Nadav Klein

Group discussion improves lie detection

Significance Detecting lies is difficult. Accuracy rates in experiments are only slightly greater than chance, even among trained professionals. Costly programs aimed at training individual lie detectors have mostly been ineffective. Here we test a different strategy: asking individuals to detect lies as a group. We find a consistent group advantage for detecting small “white” lies as well as intentional high-stakes lies. This group advantage does not come through the statistical aggregation of individual opinions (a “wisdom-of-crowds” effect), but instead through the process of group discussion. Groups were not simply maximizing the small amounts of accuracy contained among individual members but were instead creating a unique type of accuracy altogether. Groups of individuals can sometimes make more accurate judgments than the average individual could make alone. We tested whether this group advantage extends to lie detection, an exceptionally challenging judgment with accuracy rates rarely exceeding chance. In four experiments, we find that groups are consistently more accurate than individuals in distinguishing truths from lies, an effect that comes primarily from an increased ability to correctly identify when a person is lying. These experiments demonstrate that the group advantage in lie detection comes through the process of group discussion, and is not a product of aggregating individual opinions (a “wisdom-of-crowds” effect) or of altering response biases (such as reducing the “truth bias”). Interventions to improve lie detection typically focus on improving individual judgment, a costly and generally ineffective endeavor. Our findings suggest a cheap and simple synergistic approach of enabling group discussion before rendering a judgment.

The topography of generosity: asymmetric evaluations of prosocial actions.

Prosociality is considered a virtue. Those who care for others are admired, whereas those who care only for themselves are despised. For ones reputation, it pays to be nice. Does it pay to be even nicer? Four experiments assess reputational inferences across the entire range of prosocial outcomes in zero-sum interactions, from completely selfish to completely selfless actions. We observed consistent nonlinear evaluations: Participants evaluated selfish actions more negatively than equitable actions, but they did not evaluate selfless actions markedly more favorably than equitable actions. This asymptotic pattern reflected monotonic evaluations for increasingly selfish actions and insensitivity to increasingly selfless actions. It pays to be nice but not to be really nice. Additional experiments suggest that this pattern stems partly from failing to make spontaneous comparisons between varying degrees of selflessness. We suggest that these reputational incentives could guide social norms, encouraging equitable actions but discouraging extremely selfless actions.

Less Evil Than You: Bounded Self-Righteousness in Character Inferences, Emotional Reactions, and Behavioral Extremes

Recent research suggests that self-righteousness is bounded, arising more reliably in evaluations of immoral actions than in evaluations of moral actions. Here, we test four implications of this asymmetry in self-righteousness and the mechanism explaining it. We find that people are less likely to make negative character inferences from their own unethical behavior than from others’ unethical behavior (Experiment 1), believe they would feel worse after an unethical action than others (Experiment 2), and believe they are less capable of extreme unethical behavior than others (Experiment 3). We observe weaker self–other differences in evaluations of ethical actions. This occurs partly because people base evaluations of themselves on their own moral intentions, leading to predictable individual differences. People more likely to ascribe cynical motives to their own behavior exhibit a smaller asymmetry in self-righteousness (Experiment 4). Self-righteousness seems better characterized as feeling “less evil than thou” than feeling “holier than thou.”

The power and limits of personal change:: When a bad past does (and does not) inspire in the present.

Observing other people improve their lives can be a powerful source of inspiration. Eight experiments explore the power, limits, and reasons for this power of personal change to inspire. We find that people who have improved from undesirable pasts (e.g., people who used to abuse extreme drugs but no longer do) are more inspiring than people who maintain consistently desirable standings (e.g., people who have never used extreme drugs to begin with), because change is perceived as more effortful than stability (Experiments 1a and 1b). The inspirational power of personal change is rooted in people’s lack of access to the internal struggles and hard work that many others may endure to successfully remain ‘always-good.’ Accordingly, giving observers access into the effort underlying others’ success in maintaining consistently positive standings restores the inspiring power of being ‘always-good’ (Experiments 2–4). Finally, change is more inspiring than stability across many domains but one: people who used to harm others but have since reformed (e.g., ex-bullies or ex-cheaters) do not inspire, and in many cases are indeed less inspiring than people who have never harmed others to begin with (Experiments 5–7). Together, these studies reveal how, why, and when one’s past influences one’s present in the eyes of others: having some “bad” in your past can be surprisingly positive, at least partly because observers assume that becoming “good” is harder than being “good” all along.

Prosocial behavior increases perceptions of meaning in life

Abstract Finding meaning in life is a fundamental personal need, and motivating prosocial behavior is a fundamental societal need. The present research tests whether the two are connected – whether helping other people can increase helpers’ perceptions of meaning in life. Evidence from a nationally representative data-set and two experiments support this hypothesis. Participants who engaged in prosocial behaviors – volunteering and spending money to benefit others – reported experiencing greater meaning in their lives (Studies 1–3). Study 3 also identifies increased self-worth as the mechanism – participants who spent money to benefit other people felt higher personal worth and self-esteem, and this mediated the effect of prosocial behavior on meaningfulness. The present results join other findings in suggesting that the incentives for helping others do not necessarily depend on the prospect of others’ reciprocity. Prosocial behavior can be incentivized through the psychological benefits it creates for prosocial actors.

The tipping point of perceived change:: Asymmetric thresholds in diagnosing improvement versus decline.

Change often emerges from a series of small doses. For example, a person may conclude that a happy relationship has eroded not from 1 obvious fight but from smaller unhappy signs that at some point “add up.” Everyday fluctuations therefore create ambiguity about when they reflect substantive shifts versus mere noise. Ten studies reveal an asymmetry in this first point when people conclude “official” change: people demand less evidence to diagnose lasting decline than lasting improvement, despite similar evidential quality. This effect was pervasive and replicated across many domains and parameters. For example, a handful of poor grades, bad games, and gained pounds led participants to diagnose intellect, athleticism, and health as “officially” changed; yet corresponding positive signs were dismissed as fickle flukes (Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c). This further manifested in real-time reactions: participants interpreted the same graphs of change in the economy and public health as more meaningful if framed as depicting decline versus improvement (Study 2), and were more likely to gamble actual money on continued bad versus good luck (Study 3). Why? Effects held across self/other change, added/subtracted change, and intended/unintended change (Studies 4a, 4b, and 4c), suggesting a generalized negativity bias. Teasing this apart, we highlight a novel “entropy” component beyond standard accounts like risk aversion: good things seem more truly capable of losing their positive qualities than bad things seem capable of gaining them, rendering signs of decline to appear more immediately diagnostic (Studies 5 and 6). An asymmetric tipping point raises theoretical and practical implications for how people might inequitably react to smaller signs of change.

Insensitivity to Gradations in Warmth Traits Constrains Beliefs About Others’ Potential for Improvement

Do people believe that others can improve their traits and personalities? Three experiments find that the answer depends on the trait in question. People believe that others’ potential for improving warmth traits is systematically lower than others’ potential for improving competence traits (Experiments 1a–1c). Consequently, shortcomings related to ones warmth are considered harder to overcome than shortcomings related to ones competence (Experiment 2). This asymmetry is partly rooted in peoples relative inability to detect gradations in warmth-related behaviors (Experiments 3–5). Enabling participants to more easily distinguish between moderate and high levels of warmth also increased their beliefs that other people can improve warmth traits. Beliefs about potential for improvement depend on how easily a trait can be evaluated.