Omesh Kini

Does the Presence of Venture Capitalists Improve the Survival Profile of IPO Firms

The role of venture capital in the creation of the public corporation is now widely recognized. This study investigates whether venture capitalists add value to the going public process by improving the survival profile of IPO issuers. The survival of IPO issuers is not only likely to depend on managerial actions but also on the effectiveness of key market participants such as investment bankers and analysts. The form and function of the venture capital industry allows venture capitalists to influence the actions of managers, investment bankers, and analysts, and attract institutional interest. Conducting survival analyses using the Cox hazard methodology, we find that the involvement of venture capitalists improves the survival profile of IPO firms. Several other variables that are potentially influenced by VC involvement like R&D allocations, analyst following, investment banker prestige, and success on road shows are also positively related to the survival time of IPO issuers. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000.

The Life Cycle of Initial Public Offering Firms

This study uses an integrated and comprehensive approach to study the evolution of IPO issuing firms to the three basic post-IPO states: survive as an independent firm, get acquired, or fail. We develop multinomial logit models that utilize information available at or prior to the IPO to predict the probability of subsequent transition to the three post-IPO states. We find that lower risk, larger firm size, higher investment banker prestige, higher pre-IPO operating performance, and higher industry R&D intensity increase the probability of survival relative to failure. We also find that higher firm size, higher industry R&D intensity, and industry concentration increase the probability of survival relative to being acquired. Finally, lower risk and higher investment banker prestige increase the probability of being acquired relative to failure. Overall, we identify several factors that influence the probability of subsequent transition to one of the three basic post-IPO states. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999.

Financial Advisors and Shareholder Wealth Gains in Corporate Takeovers

We examine the effect of financial advisor reputation on wealth gains in corporate takeovers. In view of the adversarial nature of a takeover, we construct a measure of the relative reputation of the advisor. We document that the absolute wealth gain as well as the share of the total takeover wealth gain accruing to the bidder (target) increases (decreases) as the reputation of the bidders advisor increases relative to that of the target. We also find that the total wealth created in the takeover is positively related to the reputation of bidder and target advisors. While bidder advisor reputation is positively related to the probability of bid success in our sample, we also present some evidence to suggest that bidders with better advisors are more likely to withdraw from potentially value-destroying takeovers.

Board Expertise: Do Directors from Related Industries Help Bridge the Information Gap?

We investigate the importance of board expertise by analyzing the role of “directors from related industries�? (DRIs) on a firm’s board. DRIs are officers and/or directors of companies in the upstream (supplier) or downstream (customer) industries of the firm. About 40% of firm-years in our sample have at least one DRI. We propose and test information, market structure, and agency hypotheses about when DRIs are likely to add value. Consistent with the information hypothesis, DRIs are present when the information gap is more severe, such as in innovative firms/industries and in firms with less informative stock prices. Consistent with the market structure hypothesis, DRIs are also more likely in firms with larger market share and in more concentrated or vertically integrated industries. After correcting for endogeneity, DRIs have an economically significant impact on firm value and performance – especially when information problems are worse and boards have relatively greater power to monitor managers. Hence, a possible explanation for DRIs not being sought more widely is managerial resistance to monitoring by a better informed board. Finally, DRIs appear to enhance the ability of firms to handle negative industry shocks, suggesting that they narrow the information gap.

On investment banker monitoring in the new issues market

This article primarily addresses two largely unanswered questions in the financial economics literature: (1) Is there a demand for lead bank monitoring in the IPO market? and (2) Does monitoring by lead investment banker lead to better post-issue performance? We find evidence consistent with the demand for underwriter monitoring in the IPO market. We examine variables which proxy for the incentives of lead underwriters to supply monitoring post-issue. These variables include lead investment bank reputation and whether warrants are issued to the underwriter by the issuing firm. We find that lead bank reputation is positively associated with the post-issue performance of IPO firms. We also examine whether additional valude added monitoring is provided by unaffiliated analysts. The number of unaffiliated analysts following is positively correlated with post-issue performance. Our results are consistent with thid party monitoring in the new issues market.

