Marco A. Marini

A conjectural cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show that CCE exist for all symmetric supermodular games. Furthermore, we discuss the existence of a CCE in specific submodular games employed in the literature on environmental agreements.

Individual Uncertainty and the Political Acceptability of Road Pricing Policies

This paper presents a model regarding the role and relevance of individual specific uncertainty in explaining the acceptability of road pricing policies (RPP). The main assumptions of the model are: 1) decisions concerning the adoption of RPP are taken by politicians who operate under a reelection constraint and have perfect foresight on the aggregate voting intentions of their constituency; and 2) the agents of the economy are perfectly rational and informed, but uncertain about their personal evaluation of the public good after an RPP is adopted. These assumptions are discussed and their potential impacts are assessed. Main findings indicate that without money transfers and with no uncertainty, RPP will not be accepted, thus giving rise to an evident trade-off between economic efficiency and political acceptability; and, when assuming a high degree of individual specific uncertainty, the optimal level of RPP may, under given conditions concerning the number of voters and peoples preferences, become politically acceptable.

An Overview of Coalitions and Networks Formation Models for Economic Applications

This paper presents synthetically some recent developments in the theory of coalition and network formation. For this purpose, some major equilibrium concepts recently introduced to model the formation of coalition structures and networks among players are briefly reviewed and discussed. A few economic applications are also illustrated to give a flavour of the type of predictions such models are able to provide.

Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games

In this paper we review a number of coalitional solution concepts for the analysis of cartel and merger stability in oligopoly. We show that, although so far the industrial organization and the cooperative game-theoretic literature have proceeded somehow independently on this topic, the two approaches are highly inter-connected. We first consider the basic problem of the stability of the whole industry association of firms under oligopoly and, for this purpose, we introduce the concept of core in oligopoly games. We show that different assumptions on the behaviour as well as on the timing of the coalitions of firms yield very different results on the set of allocations which are core-stable. We then consider the stability of associations of firms organized in coalition structures different from the grand coalition. To this end, various coalition formation games recently introduced by the so called endogenous coalition formation literature are critically reviewed. Again, different assumptions concerning the timing and the behaviour of firms are shown to yield a wide range of different results. We conclude by reviewing some recent extensions of the coalitional analysis to oligopolistic markets with heterogeneous firms and incomplete information.

Optimal Compensation Structure in Consumer Cooperatives under Mixed Oligopoly

The main aim of this paper is to derive properties of an optimal compensation scheme for consumer cooperatives (Coops) in situations of strategic interaction with profitmaximizing firms (PMFs). Our model provides a reason why Coops are less prone than PMFs to pay variable bonuses to their managers. We show that this occurs under price competition when in equilibrium the Coop prefers to pay a straight salary to its manager whereas the profit-maximizing rival adopts a variable, high-powered incentive scheme. The main rationale is that, due to consumers’ preferences, a Coop is per se highly expansionary in term of output and, therefore, does not need to provide strong strategic incentives to their managers to expand output aggressively by undercutting its rival.

Measure up; A Better Way to Calculate GDP

To derive real GDP, the System of National Accounts 2008 (2008 SNA) recommends a technique called double deflation. Some countries use single deflation techniques, which fail to capture important relative price changes and introduce estimation errors in official GDP growth. We simulate the effects of single deflation to the GDP data of eight countries that use double deflation. We find that errors due to single deflation can be significant, but their magnitude and direction are not systematic over time and across countries. We conclude that countries still using single deflation should move to double deflation.

Vertical Differentiation and Collusion: Cannibalization or Proliferation?

In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning emerges and, if so, a fighting brand is marketed. We find that it is always more profitable for colluding firms to adopt a pricing strategy such that some variants are withdrawn from the market. Under pruning, these firms commercialize a fighting brand only when facing competitors in a low-end market. The same findings do not hold when firms are horizontally differentiated along a circle.

Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Sequential versus Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games

In many strategic settings comparing the payoffs obtained by players under full cooperation to those obtainable at a sequential (Stackelberg) equilibrium can be crucial to determine the outcome of the game. This happens, for instance, in repeated games in which players can break cooperation by acting sequentially, as well as in merger games in which firms are allowed to sequence their actions. Despite the relevance of these and other applications, no full-fledged comparisons between collusive and sequential payoffs have been performed so far. In this paper we show that even in symmetric duopoly games the ranking of cooperative and sequential payoffs can be extremely variable, particularly when the usual linear demand assumption is relaxed. Not surprisingly, the degree of strategic complementarity and substitutability of players’ actions (and, hence, the slope of their best replies) appears decisive to determine the ranking of collusive and sequential payoffs. Some applications to endogenous timing are discussed.

The Strategic Timing of R&D Agreements

We present a model of endogenous formation of R&D agreements among firms in which also the timing of R&D investment is made endogenous. The purpose is to bridge two usually separate streams of literature, the noncooperative formation of R&D alliances and the endogenous timing literature. Our approach allows to consider the formation of R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable R&D agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In such a case, to be stable a R&D agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, avoiding any delay. When instead R&D spillover rates are sufficiently high, the cooperation in R&D constitutes a profitable option, although firms also possess the incentive to sequence their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and the knowledge leaks mainly from the leader to the follower, to invest as follower becomes extremely profitable, making R&D alliances hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.

Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I

We introduce here the second volume of the Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, by L. C. Corchon and M. A. Marini (ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA, describing its main aim and its basic structure.