James R. Stoner
Louisiana State University
Network
Latest external collaboration on country level. Dive into details by clicking on the dots.
Publication
Featured researches published by James R. Stoner.
The Journal of American History | 1993
James R. Stoner
This work suggests that American constitutionalism is the product of a combination of two opposing schools of thought: the English common-law tradition as exemplified by the work of Edward Coke and early liberal political philosophy as seen in the work of Thomas Hobbes. Stoner addresses the question of what we expect of judges in a political system that rests on popular sovereignty and a legal order committed to the idea of fundamental law.
Theology Today | 2006
James R. Stoner
Through the concept of a “naked public square,” universities, led by schools of law, have sought to purge the American polity of religious influence as thoroughly as university classrooms have been purged of religious knowledge. But even though explicit discourse about God (theology) has been decidedly out of academic fashion, academics today–often under pressure from inquisitive, religiously well-informed students–are positioned to realize that, in order to excel in their own academic fields, they need to be informed about theology more than their graduate training half a generation ago may have led them to expect.
The Review of Politics | 1993
James R. Stoner
a severing of two elements of common law adjudication: the rule of precedent, on the one hand, and the authority of tradition, on the other. The authors of the joint opinion in Casey craft a rationalized rule of precedent in the manner of the modem reinterpreters of the common law, such as Justices Holmes and Cardozo. The dissenters, by contrast, here and in related cases, seek to recover the legal status of tradition in constitutional interpretation.
Harvard Theological Review | 2017
James R. Stoner
In 1977, legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin published Taking Rights Seriously , and it quickly received wide notice. At the time recently appointed H.L.A. Harts successor at Oxford, Dworkin combined jurisprudential analysis with pointed commentary on United States Supreme Court cases, the latter developed principally in essays in the New York Review of Books . Defining law through its aspiration to justice and defining justice in terms of rights, Dworkin argued that judges were entitled to use moral philosophy both to interpret legal rules through the principles they instantiate and to fill in gaps in the law by leveraging general legal concepts into more precise conceptions. Often paired with his contemporary John Rawlss Theory of Justice , Dworkins theory that judges should rework the law when possible to insure “equal concern and respect” was seen to elaborate the practical meaning of Rawlss first principle of justice (equal rights to basic liberties) as well as to boost the activism of judges, whom he encouraged to model “Hercules.”
Archive | 2003
James R. Stoner
Archive | 2008
Carson Holloway; Paul O. Carrese; Jeffrey Church; Kenneth L. Deustch; James Fetter; Joseph R. Fornieri; Peter Augustine Lawler; Will Morrisey; Walter Nicgorski; James R. Stoner; Geoffrey M. Vaughan; Catherine H. Zuckert
Archive | 2000
John Gibbons; Nathan Tarcov; Ralph Hancock; Jerry Weinberger; Paul A. Cantor; Mark Blitz; James W. Muller; Kenneth Weinstein; Clifford Orwin; Arthur M. Melzer; Susan Meld Shell; Peter Minowitz; James R. Stoner; Jeremy Rabkin; David F. Epstein; Charles R. Kesler; Glen E. Thurow; R. Shep Melnick; Jessica Korn; Robert P. Kraynak
Policy Review | 1995
James R. Stoner
Archive | 2017
James R. Stoner; Bradley C.S. Watson
Faulkner Law Review | 2014
James R. Stoner