Stefania Ottone

A Simulative Assessment of the Italian Electoral System

During the last sixty years, the Italian electoral system has changed three times, proportional representation. From 1993 to 2005, a new mixed electoral system (three quarters of the seats were elected by plurality, while the remaining seats were filled by proportional representation) was adopted. Finally, in December 2005, a new electoral system reintroduced the proportional representation and introduced for the first time a majority prize. The aim of our analysis is twofold. We want to compare the goodness of these electoral systems and, at the same time, to check whether other electoral systems would have provided a better performance.

Free-Riding on Altruistic Punishment? An Experimental Comparison of Third-Party-Punishment in a Stand-Alone and in an In-Group Environment

While second-party punishment is suitable in small groups, third-party punishment is much more common in large societies, where it is generally recognized as a social norm enforcement device that may guarantee social stability. However, in large societies, the presence of a potential additional third-party punisher who observes the norm violation and decides to intervene becomes more probable. The question arises as to whether third-party punishment would be robust with respect to an enlargement of the pool of potential altruistic punishers, namely the introduction of a second potential punisher. The relevance of this question is evident because, should the case be that the presence of several potential third-party punishers activates free-riding attitudes, third-party punishment may decline or even collapse altogether. In our paper we compare, by means of an economic experiment, punishment by a single third party (the Stand-Alone case) with punishment by third parties (In-Group environment). Shifting punishment choices into this “enlarged environment” allows us to study, in a systematic way, the complex relationship between the punisher’s expectations about her/his peer’s punishment decisions and her/his own punishment choices. Our data suggest that individual punishers are heterogeneous as to their individual punishment characteristics and the presence of a second punisher affects their choices to a certain extent. Consequently, the implementation of voluntary punishment depends on the distribution of types within the population. This result allows both to put into discussion the extreme emphasis devoted to voluntary third-party punishment as the “golden cornerstone” of spontaneous social order and to explain why large developed societies need institutional legal systems as the root of stability.

Are Some Countries More Honest than Others? Evidence from a Tax Compliance Experiment in Sweden and Italy

This study examines cultural differences in ordinary dishonesty between Italy and Sweden, two countries with different reputations for trustworthiness and probity. Exploiting a set of cross-cultural tax compliance experiments, we find that the average level of tax evasion (as a measure of ordinary dishonesty) does not differ significantly between Swedes and Italians. However, we also uncover differences in national “styles” of dishonesty. Specifically, while Swedes are more likely to be either completely honest or completely dishonest in their fiscal declarations, Italians are more prone to fudging (i.e., cheating by a small amount). We discuss the implications of these findings for the evolution and enforcement of honesty norms.

Willing to pay? : tax compliance in Britain and Italy : an experimental analysis

As shown by the recent crisis, tax evasion poses a significant problem for countries such as Greece, Spain and Italy. While these societies certainly possess weaker fiscal institutions as compared to other EU members, might broader cultural differences between northern and southern Europe also help to explain citizens’ (un)willingness to pay their taxes? To address this question, we conduct laboratory experiments in the UK and Italy, two countries which straddle this North-South divide. Our design allows us to examine citizens’ willingness to contribute to public goods via taxes while holding institutions constant. We report a surprising result: when faced with identical tax institutions, redistribution rules and audit probabilities, Italian participants are significantly more likely to comply than Britons. Overall, our findings cast doubt upon “culturalist” arguments that would attribute cross-country differences in tax compliance to the lack of morality amongst southern European taxpayers.

Are genetically modified foods bad for my health?. Consumer evaluation and preferred information source

We investigate the impact of competing information on the consumer’s evaluation of food products containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs). We provide three main results. First, we show that introducing mandatory labels to identify whether or not a food product contains GMOs significantly reduces the consumer evaluation. Second, providing additional information on GMOs with respect to labels significantly affects evaluation. Third, no matter what kind of information previously received, the consumer prefers to seek additional information from the information source they trust the most, i.e., their general practitioner (GP). Overall, these results indicate that the crucial issue for regulating GMOs is not the presence of the label per se, but the availability of the necessary information to make good use of the label content in order to assess potential health risks deriving from genetically modified foods. In particular, our findings suggest that this can be achieved by properly informing (and convincing) GPs and other health professionals that the risks for human health are minimal.

