P. W. Singer

The humanitarian transformation: expanding global intervention capacity

Although the threat of mass casualty terrorism has altered strategic priorities in the United States, the global community as a whole faces many of the same problems that it faced in the 1990s: civil wars; failed or failing states; and other humanitarian disasters around the world. The Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, and their difficult aftermaths, show the overlap between humanitarian and geostrategic interests. These interventions also demonstrate that demanding military stabilisation missions will be required as much for the ‘war on terrorism’ as for traditional peacekeeping. Civil conflicts still shape regional and global politics and development, and in many cases are still preventable or at least stoppable. Moreover, trends in demographics, economics, the global weapons market and international politics suggest that they are unlikely to diminish much further on their own. 1 Several hundred thousand people a year continue to lose their lives directly to war as well as to war-related famine and disease. Almost 90% of the dead are innocent non-combatants. A growing percentage of combatants are now child soldiers, in some wars as high as 60%. 2 But these wars have other costs as well. They provide terrorist groups with havens, as in Afghanistan, and with motivating causes, as in the Middle East and South Asia. Moreover, they not only help keep Africa and other parts of the developing world mired in misery, economic stagnation, and disease, but in a world of globalisation, have implications for public health across the planet. There is also a political cost. The continuation of these wars starkly undercuts the common Western argument that democracies protect and promote human rights. In a world essentially

A New Model Afghan Army

AN UNFORESEEN RESULT of the U.S. militarys stunning success in Afghanistan was the overnight suspension of that countrys vicious, 23-year-old civil war. Afghanistans ftiture-including whether it again degenerates into a terrorist base-now largely depends on what is made of this precious opportunity. In countries recovering from civil war, the most critical requirement for long-term peace is the demobilization of the formerly warring parties and their integration within a unified military. Angola and the former Yugoslavia provide cautionary tales about the difficulties of military reintegration; Mozambique and South Africa give more hopeful examples of how building a cohesive army can help solidify peace after a national conflict. In Afghanistan, the process of military integration has barely begun, but it is already close to collapse. Not only are perennial ethnic, factional, and religious disputes hampering progress, but the political elements of postwar transition are moving ahead without the requisite military corollary. Indeed, the interim admin istration inaugurated in December zoci never answered basic questions about the size, composition, and tasks of a national army. Meanwhile, the international community remains ambivalent about how it will assist, and what little aid it has promised has been slow in coming.

Bosnia 2000: Phoenix or Flames?

The Dayton Peace Agreement was intended to signify a break with the usual pattern of Balkan history, where war begets war. In the aftermath of the Bosnian war, a massive international effort was launched involving billions of dollars and thousands of soldiers, administrators, aid workers, and diplomats. The aim was to supplant militant ethnic nationalism with pluralism and economic liberalism. Bosnia was not just to be rebuilt; it was to be re-created transformed into a stable, prosperous democratic society. Nearly five years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, much has been accomplished in this odd demi-protectorate of the international community. The military side of the effort has been a resounding success, having achieved all of its major goals. The guns are silent, the respective local armed forces are corralled back at their bases, and hundreds of thousands of soldiers have been demobilized. The civilian effort, loosely coordinated by the international Office of the High Representative (OHR), has proved a much more arduous task, although the list of achievements is significant. State institutions at all levels have been created from a tripartite presidency and joint parliament on down to local civic councils. A new national currency, a new flag, and even a Bosnian state seal and anthem are in place. Several internationally monitored elections have been held. Only last summer, over 30 world leaders attended the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo, providing further proof of how far things have come. Symbolically, it was held in a stadium outside the city that had once been completely decimated by cannon fire and was now rebuilt.

To Win the “War on Terror,” We Must First Win the “War of Ideas”: Here's How

This article addresses the critical role that public diplomacy plays in improving the deteriorating image of the United States in the Muslim world. The authors argue that both public diplomacy and policies, including those on civil liberties, are vital to U.S. success in the war on terrorism and that the next U.S. president must designate this effort as a matter of highest national security importance. Many in the Muslim world believe that the war on terrorism is essentially a war on Islam; this view impedes the success of an effective foreign policy strategy. Previous efforts of public diplomacy have lacked funding, energy, focus, and an integrated strategy. The authors define six principles to improve Americas security through winning the war of ideas, including addressing civil liberties concerns, and engaging diverse constituencies in the Muslim world. Finally, the authors describe ten public diplomacy initiatives to improve U.S.–Muslim world relations.

La guerre connectée : les implications de la révolution robotique

Nous n’en sommes qu’au debut des revolutions introduites dans la guerre par la robotique. Les instruments automatises sont plus faciles d’usage, plus autonomes, la palette de leurs utilisations s’elargit. Mais ces instruments posent de multiples questions : ils peuvent etre « retournes » et soulevent des problemes de doctrine et de strategie. Ils generent aussi des problemes juridiques et interrogent le rapport du systeme de gouvernement et de la population a l’acte de guerre.