Monika Undorf

Judgments of learning reflect encoding fluency: conclusive evidence for the ease-of-processing hypothesis.

According to the ease-of-processing hypothesis, judgments of learning (JOLs) rely on the ease with which items are committed to memory during encoding--that is, encoding fluency. Conclusive evidence for this hypothesis does not yet exist because encoding fluency and item difficulty have been confounded in all previous studies. To disentangle the effects of encoding fluency and item difficulty on JOLs, we used a variant of the learner-observer-judge method in which participants observed the study phase of another participant and indicated his or her JOLs. At the same time, the to-be-studied word pairs were concealed by strings of symbols. Our experiment revealed that participants use self-paced study time as a cue for JOLs when they themselves have studied and recalled word pairs before. This metacognitive monitoring of study time provides strong support for the ease-of-processing hypothesis.

The relatedness effect on judgments of learning: A closer look at the contribution of processing fluency.

The cue-utilization view to judgments of learning (JOLs) assumes that both ease of processing during study and people’s beliefs about memory may contribute to people’s predictions on the likelihood of remembering recently studied information. However, a recent study (Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(2), 378–384, 2013; Experiment 3) found that processing fluency does not contribute to the effect of pair relatedness on JOLs, that is, to higher JOLs for related paired associates as compared to unrelated paired associates. We investigated whether this finding primarily depends on specific aspects of the paired associates employed or on the measure of processing fluency used in the previous study. In our first two experiments, participants therefore studied lists with (a) uniformly high associative strengths versus (b) a wide range of associative strengths. Results showed that processing disfluency—operationalized as number of trials to acquisition in Experiment 1 and as self-paced study time in Experiment 2—partially mediated the effect of relatedness on JOLs for both types of lists. Finally, in Experiment 3, the contribution of processing fluency to the relatedness effect increased with study-test experience. Unlike Mueller et al., we thus found that processing fluency contributes to the relatedness effect on JOLs. These findings are consistent with the assumption that ease of processing is an important basis for JOLs.

Separation of encoding fluency and item difficulty effects on judgements of learning

The fluency of information encoding has frequently been discussed as a major determinant of predicted memory performance indicated by judgements of learning (JOLs). Previous studies established encoding fluency effects on JOLs. However, it is largely unknown whether fluency takes effect above and beyond the effects of item difficulty. We therefore tested whether encoding fluency still affects JOLs when numerous additional cues indicating the difficulty of an item are available as well. In three experiments, participants made JOLs for another participant while observing his or her self-paced study phase. However, study times were swapped in one experimental condition, so that items with short study times (indicating high fluency) were presented for long durations, whereas items with long study times (indicating low fluency) were presented for short durations. Results showed that both item difficulty and encoding fluency affected JOLs. Thus, encoding fluency in itself is indeed an important cue for JOLs that does not become redundant when difficulty information is available in addition. This observation lends considerable support to the ease-of-processing hypothesis.

The Four-States Model of Memory Retrieval Experiences

Abstract. A memory measurement model is presented that accounts for judgments of remembering, knowing, and guessing in old-new recognition tasks by assuming four disjoint latent memory states: recollection, familiarity, uncertainty, and rejection. This four-states model can be applied to both Tulvings (1985) remember-know procedure (RK version) and Gardiner and coworkers (Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996; Gardiner, Richardson-Klavehn, & Ramponi, 1997) remember-know-guess procedure (RKG version). It is shown that the RK version of the model fits remember-know data approximately as well as the one-dimensional signal detection model does. In contrast, the RKG version of the four-states model outperforms the corresponding detection model even if unequal variances for old and new items are allowed for.We show empirically that the two versions of the four-statesmodelmeasure the same state probabilities. However, the RKG version, requiring remember-know-guess judgments, provides parameter estimates w...

The puzzle of study time allocation for the most challenging items

Learners often allocate more study time to challenging items than to easier ones. Nevertheless, both predicted and actual memory performance are typically worse for difficult than for easier items. The resulting inverse relations between people’s predictions of their memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs) and self-paced study time (ST) are often explained by bottom-up, data-driven ST allocation that is based on fluency. However, we demonstrate robust inverted U-shaped relations between JOLs and ST that cannot be explained by data-driven ST allocation alone. Consequently, we explored how two models of top-down, strategic ST allocation account for curvilinear JOL-ST relations. First, according to the Region of Proximal Learning model, people stop quickly on items for which they experience too little progress in learning. Second, according to the Diminishing Criterion Model, people set a time limit and stop studying when this time limit is reached. In three experiments, we manipulated motivation with different methods and examined which model best described JOL-ST relations. Consistent with the Diminishing Criterion Model but not with the Region of Proximal Learning model, results revealed that curvilinearity was due to people setting a time limit.

Metamemory and memory for a wide range of font sizes: What is the contribution of perceptual fluency?

