Omar Al-Ubaydli

RegData: A numerical database on industry-specific regulations for all United States industries and federal regulations, 1997-2012: RegData: US federal regulation data

We introduce RegData, formerly known as the Industry-specific Regulatory Constraint Database. RegData annually quantifies federal regulations by industry and regulatory agency for all federal regulations from 1997–2012. The quantification of regulations at the industry level for all industries is without precedent. RegData measures regulation for industries at the two, three, and four-digit levels of the North American Industry Classification System. We created this database using text analysis to count binding constraints in the wording of regulations, as codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, and to measure the applicability of regulatory text to different industries. We validate our measures of regulation by examining known episodes of regulatory growth and deregulation, as well as by comparing our measures to an existing, cross-sectional measure of regulation. Researchers can use this database to study the determinants of industry regulations and to study regulations’ effects on a massive array of dependent variables, both across industries and time. JEL codes: K2, L5, N4, Y1

RegData: A Numerical Database on Industry-Specific Regulations for All U.S. Industries and Federal Regulations, 1997-2012

We introduce RegData, formerly known as the Industry-Specific Regulatory Constraint Database. RegData annually quantifies federal regulations by industry and by regulatory agency for all federal regulations from 1997 to 2012. The quantification of regulations at the industry level for all industries is without precedent. RegData measures regulation for industries at the two-, three-, and four-digit levels of the North American Industry Classification System. We created this database using text analysis to count binding constraints in the wording of regulations, as codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, and to measure the applicability of regulatory text to different industries. We validate our measures of regulation by examining known episodes of regulatory growth and deregulation as well as by comparing our measures to an existing, cross-sectional measure of regulation. We then demonstrate several plausible relationships between industry regulation and variables of economic interest. Researchers can use this database to study the determinants of industry regulations and to study regulations’ effects on a massive array of dependent variables, both across industries and across time.

Carrots that Look Like Sticks: Toward an Understanding of Multitasking Incentive Schemes

Constructing compensation schemes for effort in multidimensional tasks is complex, particularly when some dimensions are not easily observable. When incentive schemes contractually reward workers for easily observed measures, such as quantity produced, the standard model predicts that unrewarded dimensions, such as quality, will be neglected. Yet, there remains mixed empirical evidence in favor of this standard principal-agent model prediction. This article reconciles the literature using both theory and empirical evidence. The theory outlines conditions under which principals can use a piece rate scheme to induce higher quantity and quality levels than analogous fixed wage schemes. Making use of a series of complementary laboratory and field experiments we show that this effect occurs because the agent is uncertain about the principals monitoring ability and the principals choice of a piece rate signals to the agent that she is efficient at monitoring.

How Large Looms the Ghost of the Past? State Dependence versus Heterogeneity in Coordination Games

In games with multiple, Pareto-rankable equilibria and repeated play, does a history of playing an inefficient equilibrium make it harder for players to reach the efficient equilibrium? In other words, can people “get stuck” in bad equilibria? Previous studies have found support for this, but they have relied on naturally occurring variation in precedent. I implement randomized control to establish that precedent effects are important, but that naturally occurring variation exaggerates the importance of precedent. I present evidence that some of the endogeneity of naturally occurring precedents is due to variation in risk attitudes. This is because in the coordination games used, the inefficient equilibrium is associated with a safe strategy. Understanding the causal effect of precedent is important since many development problems are viewed as coordination games. Moreover, an appreciation of the way in which potential heterogeneity may interact with the policy is essential when trying to lift groups out of bad precedents.

Diamonds are a Dictatorʼs Best Friend: Natural Resources and the Tradeoff between Authoritarianism and Development

Why do African and Middle Eastern countries seem cursed by an abundance of natural resources yet USA, Australia and Norway seem blessed? A growing literature has argued that the benevolence or malignance of natural resources depends upon the quality of institutions. This paper offers a new explanation based on associational freedom and its interaction with the political system. The model predicts that natural resources have an adverse impact on economic performance and transition to democracy in authoritarian regimes but not in democracies. It also predicts that repression of associational freedom will be increasing in natural resources in authoritarian regimes. I test the model’s predictions using fixed-effects regressions on an international panel from 1975-2000 and find some support.