William C. Potter

Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay

Although projections of nuclear proliferation abound, they rarely are founded on empirical research or guided by theory. Even fewer studies are informed by a comparative perspective. The two books under reviewThe Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy, by Jacques Hymans, and Nuclear Logics: Alternative Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, by Etel Solingen, are welcome exceptions to this general state of affairs, and represent the cutting edge of nonproliferation research. Both works challenge conventional conceptions of the sources of nuclear weapons decisions and offer new insights into why past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize and why current prognoses about rampant proliferation are similarly flawed. While sharing a number of common features, including a focus on subsystemic determinants of national behavior, the books differ in their methodology, level of analysis, receptivity to multicausal explanations, and assumptions about decisionmaker rationality and the revolutionary nature of the decision. Where one author emphasizes the importance of the individual leaders national identity conception in determining a states nuclear path, the other explains nuclear decisions primarily with regard to the political-economic orientation of the ruling coalition. Notwithstanding a tendency to overinterpret evidence, the books represent the best of contemporary social science research and provide compelling interpretations of nuclear proliferation dynamics of great relevance to scholars and policymakers alike.

The npt & the sources of nuclear restraint

Daedalus Winter 2010 The past decade has not been kind to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.1 Indeed, since the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (npt) was extended inde1⁄2nitely in 1995, it has been subjected to a series of body blows, which have led many nonproliferation experts, policy-makers, and media pundits to prophesize an impending cascade or chain of nuclear weapons spread, as well as the possible demise of the npt as we currently know it. Implicit in many of these forecasts are assumptions about proliferation dynamics that are poorly informed by empirical research on past nuclear renunciation decisions. This essay draws upon this literature to assess the role the npt has played in promoting prior nuclear restraint. It also examines how evolving international developments may alter the future effectiveness of the npt as a proliferation constraint.

Verification and arms control

Verification of arms control agreements has become a matter of widespread interest in the scientific community; the methods used by signatories to ensure compliance and the past record of compliance by the United States and the Soviet Union are being vigorously debated. Science has asked two experts in arms control, Manfred Eimer and Sidney Drell, to respond to questions about the means of verification, the current verifiability of agreements, and the future outlook.

INDIA AND THE NEW LOOK OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

U.S. nuclear export policy has undergone major transformations since 1945, and the most recent change, as expressed in the July 18, 2005, India-U.S. Joint Statement, represents an especially significant shift in policy. The document reverses more than a quarter century of U.S. declaratory policy, suggesting that the current U.S. administration regards nuclear proliferation to be both inevitable and not necessarily a bad thing. This article investigates this policy shift, looking at the history of U.S. nuclear export policy and the potential ramifications of the new policy on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The author also touches on the potential effects of the Joint Statement on Indian-Pakistani relations. Finally, it is suggested that it is not too late for India and the United States to change the new policy with more consideration for the NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers Group Initiative.

Illicit nuclear trafficking in the NIS: What's new? What's true?

Until very recently, conventional wisdom among the Western nonproliferation community held that nuclear theft and cross-border smuggling involving proliferation significant nuclear material had declined markedly since 1994. This alleged lull in nuclear trafficking activity was attributed to a variety of factors including the positive impact of nonproliferation assistance programs in the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, enhanced law enforcement and customs and border controls, and an increase in information and intelligence sharing among different national governments. More pessimistic interpretations for the apparent lull also have been proffered, including the rise of more sophisticated smugglers able to avoid detection and capture.

Tito's Nuclear Legacy

Should the West be worried about Yugoslavias nuclear weapons potential?

Sustainability: A vital component of nuclear material security in Russia

Dr. William Potter is Institute Professor and the Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He also directs the Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. Dr. Fred Wehling is Senior Research Associate with CNSs Newly Independent States NonproliferationProject. Before coming to CNS in 1998, Wehling was a consultant at RAND, the Coordinator of Policy Research for the University of Californias Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, and a researcher at the Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia National Laboratories.

The NPT review conference: 188 states in search of consensus

This was not a good year for theater productions on or off Broadway. By far the most costly and disappointing spectacle staged in New York this past season was the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference – an ill-conceived amalgam of farce and tragedy performed with little direction by an uninspired cast and with an all too predictable ending. As a bit player in the recent drama and as a veteran of two prior Review Conference “blockbusters”, as well as six Preparatory Committee rehearsals, the author’s current task is as a theater critic. Since the script itself is well known, attention will be concentrated primarily on two themes: 1) Why did the production fail? and 2) What are the implications of its failure?

Ambassador Henrik Salander on the 2002 NPT preparatory committee

The first session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held at United Nations headquarters from April 8-19,2002, under the chairmanship of the representative of the Western and Other States Group, Ambassador Henrik Salander (Permanent Representative of Sweden to the Conference on Disarmament (CD)). Ambassador Salander headed the Swedish delegation to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, in which Sweden, as a member of the New Agenda Coalition, played a key role in achieving the adoption of a Final Document by consensus. He thus brought considerable experience, credibility and negotiating skills to his chairmanship.

Nuclear security in Kazakhstan and Ukraine: An interview with Vladimir Shkolnik and Nicolai Steinberg

In August 1994, Vladimir Shkolnik and Nicolai Steinberg were Visiting Fellows at the Program for Nonproliferation Studies (PNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Vladimir Shkolnik is the former head of the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Agency and recently was appointed Minister of Science and New Technologies in Kazakhstan. Nicolai Steinberg is the Chairman of the Ukrainian State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety. The following interview was conducted by Dr. William C. Potter, Emily Ewell, and Elizabeth Skinner. “PNS” designates questions formulated by this group; last names are used to designate additional questions. Alexander Mikheev served as the interpreter.