Words printed in a larger 48-point font are judged to be more memorable than words printed in a smaller 18-point font, although font size does not affect actual memory. To clarify the basis of this font size effect on metamemory and memory, 4 experiments investigated how presenting words in 48 (Experiment 1) or 4 (Experiments 2 to 4) font sizes between 6 point and 500 point affected judgments of learning (JOLs) and recall performance. Response times in lexical decision tasks were used to measure perceptual fluency. In all experiments, perceptual fluency was lower for words presented in very small and very large font sizes than for words presented in intermediate font sizes. In contrast, JOLs increased monotonically with font size, even beyond the point where a large font impaired perceptual fluency. Assessments of people’s metacognitive beliefs about font size revealed that the monotonic increase in JOLs was not due to beliefs masking perceptual fluency effects (Experiment 3). Also, JOLs still increased across the whole range of font sizes when perceptual fluency was made salient at study (Experiment 4). In all experiments but Experiment 4, recall performance increased with increasing font size, although to a lesser extent than JOLs. Overall, the current study supports the idea that metacognitive beliefs underlie font size effects in metamemory. As important, it reveals that people’s font size beliefs have some accuracy.

Intuition and metacognition: The effect of semantic coherence on judgments of learning

The idea that two distinct modes of thought affect human cognition and behavior has received considerable attention in psychology. In the domain of metacognition, it is assumed that metacognitive judgments are based on both nonanalytic, experience-based processes and analytic, theory-based processes. This study examined whether the experience-based process of intuition underlies people’s predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs). In four experiments, people made JOLs and took a test on compound remote associates, that is, groups of 3 words that were either remote associates of a single solution word (coherent triads) or had no common associate (incoherent triads). Previous research has shown that increased fluency of processing coherent triads produces brief positive affects that may underlie judgments. In all experiments, JOLs were higher for coherent than for incoherent triads. The same was true for recognition memory and free recall performance. Moreover, Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that coherent triads were processed more fluently (i.e., read more quickly) than incoherent triads. Finally, Experiments 3 and 4 showed that the effect of semantic coherence on JOLs occurred for participants who were aware and unaware of relations between all three triad words, but was more pronounced for aware participants. In sum, this study demonstrates that intuition impacts JOLs over and above theory-based processes.

Simultaneous utilization of multiple cues in judgments of learning

There is much evidence that metacognitive judgments, such as people’s predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning, JOLs), are inferences based on cues and heuristics. However, relatively little is known about whether and when people integrate multiple cues in one metacognitive judgment or focus on a single cue without integrating further information. The current set of experiments systematically addressed whether and to what degree people integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. Experiment 1 varied two cues: number of study presentations (1 vs. 2) and font size (18 point vs. 48 point). Results revealed that people integrated both cues in their JOLs. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the two word characteristics concreteness (abstract vs. concrete) and emotionality (neutral vs. emotional) were integrated in JOLs. Experiment 3 showed that people integrated all four cues in their JOLs when manipulated simultaneously. Finally, Experiment 4 confirmed integration of three cues that varied on a continuum rather than in two easily distinguishable levels. These results demonstrate that people have a remarkable capacity to integrate multiple cues in metacognitive judgments. In addition, our findings render an explanation of cue effects on JOLs in terms of demand characteristics implausible.

Do Judgments of Learning Predict Automatic Influences of Memory

Current memory theories generally assume that memory performance reflects both recollection and automatic influences of memory. Research on peoples predictions about the likelihood of remembering recently studied information on a memory test, that is, on judgments of learning (JOLs), suggests that both magnitude and resolution of JOLs are linked to recollection. However, it has remained unresolved whether JOLs are also predictive of automatic influences of memory. This issue was addressed in 3 experiments. Using the process-dissociation procedure, we assessed the predictive accuracy of immediate and delayed JOLs (Experiment 1) and of immediate JOLs from a first and from a second study-test cycle (Experiments 2 and 3) for recollection and automatic influences. Results showed that each type of JOLs was predictive of both recollection and automatic influences. Moreover, we found that a delay between study and JOL improved the predictive accuracy of JOLs for recollection, while study-test experience improved the predictive accuracy of JOLs for both recollection and automatic influences. These findings demonstrate that JOLs predict not only recollection, but also automatic influences of memory. (PsycINFO Database Record

The Prototypical Majority Effect Under Social Influence

Majority views are reported with greater confidence and fluency than minority views, with the difference increasing with majority size. This Prototypical Majority Effect (PME) was attributed generally to conformity pressure, but Koriat et al. showed that it can arise from the processes underlying decision and confidence independent of social influence. Here we examined the PME under conditions that differ in social influence. In Experiment 1, a robust PME emerged in the absence of information about the majority views, but the provision sof that information increased the choice of the majority view and magnified the PME. In Experiment 2, a PME emerged in a minority-biased condition that misled participants to believe that the majority view was the minority view, but the PME was stronger in a majority-biased condition. The results were discussed in terms of a dual-process view: The PME observed under social influence may contain externally driven and internally driven components.