Patrick A. McLaughlin

RegData: A numerical database on industry-specific regulations for all United States industries and federal regulations, 1997-2012: RegData: US federal regulation data

We introduce RegData, formerly known as the Industry-specific Regulatory Constraint Database. RegData annually quantifies federal regulations by industry and regulatory agency for all federal regulations from 1997–2012. The quantification of regulations at the industry level for all industries is without precedent. RegData measures regulation for industries at the two, three, and four-digit levels of the North American Industry Classification System. We created this database using text analysis to count binding constraints in the wording of regulations, as codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, and to measure the applicability of regulatory text to different industries. We validate our measures of regulation by examining known episodes of regulatory growth and deregulation, as well as by comparing our measures to an existing, cross-sectional measure of regulation. Researchers can use this database to study the determinants of industry regulations and to study regulations’ effects on a massive array of dependent variables, both across industries and time. JEL codes: K2, L5, N4, Y1

RegData: A Numerical Database on Industry-Specific Regulations for All U.S. Industries and Federal Regulations, 1997-2012

We introduce RegData, formerly known as the Industry-Specific Regulatory Constraint Database. RegData annually quantifies federal regulations by industry and by regulatory agency for all federal regulations from 1997 to 2012. The quantification of regulations at the industry level for all industries is without precedent. RegData measures regulation for industries at the two-, three-, and four-digit levels of the North American Industry Classification System. We created this database using text analysis to count binding constraints in the wording of regulations, as codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, and to measure the applicability of regulatory text to different industries. We validate our measures of regulation by examining known episodes of regulatory growth and deregulation as well as by comparing our measures to an existing, cross-sectional measure of regulation. We then demonstrate several plausible relationships between industry regulation and variables of economic interest. Researchers can use this database to study the determinants of industry regulations and to study regulations’ effects on a massive array of dependent variables, both across industries and across time.

The Cumulative Cost of Regulations

We estimate the effects of federal regulation on value added to GDP for a panel of 22 industries in the United States over a period of 35 years (1977–2012). The structure of our linear specification is explicitly derived from the closed-form solutions of a multisector Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth. We allow regulation to enter the specification in a flexible manner. Our estimates of the model’s parameters are then identified from covariation in some standard sector-specific data joined with RegData 2.2, which measures the incidence of regulations on industries based on a text analysis of federal regulatory code. With the model’s parameters fitted to real data, we confidently conduct counterfactual experiments on alternative regulatory environments. Our results show that economic growth has been dampened by approximately 0.8 percent per annum since 1980. Had regulation been held constant at levels observed in 1980, our model predicts that the economy would have been nearly 25 percent larger by 2012 (i.e., regulatory growth since 1980 cost GDP

Something in the Water? Testing for Groundwater Quality Information in the Housing Market

4 trillion in 2012, or about

Does Haste Make Waste in Regulatory Analysis

13,000 per capita).

From Lawyer to Judge: Advancement, Sex, and Name-Calling

I test the level of information regarding possible groundwater contamination in the residential real estate market in Washington County, Minnesota. An approximately seven square-mile trichloroethylene plume has affected hundreds of households’ water supplies since at least 1988 in the region. I find that homeowners were initially well-informed by market forces, but were later somewhat misinformed by government actions regarding the potential of water contamination from the plume. A disclosure law passed in 2003 may have added new, low-cost, and imperfect information to the market that could explain the change in informational awareness.

Empirical Tests for Midnight Regulations and Their Effect on OIRA Review Time

Most federal agencies must conduct economic analysis when proposing major regulations. This paper uses a new data set scoring the quality of analysis accompanying proposed regulations in 2008 to assess whether some types of regulations receive more thorough analysis than others. Previous scholarship speculates that “midnight regulations” receive less thorough consideration, and the Office of Management and Budget asserts that agencies rarely estimate benefits and costs of “transfer” regulations that describe how agencies will spend or collect money. Our tests find that “midnight” regulations proposed after June 1, 2008, and “transfer” regulations both have significantly lower-quality analysis.

Regulation and Poverty: An Empirical Examination of the Relationship between the Incidence of Federal Regulation and the Occurrence of Poverty Across the States

This paper provides the first empirical test of the Portia Hypothesis: females with masculine monikers are more successful in legal careers. Utilizing South Carolina microdata, we look for correlation between an individuals advancement to a judgeship and his/her names masculinity, which we construct from the joint empirical distribution of names and gender in the states entire population of registered voters. We find robust evidence that nominally masculine females are favored over other females. Hence, our results support the Portia Hypothesis.

Regdata 3.0 User's Guide

The midnight regulations phenomenon - an increase in the rate of regulation promulgation during the final months of an outgoing presidents term - is empirically tested using data on the number of economically significant regulations reviewed each month. Submissions of economically significant regulations to Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) are found to increase by seven percent during midnight periods. Spikes in regulatory activity, such as those of midnight periods, are shown to decrease the amount of time regulations are reviewed at OIRA, perhaps because of budget and staff limitations. Evaluated at the mean, one additional economically significant regulation submitted to OIRA decreases the mean review time for all regulations by about half a day. If OIRA review improves the quality of regulations, then any phenomenon such as midnight regulations that leads to spikes in regulatory activity and decreases review time could result in the proliferation of low quality regulations.

Trade Flow Consequences of the European Union’s Regionalization of Environmental Regulations

We estimate the impact of federal regulations on poverty rates in the 50 US states using the recently created Federal Regulation and State Enterprise (FRASE) index, which is an industry-weighted measure of the burden of federal regulations at the state level. Controlling for many other factors known to influence poverty rates, we find a robust, positive, and statistically significant relationship between the FRASE index and poverty rates across states. Specifically, we find that a 10 percent increase in the effective federal regulatory burden on a state is associated with an approximate 2.5 percent increase in the poverty rate. This paper fills an important gap in both the poverty and the regulation literature because it is the first paper to estimate the relationship between these variables. Moreover, our results have practical implications for federal policymakers and regulators, because the increased poverty that results from additional regulations should be considered when weighing the costs and benefits of additional regulations.