Nazaria Solferino

The “Demand for Justice” in Italy: Civil Litigation and the Judicial System

This study provides an interpretative scheme of the so-called “demand for justice” in Italy. Using a microeconomic model of the choice of litigants, the characteristics of the judicial, legal, and economic systems have been modeled as they influence the decisions of the two parties and may cause opportunistic behavior, which, in their turn, may have an impact on the shape of the two systems. An empirically testable model has been derived from this theoretical framework. The empirical analysis shows that lengthy time-spans and raised costs of associated processes and high market rates have a disincentive effect on recourse to justice, which seems to prevail over that connected to opportunistic behavior of the plaintiff. We do not find evidence for the socalled pathological demand hypothesis, which has been emphasized in recent

The Migration FDI Puzzle: Complements or Substitutes?

This paper analyses the link between FDI inflows and migration waves from developing countries. In addition, it investigates mechanisms through which this link works. Empirical results indicate that FDI can be seen as substitutes of migration through direct and indirect labour demand. However, the paper demonstrates that a positive relationship (complementarity effect) between FDI and migration flows takes place. In longitudinal analysis results indicate that the complementarity effect prevails. In cross section analysis, estimating a two equation models, we find that a substitutability effect is at work through the impact of FDI on human capital accumulation but the direct complementarity effect also prevails.

Spectators Versus Stakeholders With/Without Information: The Difference it Makes for Justice

We document that being spectators (no effect on personal payoffs) and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders without information on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria after task performance to prefer rewarding talent (vis a vis effort, chance or strict egalitarianism) after guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base. Information about distribution of payoffs under different criteria reduces dramatically such choice since most players opt or revise their decision in favor of the criterion which maximizes their own payoff (and, by doing so, end up being farther from the maximin choice). Large part (but not all) of the stakeholders’ choices before knowing the payoff distribution are driven by their performance beliefs since two thirds of them choose the criterion in which they assume to perform and earn relatively better.

Performance, Luck and Equality: An Experimental Analysis of Subjects’ Preferences for Different Allocation Criteria

Abstract We perform an experimental analysis to investigate participants’ choices of allocative criteria under different conditions. We document that performance-based criteria guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base are widely preferred by both neutral spectators and stakeholders without information on relative payoffs, although popularity among stakeholders is mostly due to self-interest considerations and optimism concerning their expected performance. Information regarding the distribution of payoffs under different criteria dramatically reduces such choice because the self-interest motive directly emerges, and most players opt to revise their decision in favor of the criterion maximizing their own payoff.

Applying the Möbius Strip Model to Corporate Social Responsibility: Survey-Based Findings from Italian Social Enterprises

In this work, we apply the electro-magnetism geometrical model of the Mobius Strip in the context of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in order to test the relationship between CSR and organizational performance. We exploit a unique dataset that includes 4135 workers in a matched sample of 320 Italian social enterprises. Results show that CSR is the strongest determinant of firm performance, although there is an indirect effect of cooperation and worker alienation in terms of higher job satisfaction.

Some Insights on Procrastination: A Curse or a Productive Art?

The choice between performing a task today or procrastinating it until tomorrow or later is the building block of any economic action. In our paper, we aim to enrich the theoretical literature on procrastination by allowing for the possibility of good procrastination together with bad procrastination, and by documenting how procrastination may arise from incomplete information and hyperbolic discounting without further departures from standard preference assumptions. More specifically, we look at the special cases of pathological procrastination, the curse of perfectionism and productive procrastination. We further discuss how our theoretical framework may be applied to different types of (education, investment and production) microeconomic decisions and outline how optimal policy measures change when we consider the possibility of good as well as bad procrastination.