N. Soguel

The pain of road-accident victims and the bereavement of their relatives: A contingent-valuation experiment

The accurate description of the contingent market is a necessary condition for eliciting willingness-to-pay values. So far, however, the contingent market for a reduction in the risk of being the victim of a road accident has only been broadly specified. This Swiss experiment attempts to define the good to be purchased by respondents with greater precision. It concentrates on the human costs of road accidents, i.e., pain, suffering, and bereavement. Respondents were asked to consider themselves either as potential victims of a road accident or as relatives of potential victims and to state their willingness to pay to reduce the likelihood of such an accident occurring.

The Impact of Housing Market Segmentation between Tourists and Residents on the Hedonic Price for Landscape Quality

SummaryMarket segmentation is an important issue when estimating the implicit price for an environmental amenity from a surrogate market like property. This paper tests the hypothesis of a segmentation of the housing market between tourists and residents and computes the implicit price for natural landscape quality in Swiss alpine resorts. The results show a clear segmentation between both groups of consumers, although tests also show that the estimated coefficient for landscape is similar in the tourists’ model and in the residents’. However, since the functional form is non linear, the nominal — rather than relative — value of a change in natural landscape quality is higher in the tourist housing market than in the residents’. Hence, considering the segmentation of the market between tourists and residents is essential in order to provide valid estimates of the nominal implicit price of natural landscape quality.

Explaining Fiscal Balances with a Simultaneous Equation Model of Revenue and Expenditure: A Case Study of Swiss Cantons Using Panel Data

Empirical literature on the analysis of the efficiency of measures for reducing persistent government deficits has mainly focused on the direct explanation of deficit. By contrast, this paper aims at modeling government revenue and expenditure within a simultaneous framework and deriving the fiscal balance (surplus or deficit) equation as the difference between the two variables. This setting enables one to not only judge how relevant the explanatory variables are in explaining the fiscal balance but also understand their impact on revenue and/or expenditure. Our empirical results, obtained by using a panel data set on Swiss Cantons for the period 1980–2002, confirm the relevance of the approach followed here, by providing unambiguous evidence of a simultaneous relationship between revenue and expenditure. They also reveal strong dynamic components in revenue, expenditure, and fiscal balance. Among the significant determinants of public fiscal balance we not only find the usual business cycle elements, but also and more importantly institutional factors such as the number of administrative units, and the ease with which people can resort to political (direct democracy) instruments, such as public initiatives and referendum.

Costing the traffic barrier effect: A contingent valuation survey

When considering the environmental damage caused by road traffic, one traditionally focuses attention on the consequences of accidents, or on the impact of air and noise pollution. This somewhat narrow definition should be enlarged to capture other, more psychological nuisances. The barrier effect created by heavily travelled streets belongs to this group of nuisances, rarely described and never estimated in monetary terms. It particularly affects children, the disabled and elderly people for whom the street becomes too large to cross. In a survey carried out at Neuchâtel, Switzerland, a contingent market was proposed to suppress the barrier effect around the city centre. A valuation function to predict the bids is estimated and used to infer the annual cost of the nuisance.

Managing the crises – how did local governments react to the financial crisis in 2008 and what explains the differences? The case of Swiss municipalities

Swiss municipalities are, to a large extent, responsible for their financial resources. Since these resources primarily depend on income and property taxes from individuals and enterprises, municipality budgets are likely to be directly affected by the current crisis in the financial sector and the economy. This article investigates how municipalities perceived this threat and how they reacted to it. In a nationwide survey conducted at the end of 2009 in all 2596 Swiss municipalities, we asked local secretaries which measures had been launched in order to cope with expected losses in tax income and a possible increase in welfare spending. Did the municipalities rely on Keynesian measures increasing public spending and accepting greater deficits, or did they try to avoid further deficits by using austerity measures and a withdrawal of planned investments? Our results show that only a few municipalities – mainly the bigger ones – expected to be greatly affected by the crisis. Their reactions, however, did not reveal any clear patterns that theory would lead one to expect. Preferences for austerity measures and deficit spending become visible but many municipalities took measures from both theories. The strongest explanatory factors for determining how/why municipalities react are: the municipality’s level of affectedness followed by whether or not the municipality belongs to the French-speaking part of the country. Size also has an impact, whereas the strength of the Social Democrat party is negligible. Explaining what kind of measures municipalities are likely to take is more difficult. However, the more a municipality is affected, the more likely it is to stick to austerity measures. Points for practitioners How to react to a financial crisis is not only a challenging question to answer for the scientific community but also for practitioners being confronted with the crucial decisions to be taken. This contribution shows that the theoretical debates stipulating the exclusiveness of deficit spending or austerity measures is hardly reflecting reality, at least not at the local level. Policymakers are well advised to cut down expenditure and to invest where necessary. This is, at least, what can be learned from the practices of the Swiss municipalities after the 2008 crisis.

