Nicola Bellé

A Meta-Analysis of Job Satisfaction Correlates in the Public Administration Literature

What can we learn by applying a meta-analysis to the public administration literature on job satisfaction? More generally, how can public management scholars use this method to capitalize on the decades of research on other topics within our field? This study reports the findings of the first quantitative review of the public administration literature on job satisfaction. We retrieved quantitative data from primary studies published in 42 public administration journals since 1969 and performed a meta-analysis of the relationships between job satisfaction and 43 correlates. The findings include meta-analytically derived effect sizes, measures of the heterogeneity in the effect size underlying all primary studies, and several indicators of publication bias. In presenting the results of our meta-analysis, we address the merits and limitations of this methodology and discuss how public administration scholars could take full advantage of this information to advance knowledge in other areas within the field.

Monetary Incentives, Motivation, and Job Effort in the Public Sector An Experimental Study With Italian Government Executives

What effects do financial incentives have on the effort made by public managers? How do different types of work motivation (i.e., intrinsic, extrinsic, and public service motivation) moderate this effect? We addressed these questions using experimental data from a sample of executives working for the Italian central government and found that monetary rewards had no significant effect on the intended effort of the study participants. Furthermore, the relationship between financial incentives and intended effort, which was insignificant overall, was negatively moderated by the intrinsic motivation of the participants, positively moderated by extrinsic motivation, and unaffected by public service motivation.

NPM, administrative reforms and public service motivation: Improving the dialogue between research agendas

This article makes use of the Italian case of administrative reform to investigate the changes in the public service motivation (PSM) of public employees and managers after two decades of new public management (NPM)-inspired reforms. It emerges that NPM reforms may be associated with a reduction of the stock of PSM; however, important qualifications apply. By providing so far entirely unavailable evidence about PSM in both the public and the private/commercial sectors in Italy, the article also contributes the empirical bases for the development of comparative research on the interrelation between trajectories of administrative reform and changes in the drivers of motivation of public servants. Points for practitioners Public management reforms may have an effect in terms of accretion or depletion of public service motivation (PSM), in its turn likely to be conducive to improved performance of the public sector. Policymakers should include in the design and evaluation of public sector reforms the potential impacts on the drivers of the motivation of public servants. PSM is also a factor that may be profoundly influential on the dynamics of reform processes, to be systematically considered by reformers in different jurisdictions.

Così Fan Tutte? Adoption and Rejection of Performance-Related Pay in Italian Municipalities: A Cross-Sector Test of Isomorphism

Using data from Italian municipalities, nonprofits, and business firms, this article explores two sets of relationships. First, sectoral differences in the exposure to institutional forces triggering the adoption of performance-related pay are investigated. Second, this study estimates sectoral differences in the sensitivity to those isomorphic pressures. Coercive pressure is the strongest on municipalities and the weakest on for-profits. Exposition to mimetic pressure tends to be stronger for business establishments compared with both municipalities and nonprofits. For-profits generally face weaker normative forces relative to municipalities and nonprofits. Coercive pressure increases the probability that an organization adopts performance-related pay schemes more in business firms than in nonprofits and more in nonprofits than in municipalities. The effect of normative pressure on the probability of adoption is higher in both municipalities and nonprofits compared with for-profit establishments. Coercive pressure increases the percentage of performance-related pay more in business firms than in nonprofits and more in nonprofits than in municipalities.

Cognitive Biases in Performance Appraisal: Experimental Evidence on Anchoring and Halo Effects With Public Sector Managers and Employees:

A systematic literature review of performance appraisal in a selection of public administration journals revealed a lack of investigations on the cognitive biases that affect raters’ evaluation of ratees’ performance. To address this gap, we conducted two artefactual field experiments on a sample of 600 public sector managers and employees. Results show that anchoring and halo effects systematically biased performance ratings. For the former, average scores were higher when subjects were exposed to a high rather than a low anchor. For the latter, higher ability on one performance dimension led participants to provide a higher average score on another performance dimension. Halo effect was moderated by rater’s gender. We conclude by discussing the study limitations and providing suggestions for future work in this area.

Randomized Experiments and Reality of Public and Nonprofit Organizations: Understanding and Bridging the Gap

This article aims to contribute to the methodological advancement of experimental public administration, a nascent and promising literature stream. The article discusses the assumptions behind the theory of experimentation and the consequences of their violation; the main types of experimental designs (i.e., lab experiments, artefactual, framed, and natural field experiments); discrete choice experiments, neglected so far in our discipline for no good reason; the computation of optimal sample sizes; and the procedures for dealing with noncompliance in field experiments. The article concludes by providing tips to help public administration scholars bridge the gap between randomized trials and reality.

