Nauro F. Campos

Growth in Transition: What We Know, What We Don'T, and What We Should

This essay surveys macroeconomic issues that marked the transition from centrally planned to market economy in Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries. We first establish a set of stylized facts of the transition so far, namely: (1) output fell, (2) capital shrank, (3) labor moved, (4) trade reoriented, (5) the structure changed, (6) institutions collapsed, and (7) transition costs. We then critically survey the theoretical literature on transition, discussing various explanations for the initial output fall as well as medium term issues, such as optimal speed of transition, disorganization, institutions and sectoral reallocation as a source of output dynamics. Last, we review the empirical literature to assess how well it translates the theoretical models and explains the stylized facts. The essay concludes with a succinct list of suggestions for future research.

Why Does FDI Go Where it Goes? New Evidence from the Transition Economies

This Paper examines the importance of agglomeration economies and institutions vis-a-vis initial conditions and factor endowments in explaining the locational choice of foreign investors. Using a unique panel data set for 25 transition economies between 1990-98, we find that the main determinants are institutions, agglomeration and trade openness. We find important differences between the Eastern European and Baltic countries, on the one hand, and the former Soviet Union countries on the other: in the latter group, natural resources and infrastructure matter, while agglomeration matters only for the former group.

Context is Everything: Measuring Institutional Change in Transition Economies

The author presents measures with which to map institution building during the transition from centrally planned to market economies. Data collection and indicators are measured in terms of five institutional dimensions of governance: a) accountability; b) quality of the bureaucracy; c) rule of law; d) character of policy-making process; and e) strength of civil society. The author highlights the differences over time and between Central and Eastern European countries and those of the former Soviet Union. In terms of effects of per capita income and school enrollment, he finds the rule of law to be the most important institutional dimension, both for the sample as a whole and for differences between the two regions. In terms of life expectancy, however, the quality of the bureaucracy plays the most crucial role. One important message the author draws from the results is that institutions do change over time and are by no means as immutable as the literature has suggested. The range of feasible policy choices (for changing institutions) may be much wider than is often assumed.

Who is afraid of political instability

An unstable macroeconomic environment is often regarded as detrimental to economic growth. Among the sources contributing to such instability, much of the blame has been assigned to political issues. This paper empirically tests for a causal and negative long-run relationship between political instability and economic growth but finds no such relationship. Sensitivity analysis, however, indicates that there is indeed a short-run negative relationship and, that in the long-run and ignoring institutional factors, the group of African countries is the driving force. In other words, we suspect that excluding the African countries from their samples, results of a negative relation between SPI and growth would founder.

Foreign Direct Investment and Structural Reforms: Evidence from Eastern Europe and Latin America

This paper investigates the role of structural reforms - privatization, financial reform and trade liberalization- as determinants of FDI inflows based on newly constructed dataset on structural reforms for 19 Latin American and 25 Eastern European countries between 1989 and 2004. Our main finding is a strong empirical relationship from reforms to FDI, in particular, from financial liberalization and privatization. These results are robust to different measures of reforms, split samples, and potential endogeneity and omitted variables biases.

Do Stock Markets Promote Economic Growth

One of the most enduring debates in economics is whether financial development causes economic growth or whether it is a consequence of increased economic activity. Little research into this question, however, has used a true causality framework. This paper fills this lacuna by using Granger-causality tests and finds little evidence of a causal relationship going from stock market development to economic growth. We do find evidence that stock market development can cause currency appreciation, which may confound studies that use dollar denominated measures of economic growth.

Who is Afraid of Political Instability

An unstable macroeconomic environment is often regarded as detrimental to economic growth. Among the sources contributing to such instability, much of the blame has been assigned to political issues. This paper empirically tests for a causal and negative long-run relationship between political instability and economic growth but finds no such relationship. Sensitivity analysis, however, indicates that there is indeed a short-run negative relationship and, that in the long-run and ignoring institutional factors, the group of African countries is the driving force. In other words, we suspect that excluding the African countries from their samples, results of a negative relation between SPI and growth would founder.

International Terrorism, Domestic Political Instability and The Escalation Effect

What are the main causes of international terrorism? Despite the meticulous examination of various candidate explanations, existing estimates still diverge in sign, size, and significance. This article puts forward a novel explanation and supporting evidence. We argue that domestic political instability provides the learning environment needed to successfully execute international terror attacks. Using a yearly panel of 123 countries over 1973–2003, we find that the occurrence of civil wars increases fatalities and the number of international terrorist acts by 45%. These results hold for alternative indicators of political instability, estimators, subsamples, subperiods, and accounting for competing explanations.

The Determinants of Asset Stripping: Theory and Evidence from the Transition Economies

During the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital. Despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon, there have been no efforts to model, measure, and investigate this process empirically. This paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and econometric evidence. We argue that asset stripping is driven by the interplay between the firm’s potential profitability and its ability to influence law enforcement. Our econometric results, for about 950 firms in five transition economies, provide support for this argument.

Crises, What Crises? New Evidence on the Relative Roles of Political and Economic Crises in Begetting Reforms

Abstract Crises beget reforms is a powerful hypothesis. But which type of crises – economic or political – are the main drivers of structural reforms? To answer this question, we construct measures of labour market and trade liberalisation and the two types of crises for a panel of about 100 developed and developing countries between 1960 and 2000. We find that political crises are more important determinants of structural reforms than economic crises. This finding is robust to the inclusion of interdependencies between crises, feedbacks between reforms, different estimators and various alternative measures of crises.