Berys Gaut

Interpreting the arts: The patchwork theory

Intentionalism in philosophical aesthetics, like utilitarianism in moral philosophy, is remarkable both for its longevity and for the fact that its adherents continue to believe that some version of it must be true, even if all current versions have flaws. Thus an adequate response to intentionalism should provide a diagnosis of the underlying reasons why it is so appealing, as well as exhibit the problems with the species of it currently available. In this paper I offer such a diagnosis and in place of intentionalism propose an alternative view, the patchwork theory, which holds that no global theory of interpretation, intentionalist or otherwise, is correct. Instead, one needs a series of local theories of interpretation. The argument advanced here has important consequences for understanding the relation between interpretation and evaluation, for the role of relativism and viewer construction in interpretation and for the methodology of philosophical aesthetics.

Mixed Motivations: Creativity as a Virtue

The thought that creativity is a kind of virtue is an attractive one. Virtues are valuable traits that are praised and admired, and creativity is a widely celebrated trait in our society. In philosophical ethics, epistemology, and increasingly aesthetics, virtue-theoretical approaches are influential, so an account of creativity as a virtue can draw on well-established theories. Several philosophers, including Linda Zagzebski, Christine Swanton and Matthew Kieran, have argued for the claim that creativity is a virtue, locating this claim within a broader picture of intellectual, ethical and aesthetic virtues respectively. Moreover, a prominent research programme in psychology, led by Teresa Amabile, holds that people have an intrinsic motivation when they are creative, and this seems seamlessly to fit with the view that creativity is a virtue, for it is often held that a requirement for a trait to be a virtue is that the virtuous agent acts from an intrinsic motivation.