EU Agencies and the European Multi-Level Administrative System

Abstract Purpose The chapter furnishes empirical evidence about the extent and profiles of autonomy of EU agencies, the modalities whereby they are steered and controlled, and the interactions they have in EU policy networks. It thus provides the bases for a more complete picture of the EU multi-level administration. Methodology/approach The research is a survey-based design. A questionnaire was administered between July 2009 and April 2010 to 30 EU agencies included in the study population. The questionnaire was sent to the executive director of all the agencies included in the study. Questions were closed-ended, either in the form of multiple choices – with one answer or with check-all-that-apply and an option for ‘other’ to be filled – or in scale format. The resulting data set included ratio, interval, ordinal, and nominal scales. The reference model employed for the investigation relies on the analytical model developed within the framework of the research project COST Action IS0651 CRIPO (Comparative Research into Current Trends in Public Sector Organization – see also ‘Acknowledgements’) for the study of public agencies in Europe (Verhoest, Van Thiel, Bouckaert, & Laegreid, 2012). Findings EU agencies display a rather low level of managerial, especially financial, autonomy; conversely, they enjoy relatively high policy autonomy. As to the way in which multiple ‘parent’ administration steer EU agencies, it emerges a composite picture, in which the crossroads of steering and control by the parent administrations and accountability by the agency lies in the executive director. In terms of interactions within policy networks, EU agencies interact in a significant way with the European Commission, with national-level agencies in the pertinent policy field, and with specific technical bodies where they are part of the configuration of the policy sector, whilst interactions with national ministries as well as with other EU agencies are rare. No single model can capture in full the overall features of EU agencies, although the ‘community level institution’ model seems to capture a number of the profiles of these agencies. Research implications Both the literature on EU multi-level administration and research agendas in public management can benefit from inclusion of – and in-depth empirical knowledge about – EU agencies. The chapter provides important empirical evidence to these purposes. Practical/social implications EU agencies are actors in European public policy-making, albeit to a varied extent depending on the sector. The extent of autonomy and the way in which they are held to account are crucial aspects for an enhanced understanding of their influence on European public policy-making, as is their location in European policy networks. Originality/value Research presented in this chapter is the first systematic empirical investigation of EU agencies encompassing networking, steering and control and autonomy of EU agencies, based on primary data.

Assessing Public Preferences and the Level of Transparency in Government Using an Exploratory Approach

Any information disclosed by governments should serve the purpose it is meant to fulfill. This is an underlying pillar of transparency. Our article assesses whether the information citizens consider to be most relevant for interaction with the authorities is actually disclosed. Our research was conducted on the population of the 117 Italian provincial capitals. A sample of 500 Italian citizens were interviewed with the purpose of understanding which type of information they consider most relevant, given the choice of institutional, political, financial, and service delivery–related information. The results indicate that Italian provincial capitals currently fail to publish the information that citizens consider to be most relevant: Despite differences in opinions among users, the sample we analyzed tends to rate the importance of service-delivery transparency and financial transparency higher than institutional or political transparency, whereas most information disclosed by Italian provincial capitals is associated with data they are obliged to disclose in order to comply with transparency regulations.

European Union (EU) Agencies

At the EU there are 23 community agencies, three agencies operating in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy, three agencies operating in the field of police and judicial cooperation on criminal matters, six executive agencies entrusted by the Commission with the execution of a specific programme, two agencies created to support the aims of the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty (EURATOM), and the European Institute of Innovation and Technology All of these agencies, though very different along a number of organizational dimensions,1 are from a legal-institutional point of view ‘EU Agencies’ (or ‘EU Decentralized Bodies’).

Do Ethical Leadership, Visibility, External Regulation, and Prosocial Impact Affect Unethical Behavior? Evidence From a Laboratory and a Field Experiment:

This article investigates the effects that ethical leadership, visibility of task performance and conduct, external regulation, and prosocial impact have on revealed and observed preferences for unethical behavior in public administration settings. Experiment 1 engages university students in a laboratory experiment and observes misconduct in two tasks. Ethical messages and visibility reduced subjects’ dishonesty in declaring the outcome of the task that affected their pay but did not influence the self-reported performance in the exercise tied to raising donations. For the latter task, ethical leadership and visibility interacted negatively. Monetary incentives and prosocial impact increased individuals’ unethical behavior consistently across the two tasks. Experiment 2 is a discrete choice experiment exploring public sector workers’ preferences for misbehaving on the job. While ethical leadership and visibility did not affect their preferences, a significant financial gain and the opportunity to improve the life of many people increased the willingness to behave unethically.