Oleg Bukharin

Analysis of the size and quality of uranium inventories in russia

Little official information is available regarding the uranium inventories and the history of the production and use of uranium in Russia. Some estimates, however, can be made based on careful analysis of the programs for the production of fissile materials for weapons, naval propulsion, and power reactors, and on reasonable assumptions about the evolution of the Soviet/Russian enrichment complex.

Securing Russia's HEU stocks

Production and use of HEU and plutonium are inherently dangerous due to the possibility of their diversion to terrorist groups or rogue nations. Of the two, HEU might be of greater concern. First, HEU is used in a wide range of applications and is therefore more readily available. Second, in many cases, HEU might be more vulnerable to diversion. Unirradiated HEU does not require containment and operating personnel often have a legitimate and prolonged direct access to the material. It is also less radioactive and therefore is harder to detect by conventional passive radiation‐detection techniques that are employed at personnel and vehicle portals at nuclear facilities. Third, although the arsenals of the existing nuclear powers are built around plutonium, HEU is likely to be a material of choice for a less sophisticated bombmaker.1 HEU processing is somewhat easier and it is a relatively minor health hazard. It also has a much lower rate of spontaneous fission, a fact that makes the weapon design job some...

The U.S.‐Russian HEU agreement: Internal safeguards to prevent diversion of HEU

Under the U.S.‐Russian HEU agreement,∗ approximately 500 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from large‐scale dismantlement of former Soviet nuclear warheads will be transformed into products not usable in nuclear weapons. According to the agreement, Russian facilities will convert and blend down HEU to low‐enriched uranium hexafluoride, which will subsequently be fabricated by U.S. companies into low‐enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for nuclear reactors. However, HEU is vulnerable to insider diversion during processing operations. The paper describes the principal HEU diversion vulnerabilities at the plant, and recommends a strong internal preventive safeguards system.

Upgrading security at nuclear power plants in the newly independent states

As of 1996, 48 nuclear power reactors were operating in five newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union: 29 units at nine sites in Russia, 15 units at five sites in Ukraine, a double unit plant in Lithuania, and one unit each in Armenia and Kazakstan. These nuclear power facilities need to be reliably protected against possible radiological sabotage or terrorism. The post-Soviet transition in the NIS has been marked by ethnic and political conflicts, crime, and societal instabilities. Nuclear power facilities are not immune from these maladies and face a broad range of threats. Indeed, potentially catastrophic releases of radioactivity and resultant global societal dislocations make the NIS nuclear industry a particularly attractive target for industrial sabotage.

Russian nuclear‐powered submarine decommissioning

Russia is facing technical, economic and organizational difficulties in dismantling its oversized and unsafe fleet of nuclear powered submarines. The inability of Russia to deal effectively with the submarine decommissioning crisis increases the risk of environmental disaster and may hamper the implementation of the START I and START II treaties. This paper discusses the nuclear fleet support infrastructure, the problems of submarine decommissioning, and recommends international cooperation in addressing these problems.

Russia's Nuclear Icebreaker Fleet

Nuclear icebreakers remain important for the economic survival of Russias Arctic regions and are a central element of the Northern Sea Route development strategy. Reactor life extension activities are critical to sustaining the nuclear fleet, as several of the currently operated nuclear icebreakers are reaching the end of design service life. Russia is also finishing a new icebreaker and is planning to build additional nuclear ships within the next 10–15 years. Nuclear icebreaker reactors are fueled with highly-enriched uranium (HEU), which has to be reliably protected against theft and diversion.

Understanding Russia's Uranium Enrichment Complex

Over a period of 50 years, the Soviet Union (and now Russia) has developed a highly-efficient centrifuge technology and a large R&D and industrial complex to produce enriched uranium for nuclear weapons (in the past) and nuclear reactors. The enrichment complex is a crown jewel of the Russian nuclear complex and will remain significant for Russias economy. Because of its role in the 1993 U.S.-Russian HEU agreement, global nuclear markets, and efforts to control the spread of centrifuge enrichment technology, the Russian enrichment enterprise is also of significant importance to international security.

U.S.‐Russian cooperation in the area of nuclear safeguards

This study provides a detailed analysis of the existing problems with nuclear safeguards and material accounting in Russia by comparing the existing situation both to U.S. methods and to the system of controls that existed in the Soviet era. It also examines recent U.S. efforts under the Nunn-Lugar initiative to improve safeguards and the system of material accounting and control. Finally, it concludes with specific suggestions on how to make U.S. aid more effective and more relevant to the unique conditions hampering nuclear safeguards in Russia today.

Integration of the military and civilian nuclear fuel cycles in Russia

This paper describes the close integration of the civil and military nuclear fuel cycles in Russia. Individual processing facilities, as well as the flow of nuclear material, are described as they existed in the 1980s and as they exist today. The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union weakened the ties between the two nuclear fuel cycles, but did not separate them. Separation of the military and civilian nuclear fuel cycles would facilitate Russias integration into the worlds nuclear fuel cycle and its participation in international non-proliferation regimes.

Downsizing Russia's nuclear warhead production infrastructure

Over a period of 50 years, the Soviet Union built a giant infrastructure dedicated to designing, manufacturing, and maintaining nuclear bombs and warheads for a wide variety of strategic and tactical weapons systems (see Table 1). Under the conditions of the Soviet economic and political system, this nuclear weapons production complex developed into a self-sufficient, vastly redundant, and highly integrated organization, which was managed in an extremely secretive and centralized fashion.