Paisley Nathan Livingston

Philosophical Perspectives on Fictional Characters

This paper takes up a series of basic philosophical questions about the nature and existence of fictional characters. We begin with realist approaches that hinge on the thesis that at least some claims about fictional characters can be right or wrong because they refer to something that exists, such as abstract objects. Irrealist approaches deny such realist postulations and hold instead that fictional characters are a figment of the human imagination. A third family of approaches, based on work by Alexius Meinong, seeks an alternative to the realist/irrealist dilemma. Neo-Meinongian theories rely upon a distinction between being and existence, the key contention being that unlike human beings, fictional characters have only the former. Having surveyed relevant work by contemporary metaphysicians and philosophers of language, this paper discusses issues related to the distinction between characters and other aspects of the content of fictions, including the relation between personality theory and literary conceptions of character.

What is mimetic desire

Abstract This essay provides a conceptual analysis and reconstruction of the notion of mimetic desire, first proposed in Girard (1961). The basic idea behind the idea of mimetic desire is that imitation can play a key role in human motivational processes. Yet mimetic desire is distinguished from related notions such as social modelling and imitation. In episodes of mimetic desire, the process in which the imitative agents desires are formed is oriented by a particular species of belief about the model or mediator whose desire is copied. These ‘tutelary beliefs’ essential to mimetic desire are distinguished from the ‘thin’ and purely instrumental beliefs about the model central to Banduras (1986) social cognitive theory and similar models of observational learning. The problem of the identity of the objects of desire in episodes of social modelling motivates a distinction between internal and external forms of interpersonal mediation. Girards claims about cognitive constraints associated with mimetic de...

Intentions and interpretations

Even if everything is up for grabs in philosophy, some things are very difficult to doubt. It is hard to believe, for example, that no one ever acts intentionally. Even the most powerful arguments for the unreality of intentional action could do no more, we believe, than place one in roughly the position in which pre-Aristotelian Greeks found themselves when presented with one of Zenos arguments that nothing can move from any given point A to any other point B. One argument has it, for example, that in order to move from one point to another, a thing must first move to the half-way point; to do that, it must move half way to that point; and so on forever: so nothing ever moves at all. The argument undoubtedly stopped some auditors in their tracks; but eventually they moved on, most of them fully confident that they were doing precisely that. That at least some behavior is intentional is clearest from the

Authorship Redux: On Some Recent and Not-So-Recent Work in Literary Theory

Did roland Barthes, michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, or other “poststructuralist” theorists writing in the wake of may ’68 come up with any good ideas about authorship and related topics in the philosophy of literature? the three volumes under review have a common point of departure in that broad question, but offer a number of contrasting responses to it. in what follows i describe and assess some of the various perspectives on offer in these 700 or so pages. the short answer to my initial question comes at the end. Carla Benedetti’s book was first published in 1999 in milan as L’ombra lunga dell’autore: Indagine su una figura cancellata. professor of italian and theory of Literature at the university of pisa, and recurrent Visiting professor at nyu, she clearly shares some of Foucault’s basic assumptions about authorship: “it is the reader or viewer who transforms the artist’s selections, which in themselves may even be random or compelled, into subjective choices endowed with intentionality: that intentionality

Film and the new psychology

Abstract This paper identifies and critiques some of the interdisciplinary strategies adopted in recent trends in cinema studies. Prevalent psychological assumptions and normative claims are examined, and some alternative approaches are proposed. Typical theses about narrative in the cinema provide a particular point of focus.

Aesthetic Experience and a Belletristic Definition of Literature

A belletristic conception of literature is, quite generally, one in which literature is defined in terms of some notion of fine art. There are rival belletristic conceptions, as well as rivals to all such conceptions. My primary goal in this paper is to consider how a belletristic definition may best be delineated. My assumption is not that the word ‘literature’, its cognates, and related terms in other languages designate either a natural kind or a Platonic Idea or essence; instead, the term has a variety of appropriate uses in diverse contexts and has been associated with significantly different classifications – as is ably documented by Anders Pettersson and Lars-Olof Ahlberg in their contributions to this volume.1 My attempt to set forth a cogent, belletristic conception is motivated by the idea that although artistic values and achievements do not exhaust the multiple facets of things aptly called ‘literature’, they do provide one important way of distinguishing between some different types and qualities of discourse. I begin by setting forth a way of distinguishing between aesthetic and other sorts of experiences. With that distinction in mind, I turn to the question of how a belletristic concept of literature, based on that notion, may be elucidated and motivated.

