Paolo Fedele

Disaggregation, autonomy and re-regulation, contractualism

Abstract The spread of semi-autonomous organizations for the execution of public functions has attracted academic interest. There seem to be two main research agendas, one investigating broad issues of autonomy and control of Non-Departmental Public Bodies, another one focused on the narrower phenomenon of executive agencies. Especially the latter may benefit from the operationalization of commonly used concepts like: disaggregation, autonomy and re-regulation, contractualism. The article adopts an analytical framework based on these concepts to investigate executive agencies in Italy. Findings of interest for the international scholarly debate include: the limitations to the consideration of contractualism as an autonomous unit of analysis; the influence of the politico-administrative context on the actual utilization of performance contracting; the (apparently limited) role of re-regulation, and its sensitivity to the context; the importance of considering a wide range of factors in a combined way in explaining agency form; the consideration that ‘modern’ agencies are varied and not standardized solutions; the limitations that apply to the use of the so-called ‘tripod’ model of agency.

A Common Trend, Different Houses: Devolution in Italy, Spain and the UK

The dynamics of the implementation process of devolution reforms differ significantly from country to country. Part of the explanation for this lies in the differences in the politico-administrative system and the status of public management reforms. Factors affecting devolution are examined in this article. Implications for policy-makers and public managers, especially regarding the policy transfer of devolution reforms, are discussed.

EU Agencies and the European Multi-Level Administrative System

Abstract Purpose The chapter furnishes empirical evidence about the extent and profiles of autonomy of EU agencies, the modalities whereby they are steered and controlled, and the interactions they have in EU policy networks. It thus provides the bases for a more complete picture of the EU multi-level administration. Methodology/approach The research is a survey-based design. A questionnaire was administered between July 2009 and April 2010 to 30 EU agencies included in the study population. The questionnaire was sent to the executive director of all the agencies included in the study. Questions were closed-ended, either in the form of multiple choices – with one answer or with check-all-that-apply and an option for ‘other’ to be filled – or in scale format. The resulting data set included ratio, interval, ordinal, and nominal scales. The reference model employed for the investigation relies on the analytical model developed within the framework of the research project COST Action IS0651 CRIPO (Comparative Research into Current Trends in Public Sector Organization – see also ‘Acknowledgements’) for the study of public agencies in Europe (Verhoest, Van Thiel, Bouckaert, & Laegreid, 2012). Findings EU agencies display a rather low level of managerial, especially financial, autonomy; conversely, they enjoy relatively high policy autonomy. As to the way in which multiple ‘parent’ administration steer EU agencies, it emerges a composite picture, in which the crossroads of steering and control by the parent administrations and accountability by the agency lies in the executive director. In terms of interactions within policy networks, EU agencies interact in a significant way with the European Commission, with national-level agencies in the pertinent policy field, and with specific technical bodies where they are part of the configuration of the policy sector, whilst interactions with national ministries as well as with other EU agencies are rare. No single model can capture in full the overall features of EU agencies, although the ‘community level institution’ model seems to capture a number of the profiles of these agencies. Research implications Both the literature on EU multi-level administration and research agendas in public management can benefit from inclusion of – and in-depth empirical knowledge about – EU agencies. The chapter provides important empirical evidence to these purposes. Practical/social implications EU agencies are actors in European public policy-making, albeit to a varied extent depending on the sector. The extent of autonomy and the way in which they are held to account are crucial aspects for an enhanced understanding of their influence on European public policy-making, as is their location in European policy networks. Originality/value Research presented in this chapter is the first systematic empirical investigation of EU agencies encompassing networking, steering and control and autonomy of EU agencies, based on primary data.

Drivers of Autonomy of Public Agencies in Italy

The creation of agencies has been and still is a widespread trend in the public sector: governments in many countries often establish semi-autonomous single-purpose organizations to carry out a wide range of functions and tasks. The trend to autonomization is problematic as it affects public sectors governance: several bodies operate partly autonomously from the core elective government, and are sometimes loosely coupled with their ‘parent’ administration. Consequently, analysing the drivers of agencies’ autonomy is a crucial issue for public management. This paper, in the light of some major contributions in organizational science, assumes that agencies’ autonomy is influenced by factors that affect post-delegation relationships: agencies’ structure, culture and nature of the tasks executed. The study was aimed at testing a range of hypotheses about the autonomy of public agencies, using for this purpose the so-far not investigated case of Italy–much in the spirit of the accumulation of knowledge in an area of public management. Results do not provide any strikingly counter-intuitive finding, but a mix of confirmations and disconfirmations of previous findings that allow a finer-grained analysis on the determinants of agency autonomy.

