Olli-Pekka Vainio

What Does Theology Have to Do With Religion

Abstract In the cognitive science of religion (CSR), it is often claimed that religion is a product of information processing system that is nonconscious, automatic and irrational. This view rests on a theoretical basis provided by dual-process accounts (DPA) of reasoning. In this paper, I will provide some examples how DPAs are employed in contemporary theorizing in CSR and point out some problems, which reveal an oversight that may impede the progress of the scientific study of religion. The topic touches on the wider debate on evolutionary debunking arguments but my point concerns CSR theorizing and how it might not be able to understand religion properly.

Tolerance or Recognition? What Can We Expect?

Abstract The last two decades have seen the (re)emergence of the concept of recognition in ethical and political theory. Oftentimes, recognition is seen as a deeper, more developed version of tolerance, without the problems that tolerance purportedly has. We should not “merely” tolerate different individuals, identities and cultures, but recognize them, or so the argument goes. This move from tolerance to recognition is not without its critics. We will outline some of these criticisms and address them with the resources provided by the theory of recognition. We will suggest that while some of the criticisms are unfounded, the move from tolerance to recognition has a number of problems that the critics have correctly pointed out. The relationship between tolerance and recognition is complex: both have their own aims and functions. We will suggest that there are cases–especially ones that involve deep moral disagreements–where tolerance is a more reasonable aim than recognition.

The curious case of analogia entis

In recent Anglophone theology, there has been a renewed interest in the concept of analogia entis. Several theologians from various confessional backgrounds have discussed the meaning of this concept and revisited the earlier debate between Karl Barth, Erich Przywara and Hans Urs von Balthasar that took place almost one hundred years ago. Barth famously took the concept as the doctrine that prevented him from ever becoming a Catholic. Recent debate has charted the possibility of reinterpreting the older debate and overcoming misunderstandings across confessional borders. The first reason for the discussion is thus ecumenical, while the second reason is providing the Christian Churches with a tool that helps them to stand against the tides of secularism. I argue that analogia entis is not likely going to provide us new opportunities in ecumenism, yet it may help us to unearth and understand both some confessional differences and common concerns.

Searching for Non-Toxic Religion

This article provides more accurate tools to engage the public nature of religious and other ideological claims by proposing a distinction between belief-policies, beliefs and practices that could enable more acute ways of locating the aspects of ideology that are considered problematic in a given situation. In addition, the article proposes rules of engagement for how we might deal with these aspects in public discourse.

On believing and acting fallibly

The purpose of this article is to discuss how the possibility of being fallible fits together with religious convictions and practices. By fallibilism, it is usually meant that all our beliefs are only fallibly justified, at best. This entails that even for our best-argued beliefs, it remains possible that they can be rationally doubted. Recently, this idea has found its way to theological deliberation as well. The upside of the idea is that it enables one to dodge the charges of absolutism or immutability. The downside is that it seems to make religious belief only tentative, and unable to motivate action. In the following, I will shortly present some recent fallibilist proposals of Christian identity, and then reflect on the possibility of holding religious beliefs fallibly against the background of the demand of certitude and action. Finally, I will propose a model of Christian fallibility, based on virtue epistemology, which avoids some of the problems inherent in current models.