Language, Truth, and Literature: A Defence of Literary Humanism by Gaskin, Richard

It is a basic tenet of many versions of humanism that our primary goal in the interpretation of literature should be the discovery of the works’ original meanings. Antihumanists have complained that such a discovery is neither possible nor desirable. In this learned and sophisticated book, Richard Gaskin replies to the anti-humanists by arguing that understanding the meaning determined in the context of the work’s origin is the only way to acquire the worthwhile knowledge that some literary works can convey; he also contends that, in some cases, such an understanding is essential to the appreciation of the work’s aesthetic value. The upshot is that the ‘old historical’ goal of recovering original meaning is both worthwhile and within reach. As this reviewer ranks himself amongst Gaskin’s humanistic fellow travellers, there is a temptation to devote the largest part of this short review to the question of how we may best articulate a humanist aesthetics. Yet Gaskin’s extensive engagement with post-structuralist theories should not be passed over. He carefully corrects many fallacies and undergraduate philosophical errors that influential post-structuralist theorists have committed in print. Key motifs include use/mention fallacies and the abuse of scare-quotes [246–50], the conflation of transcendental and empirical issues [271–7], the overworking of the term ‘performative’ coupled with a total failure to understand John Austin’s performative/constative distinction [336–40], failures to observe the difference between epistemological and metaphysical questions [263], flagrant performative and semantic contradictions, and risk-free ivory-tower pseudoactivism. A crescendo is Gaskin’s citation of Catherine Belsey’s fatuous pronouncement that ‘the logic of deconstruction has the effect of dismantling the founding assumptions of Western philosophy in its entirety’ [336]. Instead of finding the ofttouted ‘rigour’ and ‘logic’ in the corpus of deconstruction, Gaskin discovers texts ‘generously pitted with errors’ (as he aptly puts it with reference to a book by J. Hillis Miller) [338]. The conclusion to be drawn is that the extraordinary academic success of post-structuralism’s discursive assault on the humanist project stands in flagrant contrast to the extremely low evidentiary and argumentative standards of this style of work. I turn now to the intra muros discussion of some of humanism’s basic tenets. Gaskin’s literary humanism embraces ‘at least’ four main theses:

Book review : Language, truth, and literature : a defence of literary humanism

It is a basic tenet of many versions of humanism that our primary goal in the interpretation of literature should be the discovery of the works’ original meanings. Antihumanists have complained that such a discovery is neither possible nor desirable. In this learned and sophisticated book, Richard Gaskin replies to the anti-humanists by arguing that understanding the meaning determined in the context of the work’s origin is the only way to acquire the worthwhile knowledge that some literary works can convey; he also contends that, in some cases, such an understanding is essential to the appreciation of the work’s aesthetic value. The upshot is that the ‘old historical’ goal of recovering original meaning is both worthwhile and within reach. As this reviewer ranks himself amongst Gaskin’s humanistic fellow travellers, there is a temptation to devote the largest part of this short review to the question of how we may best articulate a humanist aesthetics. Yet Gaskin’s extensive engagement with post-structuralist theories should not be passed over. He carefully corrects many fallacies and undergraduate philosophical errors that influential post-structuralist theorists have committed in print. Key motifs include use/mention fallacies and the abuse of scare-quotes [246–50], the conflation of transcendental and empirical issues [271–7], the overworking of the term ‘performative’ coupled with a total failure to understand John Austin’s performative/constative distinction [336–40], failures to observe the difference between epistemological and metaphysical questions [263], flagrant performative and semantic contradictions, and risk-free ivory-tower pseudoactivism. A crescendo is Gaskin’s citation of Catherine Belsey’s fatuous pronouncement that ‘the logic of deconstruction has the effect of dismantling the founding assumptions of Western philosophy in its entirety’ [336]. Instead of finding the ofttouted ‘rigour’ and ‘logic’ in the corpus of deconstruction, Gaskin discovers texts ‘generously pitted with errors’ (as he aptly puts it with reference to a book by J. Hillis Miller) [338]. The conclusion to be drawn is that the extraordinary academic success of post-structuralism’s discursive assault on the humanist project stands in flagrant contrast to the extremely low evidentiary and argumentative standards of this style of work. I turn now to the intra muros discussion of some of humanism’s basic tenets. Gaskin’s literary humanism embraces ‘at least’ four main theses:

Girard and the Origin of Culture

I certainly share Andrew McKenna’ s enthusiasm for some of Rene Girard’ s ideas, and admire his effort to mediate between Girard and aspects of post-structuralist thought. Yet I am afraid we disagree on a number of very basic points. This disagreement does not concern the tenets of some kind of Girardian orthodoxy; rather, what is at stake are different ways Girard’ s insights may be interpreted and extended. In this regard, the most basic difference between McKenna’ s position and my own involves my skepticism about the proposed bridge between deconstruction and Girard’ s anthropology.

Discipliner la communication : sémiologie et cinéma

Habiendo abandonado el analisis semiotico por el analisis orientado hacia la antropologia y la sociologia, Paisley Livingston demuestra que Metz partio a la busqueda de un metodo disciplinario pero que volvio a caer en la tematica tradicional de los estudios cinematograficos. Livingston hace una critica de la representacion en tanto que substrato epistemologico de una teoria de la cumunicacion cinematografica.