Nivedita Gangopadhyay

The dialogically extended mind: Language as skilful intersubjective engagement

Abstract A growing conceptual and empirical literature is advancing the idea that language extends our cognitive skills. One of the most influential positions holds that language – qua material symbols – facilitates individual thought processes by virtue of its material properties ( Clark, 2006a ). Extending upon this model, we argue that language enhances our cognitive capabilities in a much more radical way: the skilful engagement of public material symbols facilitates evolutionarily unprecedented modes of collective perception, action and reasoning (interpersonal synergies) creating dialogically extended minds. We relate our approach to other ideas about collective minds ( Gallagher, 2011 , Theiner et al., 2010 , Tollefsen, 2006 ) and review a number of empirical studies to identify the mechanisms enabling the constitution of interpersonal cognitive systems.

The future of social cognition: paradigms, concepts and experiments

Since the publication of Premack and Woodruff’s classic paper introducing the notion of a ‘theory of mind’ (Premack and Woodruff in Behav Brain Sci 1(4):515–526, 1978), interdisciplinary research in social cognition has witnessed the development of theory–theory, simulation theory, hybrid approaches, and most recently interactionist and perceptual accounts of other minds. The challenges that these various approaches present for each other and for research in social cognition range from adequately defining central concepts to designing experimental paradigms for testing empirical hypotheses. But is there any approach that promises to dominate future interdisciplinary research in social cognition? Is social cognition witnessing a gradual paradigm shift where hitherto grounding notions such as theory of mind are no longer viewed as explanatorily necessary? Or have we simply lost our way in attempting to devise adequate experimental setups that could sway the debate in favour of one of the contending accounts? This special issue addresses these questions in an attempt to discover what the future holds for interdisciplinary research in social cognition.

Alvin I. GoldmanSimulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading

Alvin I. Goldman’s Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading is a major contribution from a philosopher to the interdisciplinary debate on how we attribute mental states to others and to ourselves. It covers an impressive range of topics in mindreading as discussed in philosophy of mind, developmental and social psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. Goldman tackles the complex issues in mindreading in 11 chapters beginning with an overview of the philosophical and scientific approaches in the field. He goes on to introduce his conceptualization of a simulation theory of mindreading and declares his preference for a hybrid theory which combines elements of simulation, theorizing and projection for purposes of mindreading (Chapter 2). A generic conception of simulation is presented as follows: Process P simulates process P0 if, by definition, P duplicates, replicates, or resembles P0 in some significant respect and in doing so fulfils a purpose or function (p. 37). Goldman is careful to avoid a collapse of his hybrid theory into more theoretical approaches of mindreading which champion the role of theoretical reasoning about mental processes in an account of mentalizing. By way of replying to Dennett’s contention of an unavoidable collapse of simulation theory into the traditional theory–theory approach, Goldman introduces a much-needed contrast between processand theory-driven simulation. When a system attempts to simulate another fundamentally different system it requires an adequate theory about the processes which are used in Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 62 (2011), 437–441