species and other biological taxa consist of organisms that share certain similarities. HPC theory acknowledges the existence of Darwinian variation within biological taxa. The claim is that “homeostatic mechanisms” acting on the members of such taxa nonetheless ensure a significant cluster of similarities. The HPC theorist’s focus on individual similarities is inadequate to account for stable polymorphism within taxa, and fails properly to capture their historical nature. A better approach is to treat distributions of traits in species populations as irreducible facts, explained in terms of selection pressures, genealogy, and other evolutionary factors. We call this view Population Structure Theory (PST). PST accommodates the view, implicit in biological systematics, that species are identified by reference to particular historical populations.

Drift and “Statistically Abstractive Explanation”*

A hitherto neglected form of explanation is explored, especially its role in population genetics. “Statistically abstractive explanation” (SA explanation) mandates the suppression of factors probabilistically relevant to an explanandum when these factors are extraneous to the theoretical project being pursued. When these factors are suppressed, the explanandum is rendered uncertain. But this uncertainty traces to the theoretically constrained character of SA explanation, not to any real indeterminacy. Random genetic drift is an artifact of such uncertainty, and it is therefore wrong to reify it as a cause of evolution or as a process in its own right.

The Pleasure of Art

ABSTRACT This paper presents a new account of the pleasure we take in art. It distinguishes first between two types of pleasure. Relief or r-pleasure is transient and marks the end of a state that is difficult to maintain. Facilitation or f-pleasure accompanies an activity and lasts as long as the activity does. It motivates this activity and optimizes it by activating a suite of preparations and modes of acting specific to the activity. Aesthetic pleasure is a distinct form of f-pleasure. It arises from mental engagement with an object, and motivates and optimizes such engagement by activating a nexus specific to it. Aesthetic pleasure acts in two ways. In the short run, when we are in contact with a particular artefact, it keeps aesthetic engagement running smoothly. Over longer periods, it plays a critical role in shaping how we engage with objects to get this kind of pleasure from them. This account is yoked to a broadly functional understanding of art: it is not the nature of the object that makes it art, but the nature of the response that it is designed to elicit. The view does not, however, rest on individual psychology alone, as some other functional accounts do. Crucially, it is argued that shared cultural context is a key determinant of the pleasure we derive from aesthetic artefacts. The pleasure of art is always communal and communicative.

Effort and Displeasure in People Who Are Hard of Hearing.

Listening effort helps explain why people who are hard of hearing are prone to fatigue and social withdrawal. However, a one-factor model that cites only effort due to hardness of hearing is insufficient as there are many who lead happy lives despite their disability. This article explores other contributory factors, in particular motivational arousal and pleasure. The theory of rational motivational arousal predicts that some people forego listening comprehension because they believe it to be impossible and hence worth no effort at all. This is problematic. Why should the listening task be rated this way, given the availability of aids that reduce its difficulty? Two additional factors narrow the explanatory gap. First, we separate the listening task from the benefit derived as a consequence. The latter is temporally more distant, and is discounted as a result. The second factor is displeasure attributed to the listening task, which increases listening cost. Many who are hard of hearing enjoy social interaction. In such cases, the actual activity of listening is a benefit, not a cost. These people also reap the benefits of listening, but do not have to balance these against the displeasure of the task. It is suggested that if motivational harmony can be induced by training in somebody who is hard of hearing, then the obstacle to motivational arousal would be removed. This suggests a modified goal for health care professionals. Do not just teach those who are hard of hearing how to use hearing assistance devices. Teach them how to do so with pleasure and enjoyment.

Our Knowledge of Colour

Scientists are often bemused by the efforts of philosophers essaying a theory of colour: colour science sports a huge array of facts and theories, and it is unclear to its practitioners what philosophy can or is trying to contribute. Equally, philosophers tend to be puzzled about how they can fit colour science into their investigations without compromising their own disciplinary identity: philosophy is supposed to be an a priori investigation; philosophers do not work in psychophysics labs -not in their professional capacity, anyway. These inter-disciplinary barriers arise out of misunderstanding. Philosophers should not so much attempt to contribute to empirical theories of colour, as to formulate philosophical theories of colour. Philosophy is concerned with appearance and reality, object and property, function and representation, and other such fundamental categories of ontology and epistemology. Philosophical theories attempt to fit colour into these categories; such theories do not compete with colour science. However, fitting colour into philosophical theories means dealing with colour as it really isand one cannot know what it is without consulting the psychologists. That is why philosophers need an up-to-date understanding of psychological theories of colour. Equally, psychologists, who typically show a keen interest in questions concerning the reality and know ability of colour, and who are capable of devising clever experiments to discover whether colour fits this or that specification of reality, know ability, etc., need to base their opinions on sound philosophical practice. Their opinions too are worth very little when they misuse fundamental philosophical categories.

Debunking enactivism: a critical notice of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism

In this review of Hutto and Myins Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice and action.

Perception, Relativism, and Truth: Reflections on Plato's Theaetetus 152–160

My purpose in this paper is to investigate the ontological structure of the theory that Plato ascribes to Protagoras in the Theaetetus (152–160). My interest is not just historical—what I wish to do is to explore the contemporary significance of Platos Protagorean thesis, especially with regard to the theory of truth and the theory of perception. Even so, I shall attempt to say quite a lot about the text—I think that certain recent interpreters (especially M. F. Burnyeat [1982]) are on the wrong track with regard to Protagorean relativism, precisely due to their misjudging the relation of the Theaetetus doctrine to more recent philosophy.