Olivier Corten

Territorial Integrity Narrowly Interpreted: Reasserting the Classical Inter-State Paradigm of International Law

Paragraph 80 of the Kosovo AO reflects a very traditional conception of international law. By insisting on the inter-state character of the principle of territorial integrity, the Court refused to challenge the classical argument of the ‘neutrality’ of international law in regard to secession. The Court also refused any reinterpretation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. As already stated in the Wall Advisory Opinion, the prohibition of the use of force is only applicable between states. It does not apply between states and non-state actors, whether secessionist or not. Similarly, the Court refused the argument of ‘remedial secession’, at least as far as it would imply a right to violate the principle of territorial integrity of a state by a secessionist group. Indeed, if the latter principle is not applicable in such situations, it logically cannot be violated and there is therefore no right to infringe it. Finally, the Court refused to consider Kosovo as a ‘special case’ or a sui generis situation. According to the Court, this situation must be governed by the traditional rules of general international law. This implies that Kosovo did not violate international law by proclaiming independence. But this also implies that a declaration of independence by a secessionist group inside Kosovo would not be contrary to international law. Moreover, it can be pointed out that if Kosovo is not a state (a hypothesis perfectly compatible with the advisory opinion), then general international law would not preclude Serbia from invoking the argument of ‘legal neutrality’ to support such a secessionist group.

The notion of “reasonable” in international law: Legal discourse, reason and contradictions

Far from being confined to its most obvious manifestations, such as in the right to be tried within a “reasonable time” guaranteed by Articles 5 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, references to the notion of “reasonable” are found in a large variety of primary rules pronounced in both legal instruments and the case law. 1

The 'unwilling or unable' test: Has it been, and could it be, accepted?

On 23 September 2014, the United States of America sent a letter to the Security Council justifying the launch of an air campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on Syrian territory. In this letter, the US referred to a formula that appeared a few years ago in certain scholarly writings: the ‘unwilling or unable’ test. The aim of this article is to show that this test has not been accepted by the international community of states as a whole in the Syrian case. It is also to stress that such an acceptance would lead to a radical transformation of the jus contra bellum regime, one that a large majority of states is probably not ready to accept.

The Russian intervention in the Ukrainian crisis: was jus contra bellum ‘confirmed rather than weakened’?

This article assesses the extent to which the Ukrainian crisis has challenged our traditional understanding of international law. The first section reveals that no extension of the scope of Article 2(4), which prohibits threat or use of force only in ‘international relations’, can be observed. Use of internal violence has been condemned, but by reference to other legal arguments. By contrast, the use of force by a rebel group, a secessionist party or by public authorities is not prohibited as such in general international law. In the second section, it is shown that Russia did not refer to a possible right to intervene in a civil war, but has rather invoked an intervention by invitation, in a first stage by what it considered the official Ukrainian authority (President Yanukovich), in a second by the government of a new (Crimean) state. However, these extensive interpretations of international law (allowing an intervention on the sole basis of a collapsed power or of a self-proclaimed government invitation) were never accepted by the community of states as a whole. The third section finally investigates the invocation of the ex injuria jus non oritur principle. Beyond a positive answer to the question of whether international law has been ‘confirmed rather than weakened’ by the events in Ukraine, it is argued that the Ukrainian crisis illustrates the persistent tensions that surround classical rules of international law, such as self-determination, territorial integrity and, more generally, non-intervention.

The Limits of Complicity as a Ground for Responsibility: Lessons Learned from the Corfu Channel Case

International law has long been infused with a vague commitment towards an indeterminate notion of humanity. An examination of humanity as a specific normative idea in the historical discourse of international law provides a platform for better understanding the rhetorical and substantive meaning of ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ in the seminal Corfu Channel case, as well as Judge Alverez’s use of the more affective (and perhaps honest) term ‘sentiments of humanity’ in his separate opinion. With the Court otherwise silent as to the content, scope and status of the principle, such background informs the judicial attitudinal stance taken towards this apparently ‘self-evident’ principle, as well as the values which the Court and other international tribunals would subsequently bring to their norm creation and enforcement roles, not least with respect to general principles as a source of law. Drawing upon the work of Koskenniemi and the analyses of the Martens clause by scholars such as Meron and Cassese, the chapter places particular emphasis on the political, normative and empathetic potential of the term, and its inherent relationship to a foundational, essentialist and idealistic notion of humanity which continues to gain strength in the discipline.

