Nathan T. Washburn

PERSPECTIVE: The Myth of Firm Performance

Firm performance is one of the most prominent concepts in organizational research. Despite its importance, and despite the many developmental critiques that have appeared over the years, performance continues to be a difficult concept to apply in a scientifically rigorous way. After surfacing three potentially viable approaches for conceptualizing performance, we find that most studies are internally inconsistent in their use of these approaches, a situation that creates substantial difficulty in effectively interpreting research. The primary source of inconsistency lies in the use of a generalized abstract conceptualization of performance in theory building the latent multidimensional approach coupled with the adoption of one or two narrow aspects of performance in the empirical work the separate constructs approach. Follow-up analyses designed to determine the best path for resolving these mismatches indicate that our field’s heavy use of abstract performance in theorizing is not scientifically grounded and should be replaced with more specific aspects of performance to match existing practices in empirical work. Although this change would profoundly affect the field and would be resisted by many, it offers a concrete path away from indefensible practices. We offer several explanations for current practices but emphasize forces related to institutional theory. From an institutional perspective, it appears that firm performance is treated in a general fashion in many areas of our academic lives because it has been embraced as an instrument of legitimacy rather than as a scientific tool that facilitates dialogue and the accumulation of knowledge. We recommend and begin a conversation designed to highlight the long-run dangers of focusing our attention on an abstract concept of performance and suggest a set of specific steps that could help to move all of us in a new direction as we attempt to enhance the scientific rigor of our field.

Founder CEO and agent CEO self-interest

Stewardship theory suggests that CEOs whose interests are intrinsically aligned with the firm and who are granted more autonomy will curb their self-interested behaviors and act in ways that benefit the firm. In this study, we contrast subordinate perceptions of the other-regarding behaviors of agent CEOs with founder CEOs. We also examine the relationship between these perceived CEO behaviors and employee willingness to sacrifice for the firm. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that founder CEOs are less likely to be perceived as displaying other-regarding behaviors, and these behaviors are in turn related to employee willingness to sacrifice. Implications for both stewardship and agency theory are discussed.