Neil Cooper

Two Concepts of Morality

It is a surprising fact that moral philosophers have rarely examined the distinction between what I shall call ‘positive’ or ‘social’ morality on the one hand and ‘autonomous’ or ‘individual’ morality on the other. Accordingly, conceptual and moral issues of the greatest importance have been neglected. The distinction is, I take it, recognised by Hegel, when he contrasts Sittlichkeit with Moralitat . However, the rival sides who give a conceptual or a moral preference to one concept over the other rarely come to grips with one another, and the deep conflicts between them are concealed instead of being brought out into the open. Only in Burkes diatribe against Rousseau, Bradleys critique of Sidgwick ( Collected Essays I , 122), Hobhouses crusade against Bosanquet ( Metaphysical Theory of the State ), Prichards attack on Green ( Moral Obligation , p. 75), Harts criticism of Hare (‘Legal and Moral Obligation’ in Essays in Moral Philosophy , edited by Melden), and above all in Oakeshotts onslaught on Rationalism ( Rationalism in Politics , passim) do we get a glimpse of one of the main issues of moral philosophy and of morality. For just as we have two concepts, so we have two moral conceptual schemes, each of which gives a central place to one concept at the expense of the other. Those who suppose that morality is or ought to be wholly or mainly a social concept may recommend submission to a tradition. Those, on the other hand, who suppose morality to be primarily an individual or independent concept will recommend independent decisions. I want in this paper, firstly, to explain the differences between the two concepts, secondly, to show that neither of them is conceptually illegitimate or degenerate, and lastly, to determine what place, if any, each ought to have in a rational morality.

The Art of Philosophy

Any account of knowledge has to take account both of the contribution of the world and the contribution of man. Every human endeavour, every activity, every art, every science is a product of a unique interaction between man and the world. Where man is most passive, he merely reflects and reports the world; this is pure discovery, if it ever exists. Where man is most active, the worlds contribution lies merely in the provision of the raw material; this is pure invention, if it ever exists. All the arts, all the sciences can be ordered in a continuous array or spectrum ranging from pure discovery to pure invention. That they are all at some point on this continuum gives them a common but fragile thread, justifying our thinking and talking of the unity of the arts and sciences. Philosophy is neither pure discovery nor pure invention; it bears resemblances to both a science and an art. In this paper I propose to try to give reasons why we should regard the philosopher as an artist and philosophy as an art; or, at any rate, I shall try to show that there is an Art of Philosophy. In anything which is made or done there are three elements. There is first, the given, the raw material, there to be moulded, like the chaotic matter given form by Platos divine craftsman in his Timaeus. Second, there is the action of the maker or doer or agent. Every action is also a making; every agent is a maker; anything which is done has an aesthetic aspect. Third, there is how the maker thinks of or describes what he has done, what significance he gives to it. The thought here resembles that of Henry James in his preface to The Golden Bowl (Bodley Head Henry James Vol. IX, p. 34) where he says:

THE CONCEPT OF PROBABILITY

THE concept of probability has its origins in everyday thinking and it is only since the seventeenth century that it has acquired a technical and numerical use. Because of its history, two kinds of theory have grown up about the nature of probability, one-concept theories and twoconcept theories. Those who hold two-concept theories very often pooh-pooh the idea that there is any connection between the uses, or even suggest that one of the concepts is just uninteresting. Both these positions are held in the following conversation (Observation and Interpretation, ed. K6rner, Dover, p. 80):

Aristotle's Ethical Theory.

This is a study of Aristotles moral philosophy as it is contained in the Nicomachean Ethics. Hardie examines the difficulties of the text; presents a map of inescapable philosophical questions; and brings out the ambiguities and critical disagreements on some central topics, inclduing happiness, the soul, the ethical mean, and the initiation of action.