How does depreciations management affect subsequent fiscal performance? The case of the Swiss cantons

Creative accounting allows governments and, more particularly, finance ministers to somehow manage financial reports to achieve specific and possibly self-interested goals. It is usually used to hide deficits. It sometimes also helps to present financial performance as being more worrisome than it actually is. In that case, ministers press more than needed for lower expenses and a higher tax burden. This pressure is expected to tame deficits or increase surpluses over time. Using panel data relative to the 26 Swiss cantons over the period 1980–2013, we estimate econometrically how a political finessing technique like ‘depreciations management’ affects subsequent government expenses and revenues and thus subsequent financial performance.

Does personal background influence a finance minister to cook the books? An investigation of creative accounting in Swiss cantons

ABSTRACT This article aims to identify the factors influencing the use of creative accounting in the public sector. Its distinctive feature is that it sheds light on creative accounting when used, not to hide public deficits, but to conceal surpluses. It especially explores the impact of the finance minister’s (FM)’s background on the phenomenon. We take advantage of the quasi-experimental settings of the Swiss cantons in which the financial management act sets out the possibility of implementing certain accounting gimmicks, including mainly additional ‘depreciation’ charges. These charges, which are depreciations in name only, enable the FM to artificially inflate expenses, thus increasing the deficit or reducing the surplus. Our panel data set of the 26 cantons over the period 1980–2012 includes a new data set of creative accounting and of 116 cantonal FMs. Our results indicate that the FMs cook the books irrespective of their personal or ideological background with the exception that trained economists tend to apply creative accounting more. Additionally, stringent fiscal rules urge FMs towards more surplus-hiding accounting.

Welfare Loss with Municipal Amalgamations and the Willingness-to-Pay for the Municipality Name

Abstract Functional advantages and drawbacks are commonly mentioned to rationally justify or condemn municipality amalgamations. However, many consolidation projects are resisted by local governments or citizens on the grounds that amalgamation would dampen local identity. A municipality’s name change is probably the most visible sign of the loss of community bond experienced by citizens at amalgamation time. This article aims to put a value on this loss by measuring citizen willingness to pay for their city name. This methodological approach innovates upon the literature on municipal amalgamation and place branding by exploiting the versatility of the so-called contingent valuation method (CVM). CVM confronts respondents, in a survey setting, with a hypothetical market in which a characteristic of interest is exchanged. Here the characteristic is the possibility to retain one’s city name for an amalgamated jurisdiction. The article presents the estimates provided by a survey conducted in four Swiss cities.

Do Nasty and Pleasant Surprises Regarding Tax Revenue Explain Spending Drifts ? : The Case of the Swiss Cantons

This article aims to explain the difference between the expenditure reported in governmental end-of-the-year budgets and the amounts previously forecasted in the approved beginning-of-the-year budgets. We measure how political, financial, and institutional variables affect this spending drift. We focus on two much-debated factors, namely, tax revenue budgeting errors and the stringency of fiscal rules. Our econometric approach uses a panel based on the 26 Swiss cantons covering the period of 1980 to 2011. Results suggest that stringent fiscal rules discourage budget overruns, whereas underestimating tax revenue—i.e., a budgetary “pleasant surprise”—offers the opportunity for some overspending.

Financial Management System, Legislation and Stakeholders

This chapter discusses how financial management at the various Swiss government levels is governed by legislation and organized in practice. It presents the legal framework, the main institutional settings and the actors involved. Within the Swiss federalist system, the cantons exercise considerable autonomy in financial management; each canton has designed its own way to manage its public finances. The ‘standard’ financial management both at the federal and at the cantonal level is summarized here. Checks and balances in the system have led—particularly in the last two decades—to sound public budgets with relatively low debt levels. Two specifically Swiss institutions meant to ensure the government’s fiscal sustainability are presented: the fiscal rules and the financial referendum.