Naoki Yoshihara

Alternative characterizations of three bargaining solutions for nonconvex problems

Abstract This paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining problems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution. Our characterizing axioms are various extensions of Nashs original axioms.

Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills

In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. Instead of Consistency of Resource Allocation across Dimension (CONRAD)[Roemer (1986, 1988)], which is essentially equivalent to the axiom of Welrfarism [Roemer (1988)], we introduce a weaker axiom, Consistency w.r.t. Technological Innovations (CTI), so that the non-welfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can classify the three bargaining solutions (the Nash, the Kalai-Smorodinsky, and the Egalitarian solutions)from the viewpoint of responsibility and compensation discussed by Dwokin (1981, 1981a).

Wealth, Exploitation and Labor Discipline in the Contemporary Capitalist Economy

This paper synthesizes, in one Leontief economic model, the arguments of exploitation and unequal distribution of wealth by Roemer (1982,1986) and of the power relationship between employers and employees concerning the labor extraction by Boyles and Gintis (1988,1990). The author introduces the level of the agents labor-discipline as measured by the ratio of labor effort per unit of labor time to the real wage rate.

Exploitation in economies with heterogeneous preferences, skills and assets: An axiomatic approach:

This paper provides a novel axiomatic analysis of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour in economies with heterogeneous optimising agents endowed with unequal amounts of physical and human capital. A definition of exploitation is proposed, which emphasises the relational nature of exploitation and the resulting inequalities in the allocation of labour and income. It is shown that, among all of the major definitions, this is the only one which satisfies two formally weak and normatively salient axioms, and allows one to generalise a number of core insights of exploitation theory.

Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: Characterization Results

This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-consequentialist nature, which draws on the evidence taken from experimental and behavioral economics. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009), the paper considers implementation problems with partially-honest agents, which presume that there is at least one individual in society who concerns herself with not only outcomes but also honest behavior at least in a limited manner. Given this setting, the paper provides a general characterization of Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals. It also provides the necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals by mechanisms with some types of strategy-space reductions. As a consequence, it shows that in contrast to the case of the standard framework, the equivalence between Nash implementation and Nash implementation with strategy space reduction no longer holds.

Natural Implementation with Partially-Honest Agents

The paper proposes necessary and sufficient conditions for the natural implementation of(efficient) social choice correspondences (SCCs) in pure finite exchange economies when some ofthe agents are partially honest. A partially honest agent is an agent who strictly prefers to tellthe truth when lying has no better material consequences for her. Firstly, it is shown that ifthere is even one partially honest agent in the economy (and the planner does not know heridentity), then any SCC is Nash implementable by a natural price-allocation mechanism. Secondly,and in sharp contrast with the results of conventional models of natural implementation, it isshown that the equivalence relationship between natural price-allocation mechanisms and naturalprice-quantity² mechanisms no longer holds. Finally, and even more strikingly, the paper reportsthat the class of implementable SCCs by natural price-quantity mechanisms is significantly enlarged.

CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP SOLUTIONS

This paper characterizes two public ownership solutions in convex production economies with multiple inputs and multiple outputs, known respectively as the proportional and equal benefit solutions (Roemer and Silvestre (1989)), by means of axioms of upper and unanimously lower bounds of welfare respectively and an axiom of informational efficiency, Supporting Price Independence.

Exploitation of Labour and Exploitation of Commodities: A "New Interpretation"

In the standard Okishio-Morishima approach, the existence of profits is proved to be equivalent to the exploitation of labor. Yet, it can also be proved that the existence of profits is equivalent to the “exploitation” of any good. Labor and commodity exploitation are just different numerical representations of the productiveness of the economy. This paper presents an alternative approach to exploitation theory which is related to the “New Interpretation” (Duménil 1980; Foley 1982). In this approach, labor exploitation captures unequal social relations among producers. The equivalence between the existence of profits and labor exploitation holds, whereas it is proved that there is no relation between profits and commodity “exploitation.”

A Characterization of Natural and Double Implementation in Production Economies

Abstract. We define two types of natural mechanisms, quantity and price-quantity types, in convex production economies, and characterize the class of Pareto subsolutions doubly implementable in Nash and strong Nash equilibria by these mechanisms respectively. First, we show that there is a class of Pareto subsolutions doubly implementable by natural quantity mechanisms, as long as production sets have smooth boundaries. We characterize the class of Pareto subsolutions doubly implementable by natural price-quantity mechanisms without assuming differentiability of utility functions. Third, we show that the Walrasian solution is the unique Pareto and fully individually rational solution naturally and doubly implementable in private ownership economies.

A Progress Report on Marxian Economic Theory: On the Controversies in Exploitation Theory since Okishio (1963)

This report explores the development of exploitation theory in mathematical Marxian economics by reviewing the main controversies surrounding the definition of exploitation since the contribution of Okishio (1963). The report first examines the robustness and economic implications of the debates on the Fundamental Marxian Theorem, developed mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by the property relation theory of exploitation by Roemer (1982). Then, the more recent exploitation theory proposed by Vrousalis (2013) and Wright (2000) is introduced, before examining its economic implications using a simple economic model. Finally, the report introduces and comments on recent axiomatic studies of exploitation by focusing on the work of Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a).