Spectators Versus Stakeholders With/Without Information: The Difference it Makes for Justice

We document that being spectators (no effect on personal payoffs) and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders without information on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria after task performance to prefer rewarding talent (vis a vis effort, chance or strict egalitarianism) after guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base. Information about distribution of payoffs under different criteria reduces dramatically such choice since most players opt or revise their decision in favor of the criterion which maximizes their own payoff (and, by doing so, end up being farther from the maximin choice). Large part (but not all) of the stakeholders’ choices before knowing the payoff distribution are driven by their performance beliefs since two thirds of them choose the criterion in which they assume to perform and earn relatively better.

Are Genetically Modified Foods Bad for My Health? Individuals’ Valuation and the Choice Among Different Information Sources

We investigate the role of information on consumers’ valuation for food products containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs), using data from a specifically designed survey. We provide three main results. First, we show that introducing mandatory labels to identify whether or not a food product contains GMOs, significantly reduces consumers’ valuation. Second, adding to the label additional information on GMOs significantly affects valuation. Third, no matter the sign of the information previously received, consumers are more willing to trust General Practitioners (GPs), the information source they prefer most. Overall, these results indicate that the crucial issue is not the presence of the label per se, but the availability of the necessary information to make good use of the label content to assess potential health risks deriving from GM foods. In particular, our findings suggest that this can be achieved by properly informing (and convincing) GPs and other health professionals that risks for human health are minimal.

Goal Achievement Failure Drives Corticospinal Modulation in Promotion and Prevention Contexts

When making decisions, people are typically differently sensitive to gains and losses according to the motivational context in which the choice is performed. As hypothesized by Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT), indeed, goals are supposed to change in relation to the set of possible outcomes. In particular, in a promotion context, the goal is achieving the maximal gain, whereas in a prevention context it turns into avoiding the greatest loss. We explored the neurophysiological counterpart of this phenomenon, by applying Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) and recording the motor evoked potentials (MEPs) in participants taking part in an economic game, in which they observed actions conveying different goal attainment levels, framed in different motivational contexts. More than the actual value of the economic exchange involved in the game, what affected motor cortex excitability was the goal attainment failure, corresponding to not achieving the maximal payoff in a promotion context and not avoiding the greatest snatch in a prevention context. Therefore, the results provide support for the key predictions of RFT, identifying a neural signature for the goal attainment failure.

Performance, Luck and Equality: An Experimental Analysis of Subjects’ Preferences for Different Allocation Criteria

Abstract We perform an experimental analysis to investigate participants’ choices of allocative criteria under different conditions. We document that performance-based criteria guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base are widely preferred by both neutral spectators and stakeholders without information on relative payoffs, although popularity among stakeholders is mostly due to self-interest considerations and optimism concerning their expected performance. Information regarding the distribution of payoffs under different criteria dramatically reduces such choice because the self-interest motive directly emerges, and most players opt to revise their decision in favor of the criterion maximizing their own payoff.

Third-Party Punishment under Judicial Review: An Economic Experiment on the Effects of a Two-Tier Punishment System

Abstract This paper analyses, by means of an economic experiment, the impact of a vertical review on third-party punishment. Whereas the existing empirical literature has studied, under many different aspects, third-party costly punishment as such, it has not addressed the impact of a second “instance” (competent to overrule punishment decisions by the first punisher) on the incidence and amount of such first-instance punishment and the underlying unwanted behaviour (“stealing”). In this paper, we apply experimental methodology that allows us to construct in the lab the counterfactual context for a direct institutional comparison that we cannot find in real life. In particular, we examine first of all whether and how the presence of a second “vertical” punishment layer (i.e. of a “second instance”) affects the amount of punishment imposed in the first instance. Secondly, we check whether the presence of a second level of punishment has a deterrent effect on the underlying (undesired) behaviour. Finally, we examine the level of satisfaction of the victims in all scenarios. In our experiments, we find that the introduction of a second (vertical) tier of punishment increases (i) the level of punishment provided for in the first instance, (ii) deterrence with regard to the underlying behaviour (i.e. a reduction in the number of “thefts” being committed), and also (iii) the level of satisfaction for victims. Real-world applications of this study are plentiful, including the organisation of courts and the appeals process as a whole. Our evidence confirms that the presence of an “instance” (a second tier of legal decision making) is, other things equal, likely to generate beneficial effects.