Ornella Tarola

Time-to-Market in Vertically Differentiated Industries

We study the introduction of new products in a vertically differentiated industry. Innovative firms have to engage into reducing time-to-market investments in order to shorten the time interval between innovation and sales. Still, these investments generate irreversible costs which have to be put in balance with profits accruing to the firm when starting its sales earlier than otherwise. We characterize the optimal investment policies under various assumptions concerning the market structure.

Monopoly Pricing over Time and the Timing of Investments

We consider a monopoly producing a good whose demand grows over time. Whatever the price policy which is adopted, the monopolist invests in order to meet the resulting demand growth. She can only invest in indivisible factory units. We identify the optimal price policy, and the ensuing optimal sequence of investment time points the monopoly selects through time. We show that this sequence satisfies the constant cycle property observed under capacity expansion for an exogenous increase in demand (Manne, 1961).

Product innovation and firms' ownership

This paper explores (i) the incentives for an incumbent firm to acquire an entrant willing to sell a product innovation rather than openly competing with this entrant, and (ii) in case of acquisition, the incentives to sell simultaneously both the existing products and the new one rather than specializing on a single variant. We prove that, in some circumstances, an incumbent firm can find it profitable to make an acquisition proposal to the entrant. Nevertheless, in this acquisition scenario, a product proliferation strategy is never observed at equilibrium. Furthermore, while being available for sale, sometimes the innovation simply remains unexploited.

Pricing and financing transport infrastructures in switzerland. A success story

This chapter briefly presents the Swiss financing and regulation scheme of the transport system as it worked until 2001. The chapter then focuses on the relationship between Switzerland and the European Union (EU) and the emergence of the transalpine freight problem, which inspires the realized changes in the traditional pricing scheme. The subsequent section deals with the present pricing regime and the new policy target, according to new rules, which were introduced in January 2001. Finally, the chapter draws some conclusions on the impact of the new pricing regime and its potential to shift freight traffic from road to rail.

R&D cooperation, innovation, and growth.

This paper presents a standard endogenous growth framework in which the source of growth is represented by vertical innovations. The crucial assumption we introduce is that there is a positive information gap concerning the discovery of innovation. The aim of reducing the information-dissemination lag provides incentives for firms to decide to merge their research efforts. Also, we find that the skilled--unskilled wage gap is strongly related to this phenomenon. We prove that changing antitrust attitudes toward efficiency-motivated mergers in contestable industries may simultaneously explain observed changes in the industry structure, qualitative innovation, wage inequality, and labor-supply composition.

Vertical Differentiation and Collusion: Cannibalization or Proliferation?

In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning emerges and, if so, a fighting brand is marketed. We find that it is always more profitable for colluding firms to adopt a pricing strategy such that some variants are withdrawn from the market. Under pruning, these firms commercialize a fighting brand only when facing competitors in a low-end market. The same findings do not hold when firms are horizontally differentiated along a circle.

Air traffic expansion and monopoly princing

In this paper we examine the pricing policy, and the ensuing optimal expansion of the aircraft fleet capacity, for a monopolistic air company. We characterise the optimal pricing and show that the resulting capacity ex-pansion is such that the length of the time interval between two successive purchases of a plane is constant through time.

Mergers, Innovation, and Inequality

This paper presents a standard endogenous growth framework in which the source of growth is represented by vertical innovation. The crucial assumption we introduce is that there is a positive information gap concerning the discovery of innovation. The aim of reducing the information dissemination lag provides incentives for firms to decide to merge their research efforts. At the same time we find that the skilled/unskilled wage gap is strongly related to this phenomenon. We prove that changing antitrust attitudes toward efficienc-motivated mergers in contestable industries may simultaneously explain observed changes in the industry structure, in qualitative innovation, in wage inequality, and in labor supply composition.

Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products

Abstract This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To this aim, we introduce a three-stage game in which, at the first stage, three independent firms can decide to merge with their competitors via a sequential game of coalition formation and, at the second and third stage, they can optimally revise their qualities and prices, respectively. We study whether such binding agreements (i.e. full or partial mergers) can be sustained as subgame perfect equilibria of the coalition formation game, and analyze their effects on equilibrium qualities, prices and profits. We find that, although profitable, the merger-to-monopoly of all firms is not an outcome of the finite-horizon negotiation, where only partial mergers arise. Moreover, we show that all stable mergers always include the firm initially producing the bottom quality good and reduce the number of variants on sale.

A Note on Acquisition of Complements in a Vertically Differentiated Market

This note is concerned with the effects of joint ownership of complements when they are vertically differentiated. We provide strong arguments for the positive nature of network integration among firms, while showing at the same time that, in some circumstances, anti-competitive consequences can be observed under acquisition.