Aku Visala

Religion and the Human Mind : Philosophical Perspectives on the Cognitive Science of Religion

SUMMARY The cognitive science of religion is a multi-disciplinary research program that attempts to integrate the study of religion with behavioural sciences such as cognitive sciences. Such integration raises several methodological questions that concern, for example, the nature of the relationship between psychology and social life, the autonomy of the study of religion and the role of causal explanations in social sciences. This article examines the methodological assumptions of the cognitive science of religion and analyses possible drawbacks as well as advantages of a naturalistic study of religion. Finally, this article argues that we should allow different kinds of methodological frameworks in the study of religion. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Mit den »Kognitionswissenschaften der Religion« wird ein multidisziplinäres Wissenschaftsprogramm bezeichnet, dessen Ziel es ist, Theologie und Religionswissenschaften mit Verhaltenswissenschaften wie den Kognitionswissenschaften zu verflechten. Solch eine Verflechtung stellt vor verschiedene methodologische Fragen, die beispielsweise das Verhältnis von Psychologie und Sozialleben, die Autonomie von Theologie und Religionswissenschaften und die Rolle von kausalen Erklärungen in den Sozialwissenschaften betreffen. Dieser Artikel untersucht die methodologischen Prämissen der Kognitionswissenschaft der Religion und analysiert mögliche Probleme wie auch Vorteile des naturalistischen Ansatzes in Theologie und Religionswissenschaften. Der Artikel vertritt abschließend die These, dass in Theologie und Religionswissenschaften verschiedene methodologische Rahmentheorien zugelassen werden sollten.

The Theory of Credition and Philosophical Accounts of Belief: Looking for Common Ground

The nature and function of belief and the goal of believing have been central topics in Western philosophical and theological traditions since Antiquity. Basic questions have been asked, for instance, about the relationship between belief and knowledge, belief in God or gods, and the nature of believing itself. Is belief somehow inferior to knowledge, and how is it related to evidence? In this chapter, we introduce some historical and contemporary philosophical discussions about these issues and explore a number of ways in which the theory of credition could benefit from engaging with the philosophical literature on belief. We begin by looking at some historical and contemporary accounts of the relationship between belief and knowledge. After that, we address the perennial association of religion with belief. Finally, we conclude the chapter by making some preliminary suggestions as to how we could relate philosophical debates and discussions to the theory of creditions. We suggest that philosophy has much to give to the theory of credition and vice versa.

The cognitive science of religion and theism again: a reply to Leo Näreaho

In this article we respond to Leo Nareahos critique of our position on the relationship of the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and theism, arguing that he misrepresents our position and assimilates our views to ones we do not in fact hold. The central issue we address has to do with how Nareaho construes what he takes to be our commitment to a ‘world-view neutrality’ thesis regarding the ‘assumptions and results’ of the new bio-psychological theories of religion (in the case at hand, CSR). We suggest that Nareaho has misconstrued us on what the neutrality thesis actually is and what follows from it. We conclude that his own proposal for compatibility is not an alternative to ours but rather one permissible metaphysical reading of CSR among others.

Pro-Science Rhetoric or a Research Program? – Naturalism(s) in the Cognitive-Evolutionary Study of Religion

Aku Visala takes a closer look at the role of naturalism in CSR. The cognitive-evolutionary study of religion takes itself as “naturalizing” not only the study of religion, but the humanities as a whole. Apart from the obvious denial of non-supernatural causal factors, it is sometimes difficult to see whether this naturalization involves anything more than a general rhetorical strategy meant to play up the “science” part (and downplay other, “non-scientific” approaches). In his paper, Visala seeks to identify the basic philosophical assumptions of the naturalization project, present some critical points about them, and suggest what he considers to be more plausible assumptions instead. The basic assumptions of the naturalization project include a commitment to a specific kind of unity of science, a commitment to a certain kind of inter-level reduction and explanatory fundamentalism and a deep suspicion towards causal factors above the cognitive/psychological level. He suggests that these commitments suffer from a number of problems and the goals of the cognitive-evolutionary study can be achieved just as well, or even better, by adopting weaker and more plausible commitments. Here he briefly discusses some new accounts of mechanistic explanation, Robert McCauley’s model of inter- and intra-level relationships and the idea of explanatory pluralism. He conjectures that loosening the “naturalistic” constraints of the cognitive-evolutionary study of religion might result in a more pluralistic (but nevertheless strict) approach to religion.

Tolerance or Recognition? What Can We Expect?

Abstract The last two decades have seen the (re)emergence of the concept of recognition in ethical and political theory. Oftentimes, recognition is seen as a deeper, more developed version of tolerance, without the problems that tolerance purportedly has. We should not “merely” tolerate different individuals, identities and cultures, but recognize them, or so the argument goes. This move from tolerance to recognition is not without its critics. We will outline some of these criticisms and address them with the resources provided by the theory of recognition. We will suggest that while some of the criticisms are unfounded, the move from tolerance to recognition has a number of problems that the critics have correctly pointed out. The relationship between tolerance and recognition is complex: both have their own aims and functions. We will suggest that there are cases–especially ones that involve deep moral disagreements–where tolerance is a more reasonable aim than recognition.

Persons, Minds, and Bodies: Christian Philosophy on the Relationship of Persons and Their Bodies, Part I

The relationship of minds, bodies, and persons has been a central topic of debate in Western philosophy and theology. This article reviews the ongoing debates about the relationship and nature of bodies, minds, and persons among contemporary Christian analytic philosophers and theologians. The first two parts present some general theological constraints for philosophical theories of persons and describe the basic concepts used (substance, property, supervenience, and physicalism). The views themselves fall into three broad categories. Dualists think that persons are either identical with or partly constituted by non-physical souls. On this view, there are immaterial substances and properties. Hylomorphists maintain that persons are composites of bodies and the souls that inform them. Finally, physicalists claim that there are no immaterial parts to persons. Instead, persons are composed of bodies and brains, the mental properties they have supervene on physical properties. The relationship of minds, bodies, and persons has been debated in Western philosophy and theology almost ad infinitum. This article reviews some of the ongoing debates among contemporary Christian analytic philosophers and theologians. The aim is not to give a comprehensive list of all views and arguments but rather provide the reader with a roadmap or classification of positions as well as a small taste of the kinds of arguments that are being discussed. Although the majority of views discussed here are more philosophical than theological, there are theological constraints to all person/mind/body views, if they are to remain at least vaguely loyal to traditional Christian anthropology. 1. Three Theological Constraints The first constraint is that there must be persons. Let us call this the person constraint. TheChristian tradition affirms that there are individual persons, and we humans are such persons. This constraint is important, because in the contemporary debates, there are views according to which there are no such things as persons (personal nihilism). Further, the tradition also affirms the multiplicity of minds. That is to say, there are more than just one mind and all persons have their own minds. What is ruled out here is the view that there exists only one mind to which all minded beings participate. Although it is true that on some Christian view, human minds are vastly inferior to the mind of God and require God’s illumination to operate properly, humans still do have individual minds. Second, one of the most important Christian constraints is that persons need to survive the death of their current physical bodies. We can call this the survival constraint. Although Christians believe in the resurrection of the body, the bodies that we now have are not our resurrection bodies. The bodies that we now have will eventually die and disintegrate. As a consequence, most Christian philosophers reject views entailing that persons and minds are reducible to or identical with their current bodies or some parts of their bodies.