Nathan Tarcov

Discourses on Livy

Discourses on Livy (1531) is as essential to an understanding of Machiavelli as his famous treatise, The Prince. Equally controversial, it reveals his fundamental preference for a republican state. Comparing the practice of the ancient Romans with that of his contemporaries provided Machiavelli with a consistent point of view in all his works. Machiavellis close analysis of Livys history of Rome led him to advance his most original and outspoken view of politics - the belief that a healthy body politic was characterized by social friction and conflict rather than by rigid stability. His discussion of conspiracies in Discourses on Livy is one of the most sophisticated treatments of archetypal political upheaval every written. In an age of increasing political absolutism, Machiavellis theories became a dangerous ideology. This new translation is richly annotated, providing the contemporary reader with sufficient historical, linguistic, and political information to understand and interpret the revolutionary affirmations Machiavelli made, based on the historical evidence he found in Livy. The complete Livy in English, available in five volumes from Oxford Worlds Classics. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford Worlds Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxfords commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more.

Locke's Second Treatise and “The Best Fence Against Rebellion”

Locke is at once a traditional and a subversive author for us. As an authority for the American Founders he stands at the source of our tradition. But he was an authority for those revolutionaries because his political teaching culminates in the last chapter of the Second Treatise , a defense of the right of resistance. Insofar as we remain a revolutionary or rebellious people (with a particular proclivity to tax rebellions), Lockes political teaching lives in us. But insofar as we have become traditional and taken our revolution for granted, even coming to look at our founding with “sanctimonious reverence” and ascribing to our founders “a wisdom more than human,” as Jefferson feared we would, Locke has lost his vitality for us. It is no wonder then that we do not read his defense of the right of resistance with the care it deserves, even as we sometimes see or feel its revolutionary spirit still around us. But careful attention to the structure of Lockes argument for the right of resistance shows that he was more consistent and more radical than is usually supposed.

Belief and Opinion in Machiavelli's Prince

This article examines the roles of belief and opinion in Machiavelli’s Prince. Political success and failure are effected not only by force and arms but by religious belief in particular, and more generally by the beliefs and opinions of peoples. Princes can also be the beneficiaries or the victims of their own beliefs and opinions. Machiavelli occasionally explicitly states a view as his own belief or opinion such as his belief in cruelty well used or his opinions that a prince should found himself on the people and avoid their hatred. His beliefs and opinions both contrast with common beliefs and opinions and are modified in response to them. Many have had the opinion that force and arms are the only effectual truth in Machiavelli’s Prince and that he preaches nothing but distrust and faith breaking. Nonetheless, the beliefs and opinions of peoples, of princes, and of Machiavelli himself have important roles in the work. This essay attempts to elucidate those roles through an examination of Machiavelli’s use of those key terms. I. Belief, Opinion, and Religion Belief occurs in The Prince in a range of contexts but occasionally has a particular relation to matters of religion that may even inflect its meaning in other contexts. The famous list in chapter 15 of the paired qualities that bring men and especially princes praise or blame includes the pair “the one religious, the other unbelieving [incredulo].” Belief here is used as synonymous with religious belief, though as we shall see there are many other instances of Nathan Tarcov is Professor of Social Thought and Political Science, University of Chicago, 1130 E. 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637 (n-tarcov@uchicago.edu). I am grateful for the comments of Ralph Lerner, Christopher Lynch, and Susan

Leo Strauss's “On Classical Political Philosophy”

Abstract Leo Strausss “On Classical Political Philosophy” contrasts classical political philosophy with modern political philosophy and present-day political science. Strauss stresses two seemingly contrary features of classical political philosophy: its direct relation to political life and its transcendence of political life. Its direct relation to political life prevented it from taking for granted the necessity and possibility of political philosophy. The classical political philosopher appears as good citizen, umpire among the parties, or ultimately teacher of lawgivers. He was compelled to transcend political life when he realized its ultimate aim can be reached only by the philosophic life. Philosophy must concern itself with political life, yet political philosophys highest subject must be the philosophic life.

Introduction to Two Unpublished Lectures by Leo Strauss

These two lectures by Leo Strauss, “What Can We Learn from Political Theory?” delivered in July 1942, and “The Re-education of Axis Countries Concerning the Jews,” delivered November 7, 1943, include not only Strausss most elaborate statement about the relation of political philosophy and political practice (in the first), but what may well be his fullest written public statements about matters of contemporary foreign policy. Both lectures obviously were carefully considered, composed, and corrected, but Strauss did not attempt to publish either. He may have had second thoughts about some of the arguments he advanced in these lectures, or he may simply have chosen to concentrate his literary efforts elsewhere. Other lectures he prepared during this period but did not publish himself have since been published: “The Living Issues of German Postwar Philosophy,” delivered April 1940 at Syracuse University, and “Reason and Revelation,” delivered January 1948 at Hartford Theological Seminary, both in Heinrich Meier, Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem (Cambridge University Press, 2006); “German Nihilism,” delivered to the New Schools General Seminar February 26, 1941, is in Interpretation 26:3 (Spring 1999).