The Impact of Strategic Investment Choices on Post-Issue Operating Performance and Survival of US IPO Firms

We examine the impact of strategic investment choices at the time of the IPO on: (i) the post-issue operating performance and (ii) the likelihood of failure and time-to-failure of newly public US firms. Our post-issue operating performance analysis uses various performance metrics, benchmarks, and expectation models. Overall, our evidence indicates that the extent of diversification and industry-adjusted capital expenditures intensity are generally positively related to changes in operating performance. We do not, however, document a consistent relation between industry-adjusted R&D expenditures and changes in operating performance. The results from our survival analysis suggest that pre-issue managerial commitment to R&D spending and developing diversified product lines enhance the ability of IPO issuing firms to remain viable for longer periods of time. Our study highlights the impact of various managerial investment decisions on the subsequent performance of newly public firms.

The Dividend Initiation Decision of Newly Public Firms: Some Evidence on Signaling with Dividends

We track the dividend initiation (DI) decisions from a sample of 6,588 firms that went public during the period 1979–2005 and find that 873 of them initiated dividends. Our primary objective is to determine whether information signaling can explain the DI decision. We find that variables suggested by the dividend-signaling models of John and Williams (1985) and Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) are significant determinants of the DI decision and the associated announcement-period stock price effect. We also find support for the residual, agency, tax, clientele, transaction costs, catering, and life-cycle explanations of dividend policy.

On the Determinants, Financial and Operating Consequences, and the Product Market Effects of Product Recalls

We study a large sample of product recalls that include a wide variety of products such as consumer products, food, drug, medical devices, and automobiles and show that such product quality failures have significant adverse value consequences for the recalling firms. Our analysis sheds light on factors that affect the incidence of product recalls, the financial and operating consequences for the recalling firms, and the actions taken by them in response to the recall. We also study the value implications for the rivals and suppliers – which enable us to draw important inferences about product market linkages. We find that the financial condition, competitive position, coordination costs, incentives of workers and management, and monitoring environment impact recall likelihood. Recall events result in significant costs for key suppliers which are further exacerbated if they have made larger relationship-specific investments. Further, instead of benefiting from the recalling firms’ problems, industry rivals suffer adverse contagion effects, perhaps due to anticipated regulation and diminished perceptions about the product category. We find that a larger investment in brand capital alleviates the negative wealth effects for the recalling firms. Finally, using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that recalling firms suffer sales declines and increase advertising expenditures – consequences and policy changes that we further show are not just due to a continuation of a differential trend from before the recall event and, therefore, directly attributable to the recall.

The Influence of Directors from Related Industries in Shaping Firm Policies

Does the specific background and expertise of outside directors influence corporate policies? While the literature recognizes that directors contribute to firm value through their monitoring and advisory functions, the precise manner and extent to which directors’ expertise affects the firm’s operational and financial decisions is not well understood. We analyze this issue by identifying a group of directors that are likely to have considerable knowledge about the firm’s industry: directors from related upstream (supplier) or downstream (customer) industries (DRIs). We then investigate the impact of DRIs on specific corporate policies. We find that firms with DRIs benefit from: (1) shorter cash-conversion cycles, (2) lower inventory, (3) lower accounts receivable and, (4) higher accounts payable. We also find that firms with DRIs are less financially constrained as indicated by their lower cash-to-cash flow sensitivities. In addition, the investment to cash flow sensitivity is also lower with DRIs, thereby suggesting that they reduce investment distortions within firms. Further, investment responds less to stock prices (measured by Tobin’s Q) in firms with DRIs when the stock prices are not very informative – suggesting that DRIs act as alternative conduits of information. In a similar vein, we find that firms with DRIs utilize their production factors more efficiently (as measured by labor and total factor productivity), thus signifying that the industry expertise of DRIs helps the firm better anticipate industry conditions and trends.

Impact of Financial Leverage on the Incidence and Severity of Product Failures: Evidence from Product Recalls

We study the impact of the financial condition of firms on firms’ ability to produce safer products that result in fewer recalls. Using a variety of tests, including two quasi-natural experiments that result in exogenous negative industry cash-flow shocks, we find that firms with higher leverage or distress likelihood have a greater probability of a product recall. These firms also face more frequent and severe recalls. Further, firms with more debt due at the onset of the financial crisis experience a greater likelihood and frequency of recalls. We conclude that a firm’s financial condition has real effects that impact product safety.