Patrick Baert

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: A TYPOLOGY AND EXAMPLES

This paper addresses the question: what is an unintended consequence? It presents a classification which enables us to understand different types of unintended consequences. The classification refers to several questions: whether or not the effects are social, whether they are desirable, whether they fulfil the initial intention, whether they are unanticipated, and whether they occur later than the initial action. The classification is used to deal with the phenomenon of unintended-but-anticipated consequences and is exemplified by the cases of sub-optimality, counter-finality and structuration.

University under siege

This paper explores the changes that are taking place in European higher education: a shift from the Humboldtian notion of the university to one that operates under quasi-market pressures. While increasing the culture of accountability in universities, this development, linked to shifts in their sponsorship and associated ‘missions’, is associated with an erosion of traditional mechanisms of trust. The focus is on UK experience, which is now extending internationally. Lessons are drawn on some of the institutional changes and problems that may lie ahead for European universities.

Pragmatism as a Philosophy of the Social Sciences

This article introduces and critically analyses Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatism as a contribution to the philosophy of social sciences. Although Rorty has written little about philosophy of social sciences as such, it is argued that his overall philosophical position has significant ramifications for this subject area. The first part of the article sets out the implications of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism for various issues in the philosophy of social sciences, for instance, the doctrine of naturalism, the nineteenth-century Methodenstreit, the philosophical tenets of Marxism, and the relatively recent wave of post-structuralism. The second part presents a constructive critique of Rorty’s neopragmatist philosophy of social sciences. Although critical of some aspects of Rorty’s argument, it is argued that his stance could provide a base for a fruitful view of social sciences, aiming at enlarging human potentialities rather than representation.

Towards a Pragmatist-Inspired Philosophy of Social Science

The article reflects on the possibility of a social science that aims at self-referential knowledge-acquisition. This form of social research explores and questions deep-seated presuppositions prevalent in contemporary culture and strives to become aware of other forms of life. This view of social sciences, therefore, is perfectly in line with the pragmatist perspective that language and knowledge, rather than acts of representation, allow people to increase the scope of human possibilities. Various forms of social research, in a wide range of disciplines, have already explored this self-referential knowledge: for instance, genealogical history and sociology, post-processual archaeology and the critical turn in anthropology. The article locates this self-referential knowledge within the context of contemporary American pragmatism (e.g. Rorty, Bernstein). It is argued that this type of knowledge ties in with the radical tradition in neo-pragmatism, in particular its anti-foundationalist notion of critique.

Pragmatism, Realism and Hermeneutics

This paper explores themethodological consequences of AmericanPragmatism for the social sciences. It alsocriticises some rival perspectives onmethodology of social research, in particularfalsificationist, realist and someanti-naturalist views. It is argued thatAmerican Pragmatism shows striking affinitieswith the genealogical method of history and thereflexive turn in cultural anthropology. It isalso argued that Pragmatism forces us to thinkdifferently about the relationship betweentheory and empirical research.

New Pragmatism and Old Europe Introduction to the Debate between Pragmatist Philosophy and European Social and Political Theory

Pragmatism has become a vital force in contemporary intellectual life. There are a number of reasons for this, of which four are especially notable. First, whereas early critical theorists tended to be hostile to American pragmatism, contemporary critical theory is steeped in the pragmatic tradition. This is especially the case for Jürgen Habermas, whose earlier work on philosophy of science, as well as his recent writings on communicative rationality and discourse ethics draw heavily on the work of Charles S. Peirce (Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1996, 1998; Aboulafia et al., 2001). Second, the renewed interest in G.H. Mead has been one that attempts to put Mead in his intellectual context. Whereas interpreters like Blumer used to construct a presentist reading of Mead (Mead as a precursor of symbolic interactionism and opponent of structural-functionalism), more recently the tendency has been to demonstrate the extent to which Mead was embedded in the pragmatic tradition of the time (e.g. Aboulafia, 1991, 2001; Cook, 1993; Joas, 1985). Not surprisingly, some of those scholars have also tried to study the relevance of other pragmatists for social theory (e.g. Joas, 1993, 1996). Third, Richard Rorty has embraced John Dewey’s pragmatism as a source of inspiration for his anti-foundationalist philosophy. Rorty’s reliance on Dewey was not as obvious in his path-breaking Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980), but Rorty has been acknowledging the influence ever since the publication of Consequences of Pragmatism (e.g. Rorty, 1982, 1998, 1999). Hence Rorty’s influence, for instance in literary theory, went hand in hand with a growing interest in the tradition of pragmatism. Fourth, in opposition to the non-foundational and non-representational dimensions of pragmatism, critical realism has also sparked a renewed interest in Peirce whose reflections on abduction are at the centre of the realist notion of scientific explanation (Archer et al., 1998; Creaven, 2001; Cruickshank, 2003; Danemark, 2002; Joseph, 2002; Outhwaite, 1987). The aim of this special issue is to discuss the role of pragmatism in social and European Journal of Social Theory 7(3): 267–274

Pragmatism versus sociological hermeneutics

The aim of this paper is to open a debate about the relevance of American pragmatism for the philosophy of the social sciences. The agenda for a pragmatist philosophy of social science is introduced by contrasting it with ‘sociological hermeneutics’. Sociological hermeneutics refers to a common research agenda that attempts to implement insights from the philosophical project of hermeneutics into the social sciences. According to this view, the interpretative method is a sine qua non for any faithful representation of the external world. In contrast, a pragmatist philosophy of social sciences shows affinities with Nietzsches genealogical method and the reflexive turn in cultural anthropology. Its aim is not to represent something out-there, but to use the encounter with different forms of life to reassess our selves and our own culture.

Richard Rorty's Pragmatism and the Social Sciences

Richard Rorty (1998) Achieving our Country. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Richard Rorty (1999) Philosophy and Social Hope. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Robert B. Brandom (ed.) (2000) Rorty and its Critics. Oxford: Blackwell. John Pettegrew (ed.) (2000) A Pragmatist’s Progress? Richard Rorty and American Intellectual History. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson (eds.) (2001) Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues. Cambridge: Polity Press.

The power struggle of French intellectuals at the end of the Second World War: A study in the sociology of ideas

This article is one of the first sociological explorations of power struggles between intellectuals where matters of life and death are literally at stake. It counters the prevailing tendency within sociology to study intellectuals within confined academic institutions where power struggles are limited to matters of symbolic and institutional recognition. This study explores the conflict between collaborationist and Resistance intellectuals at the end of the Second World War in France, and it focuses in particular on the purge of collaborationist intellectuals which culminated in several high profile trials. This article shows that the arguments and meta-arguments put forward in these trials led to broader intellectual debates outside the courtroom. These debates not only centred on the notion of the writer’s responsibility, but also dealt with anxieties about the disintegrative forces of modern society. Whereas collaborationist intellectuals portrayed their writing as either separate from politics or rescuing a defunct or degenerate nation, Resistance intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre were keen to portray collaborators as outsiders, both socially and sexually, lacking in social integration and subservient to a strong external force. The Resistance intellectuals saw the notion of individual responsibility not as antithetical but as integral to the remaking of the French nation, and this concept would become the cornerstone of the reshaping of the intellectual landscape in the post-war era in France.

Time, reflectivity and social action

The object of this article is to present the outline of a temporalised sociology, emphasising novelty and diachrony, and linking the shorter and longer temporal spans. This temporalised sociology draws upon a critical reassessment of four theoretical traditions: positivism, functionalism, structuralism and ethnomethodology. These four traditions fail to take temporality into account, but more fruitful ideas are borrowed from them. A more important source is G.H. Meads work.