Nikolay Korgin

Dynamic models of informational control in social networks

The dynamic models of informational control in social networks were considered. The problems of analysis and design of the optimal controls were posed and examined.

Use of intersection property for analysis of feasibility of multicriteria expertise results

We study properties of strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria expertise representable by generahzed voter median schemes that allow to decrease the complexity of verification of the so-called intersection property. The latter is necessary and sufficient for the outcome of the expertise to belong to the set of feasible results. The algorithm is proposed, that for an arbitrary generalized median scheme determines for which sets of feasible results of the expertise this scheme satisfies the intersection property.

Application of generalized median voter schemes to designing strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise

Mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise are represented in the form of generalized median voter schemes for collective decision-making in the terms of families of right and left coalition systems. This approach allows for applying the results, obtained in the theory of social choice, to designing strategy-proof mechanisms.

Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise

We demonstrate that any sequential allotment rule enjoying strategy-proofness on the domain of single-peaked preference functions can be represented in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of active expertise on the domain of multidimensional single-plateaued preference functions, i.e., a generalized median voter scheme with a tie-breaking rule.

Equivalence and strategy-proofness of non-anonymous priority allotment mechanisms

This paper gives an analytical characterization for the strategy-proof sequential allotment mechanisms of a limited resource that are equivalent to the straight and reverse priority mechanisms. The previously known equivalence of the anonymous priority mechanisms is extended to the non-anonymous case by establishing the following fact: for an arbitrary straight priority mechanism, there exists an equivalent reverse priority mechanism, but the converse fails. And finally, we provide a characterization for the class of reverse priority mechanisms having an equivalent straight priority mechanism.

Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation

This paper studies the resource allocation problem based on agents’ opinions with possible delegation. In other words, any agent can report just some components of the allocation vector as his request. We describe symmetrical anonymous generalized median voter schemes supplemented with delegation procedures; they can be applied for solving the posed problem.

Algorithmic verification of feasibility for generalized median voter schemes on compact ranges

Abstract Barbera, Masso and Serizawa (1998) provided full characterization for class of strategy-proof social choice functions for societies where the set of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences. They proved that this class is composed by generalized median voter schemes satisfying an additional condition, called the “intersection property”. But according to their results in order to understand whether any generalized median voter scheme satisfies intersection property for given set of alternatives or not it was necessary to check all the alternatives from the set of unfeasible alternatives – addition of the set of feasible alternatives to minimal Cartesian product range, containing this set. So the number of alternatives to be checked, was infinite. In this paper it is proved, that it is enough to check finite number of alternatives from the set of unfeasible alternatives and constructive algorithm to determine alternatives that should be checked is provided.

Incentive Problems and Exchange Schemes

For the one-agent active system with internal uncertainty and asymmetric information, the incentive problem regarded as the exchange scheme was solved using the principle of open control, that is, constructing an incentive mechanism with revelation of information, where revelation of the true parameters of income function is the dominant agents strategy.

On strategy-proof direct mechanism of active expertise over strictly convex compact set

We investigate the problem of strategy-proofness in the active expertise process where the decision making are based on the messages of experts who can distort the information for their benefit. In our model the expertise result is the arithmetic mean of expert messages and the opinion space is the multi-dimensional strictly convex compact set. We construct the corresponding direct expertise mechanism. We also prove that there is no strategy-proof direct expertise mechanism for this case. The problem of finding mechanism with minimum manipulation equivalent to the arithmetic mean expertise mechanism is formulated.