¿Hay que hacer valer el macho en todas partes? El reto de las teorías feministas en el derecho de la paz y de la seguridad internacional

En un articulo fundador que aparecio en 1991 intitulado «Feminist Approaches to International Law», Hillary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin y Shelley Wright denuncian el derecho internacional como un «thoroughly gendered system». Estas autoras estiman, en efecto, que la dominacion masculina se puede identificar tanto en el contenido como en la estructura de toda una serie de reglas del derecho internacional. El presente articulo busca establecer una evaluacion de esta hipotesis con relacion a los discursos y a la reglas del derecho de la paz y de la seguridad internacional. En el analisis, y especialmente con relacion a la Resolucion 1325 de 2000 y lo que ha sucedido con posterioridad con las teorias feministas, aparecen estas como un motor de cambio en la retorica, pero tambien, en el largo plazo, en la practica. En contraposicion, estas teorias muestran ciertos limites cuando pretenden denunciar, mas alla de la violacion de los derechos individuales de la mujer, la ‘masculinidad’ de las reglas que constituyen el jus contra bellum.Dans un article fondateur paru en 1991 sous le titre de « FeministApproaches to International Law », Hillary Charlesworth, ChristineChinkin et Shelley Wright denoncent le droit international comme un«thoroughly gendered system ». Ces auteures estiment en effet que la domination masculine peut etre decelee a la fois dans le contenu et dans la structure de toute une serie de regles de droit international. Le present article teste cette hypothese au regard des discours et des regles du droit de la paix et de la securite internationale. A l’analyse, et specialement au regard de la resolution 1325 (2000) et de ses suites, les theories feministes apparaissent comme un moteur d’un changement rhetorique mais aussi, a plus long terme, pratique. En revanche, ces theories montrent certaines limites lorsqu’elles pretendent denoncer, au-dela de la denonciation de la violation des droits individuels de la femme, la « masculinite » des reglesqui constituent le jus contra bellum.

La Commission du droit international comme agent de formalisation du droit de la responsabilité:: modalités et significations de l’utilisation d’arbitrages partiellement détachés du droit positif

au-delà de la variété des règles substantielles qui le composent et des « engagements partiellement contradictoires résultant de systèmes de droits spéciaux toujours plus perfectionnés »3, le droit international est ainsi présenté dans son unité formelle4. dans son cours de La haye, le dédicataire des présents mélanges semble ainsi exprimer ses réticences face à la thèse de la « déformalisation » du droit international. selon cette thèse, défendue notamment aux etats-Unis, la formalisation,

Formalization and Deformalization as Narratives of the Law of War

In his seminal of war and law, David Kennedy demonstrates how the shift from formalism to realism can be observed in the evolution of the law of war. This shift, which can be characterized as a “deformalization” narrative of the law of war, is the main object of this chapter. More precisely, I argue that, especially in regard to the codification of relevant rules in jus contra bellum and in jus in bello, formalism must not be underestimated. On the one hand, the formalization narrative appears far more convincing than the deformalization one to understand the evolution of the law of war from the nineteenth century. Every time a war is waged, it leaves no doubt that a large range of actors will debate about its formal legality. On the other hand, formalism must not be overestimated. It provides only a strategy which can—or not, depending on the circumstances of the case at hand—be used to support or combat a war. And, of course, the efficiency of the argument will depend both on the audience concerned and on the political context in which the debate takes place.

Symposium: The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo: Editors' Introduction

The present symposium follows on from a workshop held at the University of Cambridge on 2 September 2010 by the Interest Group on Peace and Security (IGPS) of the European Society of International Law, in collaboration with the Centre for International Security and European Studies (CESICE) of the University of Grenoble II and the International Law Centre of the Universite Libre de Bruxelles.