Pascal Courty

An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives

This article studies a particular kind of gaming responses to explicit incentives in a large government organization. The gaming responses we consider occur when agents strategically report their performance outcomes to maximize their awards. An important contribution of this work is to examine whether this behavior diverts resources (e.g., agents’ time) from productive activities or whether it simply reflects an accounting phenomenon. We evaluate the efficiency impact of the behavior we identify and find that it has a negative impact on the true goal of the organization.

Ticket Pricing Under Demand Uncertainty

This paper studies the case of a monopolist who sells tickets to consumers who learn new information about their demands over time. The monopolist can sell early to uninformed consumers and/or close to the event date to informed ones, or it can ration tickets and allow ticket holders to resell. I show that rationing and intertemporal sales are never optimal. More surprising, the monopolist cannot do strictly better by allowing resale. I discuss the implications of the model for the pricing practices observed in ticket markets.

Setting the Standard in Performance Measurement Systems

ABSTRACT A fundamental challenge in the design of performance measurement and incentive systems is the establishment of appropriate benchmark levels of performance, also known as performance standards. Drawing from the information economics, contract theory and public administration literatures, we derive theoretical implications for the construction of performance standards. We then assess alternative methods that are commonly used to construct performance standards and consider their application in performance measurement systems in public programs. We draw out important lessons for the establishment of performance benchmarks and other implications for performance standards system design in public organizations.

Timing of Seasonal Sales

We present a model of timing of seasonal sales where stores choose several designs at the beginning of the season without knowing wich one, if any, will be fashionable. Fashionable designs have a chance to fetch high prices in fashion markets while non-fashionable ones must be sold in a discount market. In the beginning of the season, stores charge high prices in the hope of capturing their fashion market. As the end of the season approaches with goods still on the shelves, stores adjust downward their expectations that they are carrying a fashionable design, and may have sales to capture the discount market. Having a greater number of designs induces a store to put one of them on sales earlier to test the market. Moreover, price competition in the discount market induces stores to start sales earlier because of a greater perceived first-mover advantage in capturing the discount market. More competition, perhaps due to decreases in the cost of product innovation, makes sales occur even earlier. These results are consistent with the observation that the trend toward earlier sales since mid-1970s coincides with increasing product varieties in fashion good markets and increasing store competition.

A General Test for Distortions in Performance Measures

Results from the incentive literature suggest that performance measures are often distorted, eliciting dysfunctional and unintended responses. The existence of these responses, however, is difficult to demonstrate in practice because this behavior is typically hidden from the researcher. We present a simple model showing that one can test for the existence of distortions by estimating the change in the association between a performance measure and the true goal of the organization with the measures introduction. Using data from a public-sector organization, we find evidence consistent with the existence of distortions. We draw implications for the selection of performance measures.

Sales, Quantity Surcharge, and Consumer Inattention

Quantity surcharges occur when retailers carry a product in two sizes and offer a promotion on the small size: the large size then costs more per unit than the small one. When quantity surcharges occur, sales of the large size decline only slightly even though the same quantity can be purchased for less. We document this behavior in two data sets and four product categories. It is consistent with the notion of passive shoppers found in the industrial organization literature and the notion of rational inattention in macroeconomics. We discuss implications for consumer decision making, demand estimation, and firm pricing.

The Pricing of Art and the Art of Pricing: Pricing Styles in the Concert Industry

We document the existence of pricing styles in the concert industry. Artists differ in the extent to which they rely on second- and third-degree price discrimination and in how likely they are to sell out concerts. Most strikingly, artists who use multiple seating categories are more likely to vary prices across markets and less likely to sell out concerts. These patterns are difficult to explain under a standard profit maximization paradigm. The hypothesis that artists differ in their willingness to exploit market power provides a plausible framework for explaining these patterns in artist pricing style.

Product Launches and Buying Frenzies: A Dynamic Perspective

Buying frenzies in which a firm intentionally undersupplies a product during its initial launch phase are a common practice within several industries such as electronics (cell phones, video games, game consoles), luxury cars, and fashion goods. We develop a dynamic model of buying frenzies that captures the production and sales of a product over time by the firm and then characterize the conditions under which frenzies are an optimal policy for the firm. We show that buying frenzies occur when customers are sufficiently uncertain about their product valuations and when customers discount the future but not excessively. Further, we propose a measure of

Performance Incentives with Award Constraints

This Paper studies the provision of incentives in a large US training organization, which is divided into about 50 independent pools of training agencies. The number and the size of the agencies within each pool vary greatly. Each pool distributes performance incentive awards to the training agencies it supervises, subject to two constraints: the awards cannot be negative and the sum of the awards cannot exceed an award budget. We characterize the optimal award function and derive simple predictions about how award prizes should depend on the number of agencies, on their sizes, and on their performances. Our results indicate that the constraints on the award distribution bind and reduce the overall efficiency of the incentive system.

Do Fans Care about Compliance to Doping Regulations in Sports? The Impact of PED Suspension in Baseball

There is little evidence in support of the main economic rationale for regulating athletic doping that doping reduces fan interest. The introduction of random testing for performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) by Major League Baseball (MLB) offers unique data to investigate the issue. The announcement of a PED violation (a) initially reduces home-game attendance by 8%, (b) has no impact on home-game attendance after 15 days, and (c) has a small negative impact on the game attendance for other MLB teams. This is the first systematic evidence that doping decreases consumer demand for sporting events.