Oya Celasun

Primary Surplus Behavior and Risks to Fiscal Sustainability in Emerging Market Countries

This paper proposes a probabilistic approach to public debt sustainability analysis (DSA) using fan charts. These depict the magnitude of risks upside and downside surrounding public debt projections as a result of uncertain economic conditions and policies. We propose a simulation algorithm for the path of public debt under realistic shock configurations, combining pure economic disturbances (to growth, interest rates, and exchange rates), the endogenous policy response to these, and the possible shocks arising from fiscal policy itself. The paper emphasizes the role of fiscal behavior, as well as the structure of disturbances facing the economy and due to fiscal policy, in shaping the risk profile of public debt. Fan charts for debt are derived from the marriage between the pattern of shocks on the one hand and the endogenous response of fiscal policy on the other. Applications to Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey are used to illustrate the approach and its limitations.

The 1994 Currency Crisis in Turkey

As a result of Turkeys currency crisis in 1994, output fell 6 percent, inflation rose to three-digit levels, the Central Bank lost half of its reserves, and the exchange rate (against the US dollar) depreciated by more than half in the first three months of the year. The author presents stylized facts associated with the governments debt-financing mechanisms and other relevant macroeconomic variables to show the systems inherent fragility at the time of the crisis and to clarify the extent to which different factors contributed to the crisis. The author argues that huge requirements for public sector borrowing in 1993 and early 1994, combined with major policy errors in financing the deficit, led to the currency crash. As a result of interventions to control interest rates and treasury borrowing at the same time, the market for domestic borrowing almost disappeared, the government turned to monetization for financing, and the value of the overappreciated Turkish lira plummeted.

On the Properties of Various Estimators for Fiscal Reaction Functions

This paper evaluates the bias of the least-squares-with-dummy-variables (LSDV) method in fiscal reaction function estimations. A growing number of studies estimate fiscal policy reaction functions-that is, relationships between the primary fiscal balance and its determinants, including public debt and the output gap. A previously unexplored methodological issue in these estimations is that lagged debt is not a strictly exogenous variable, which biases the LSDV estimator in short panels. We derive the bias analytically to understand its determinants and run Monte Carlo simulations to assess its likely size in empirical work. We find the bias to be smaller than the bias of the LSDV estimator in a comparable autoregressive dynamic panel model and show the LSDV method to outperform a number of alternatives in estimating fiscal reaction functions.

Obstacles to Disinflation: What is the Role of Fiscal Expectations?

Is backward-looking behavior in pricing or imperfect credibility of stabilization efforts responsible for the failure of inflation rates to decline to targeted levels during many disinflation programs? This paper assesses the relative importance of these two factors during a number of disinflation attempts in developing and transition economies. Using survey data, we find that expectations of future inflation play a much more important role than past inflation in shaping the inflation process. We also find that an improvement in primary fiscal balances significantly reduces inflation expectations. This suggests that during stabilization episodes, priority should be given to building fiscal credibility by strengthening public finances.

Sovereign debt and corporate borrowing costs in emerging markets

We document that the corporate sector faces higher borrowing costs when the external debt of the public sector is higher. By contrast, no significant relationship is found between domestic public debt and corporate borrowing costs. An increase in sovereign debt by one standard deviation from its sample mean is associated with 9% higher loan yield spreads. The correlation is considerably higher in countries with weak creditor rights and past sovereign default episodes. Overall, these findings suggest substantial adverse linkages between public external debt and private financing costs.

An Analysis of Money Demand and Inflation in the Islamic Republic of Iran

This study examines money demand and inflation dynamics in the Islamic Republic of Iran using quarterly data for the period 1990/91-2001/02 and tests whether the disinflation during 2000/01-2001/02 represents a structural break in the data. A long-run money market equilibrium condition is identified and the short-run behavior of the inflation, measured in terms of non-administered component of the consumer price index (CPI) is modeled conditional on the disequilibria in the money market. Estimation results indicate that the stabilization of the exchange rate on account of strong oil revenues during 2000/01-2001/02 buoyed the demand for domestic money and contributed to the decline in inflation. Tests of model stability do not point to a structural shift in the inflation equation during the period of analysis.

Boon or Burden? The Effect of Private Sector Debt on the Risk of Sovereign Default in Developing Countries

We explore how the share of the private sector in total external debt affects perceived creditworthiness and the likelihood of sovereign default in developing countries. While there are theoretical arguments both in favor and against a stabilizing role of private-sector borrowing, the evidence supports the notion that a greater share of the private sector in total external debt is associated with a reduced likelihood of sovereign default.

Nominal Exchange Rate Anchoring Under Inflation Inertia

This paper develops a theory of inflation inertia based on forward looking staggered price setting in the nontradable goods sector of a small open economy. Unlike current theories of sticky prices, transitions to a lower steady state inflation rate take time even if they are fully credible, and they are associated with significant output losses in nontradables There is a welfare trade-off between these output losses and the gains from smaller inflationary distortions. Gains exceed losses for most calibrations. The optimal steady state is the Friedman rule.

Sticky Inflation and the Real Effects of Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization

Exchange rate-based inflation stabilization (ERBS) policies are associated with a boom-recession cycle in economic activity and sustained real exchange rate appreciation. A class of models in the literature has explained these empirical regularities with the lack of credibility of the stabilization plans. The lack-of-credibility models typically assume perfectly forward-looking pricing behavior without inflation stickiness and attribute the slow decline in inflation to the consumption boom that occurs due to the perceived temporariness of the ERBS policy. This paper tests the empirical validity of forward-looking pricing behavior in Mexico and Turkey, two countries which have experienced ERBS. It finds that the forward- and backward-looking components of inflation weigh approximately equally in pricing behavior, and therefore, that inflation is partially sticky. The paper then develops the theoretical implications of partial inflation stickiness in a lack of credibility model of ERBS and concludes that the presence of stickiness significantly reduces the persistence of the consumption boom predicted by the model, but helps to explain the recession in the late phase of the stabilization.

Banking Sector Reforms and Corporate Borrowing Costs in Emerging Markets

Using a panel data set of syndicated bank loans in emerging markets, we find that banking sector reforms that improve bank competition and facilitate bank privatization lead to lower borrowing costs, suggesting that these reforms improve efficiency in credit markets. Reforms that tighten bank supervision, however, increase loan spreads, consistent with better risk pricing with effective oversight. Bank competition and supervision reforms affect borrowing costs primarily in countries with low corruption and well-functioning legal environment. Bank privatization reforms are effective in countries with better investment profiles. These results suggest that the success of banking reforms depend closely on the quality of institutions.