Organizational underpinnings of interactive decision making: an empirical inquiry

Purpose – Interactive decision making has become a recurrent practice across countries, policy sectors and tiers of government. The purpose of this paper is to analyze how organizational arrangements, i.e. the way the interactive process is designed, influence its outcomes. Design/methodology/approach – The research is carried out through a multiple case study. Four cases of interactive decision making are analyzed using a qualitative framework. Findings – Findings can contribute to shed light on the organizational underpinnings of the outcomes of interactive decision making. Accessibility, in particular meant as process openness, i.e. the intensity of the decision-making powers that are devolved to the public, seems to represent the key factor in producing positive outcomes, especially if associated to less-formalized arrangements. Practical implications – On the practice oriented side, findings provide decision makers with insights about how to design interactive mechanisms to improve the chances they w...

European Union (EU) Agencies

At the EU there are 23 community agencies, three agencies operating in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy, three agencies operating in the field of police and judicial cooperation on criminal matters, six executive agencies entrusted by the Commission with the execution of a specific programme, two agencies created to support the aims of the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty (EURATOM), and the European Institute of Innovation and Technology All of these agencies, though very different along a number of organizational dimensions,1 are from a legal-institutional point of view ‘EU Agencies’ (or ‘EU Decentralized Bodies’).

Determinants of Result-based Control in Italian Agencies

Explaining the form of public sector organizations, and ultimately the decision-making behaviour of public sector organizations as the key dependent variable, is a major contribution that organizational theory has to offer to the study of the public sector. In this chapter, we investigate the characteristics of the relationships between agencies and their parent administration in the Italian central government. The study, rooted in organizational theory, adopts different theoretical angles, at first a ‘cultural-normative’ approach mainly embedded in a logic of appropriateness perspective (March and Olsen 1996, 1994, 1989), then an approach focused on instrumental rationality mainly embedded in a logic of consequences perspective (for an overview of different streams in organization theory for the study of the public sector, see Christensen et al. 2007).

Obstacles and solutions on the ladder of citizen participation: a systematic review

ABSTRACT This article presents a systematic review of the English-language empirical literature about citizen participation to identify the obstacles to its implementation and the most successful ways to address them. Three sets of variables seem to impact effectiveness: contextual factors, including information asymmetries and public officials’ attitude; organizational arrangements, including community representation criteria and process design; and process management patterns, including group dynamics and collaboration quality. Two recommendations stem from our analysis: internalize decisions in organizational procedures, and establish ongoing interactions between government bodies and their stakeholders. We conclude that half-hearted engagement is unlikely to lead to successful citizen participation.

The Iron Law of Unintended Effects, Again? Outcome Measures and Blame-Avoidance

The shift from output to outcome measures is a recurrent doctrine in public administration studies and practice. However, as with many popular doctrines before, more empirical analysis is still needed. This chapter focuses on the unintended effects of outcome-based performance management and explores how the use of outcome measures influences blame-avoidance strategies by officials and service providers. In looking for answers and using the concept of social mechanism as the analytical lens, this contribution explores a pilot case in the Italian public sector, where a performance ranking composed of outcome measures was introduced as the pivotal performance management tool. Results allow to conceptualize a link between the type of blame-avoidance response and the features of the potential blamers.

Outcome-Based Performance Management in the Public Sector: What Role for Inter-organizational ICT Networks?

Public sector decision-making takes place across multiple tiers of government and societal organizations. Governance arrangements have major implications on performance, especially when addressing wicked problems: dispersed authority can lead to silos mentality, thus triggering coordination problems. We explore how inter-organizational Information and communication technology (ICT) networks can improve the performance of public sector organizations responsible for wicked problems by observing three such networks implemented by the Friuli Venezia Giulia Region (Italy): a portal for tourism promotion, a tracking system for intermodal cargo networks and a database of public works designed to prevent floods and landslides. Our analysis highlights that inter-organizational ICT networks improve outcomes when interests converge, but seem to have little impact when stakeholders perceive the interplay as a zero-sum game, and to perform best when interaction patterns are closest to hierarchy. In brief, the evidence suggests that ICT cannot contend to be a substitute for a shared governance model.