Patrik Sandås

Empirical Analysis of Limit Order Markets

We analyse order placement strategies in a limit order market, using data on the order flow from the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Traders submitting market or limit orders trade off the order price against both the execution probability and the winner’s curse risk associated with different order choices. The optimal order strategy is characterized by a monotone function, which maps the liquidity demand of the investors into their order choice. We develop and implement a semiparametric test of this monotonicity property, and find no evidence against the monotonicity property for buy orders or sell orders. We do find evidence against the hypothesis that the trader’s decision to be a buyer or a seller depends only on the trading profits available in the limit order book. We estimate that traders submitting market buy orders have private valuations that exceed the asset value by 2.3% on average and receive an average payoff of at least 1.8% of the asset value. Traders submitting limit buy orders at the price below the best ask quote have private valuations between 0.1% and 2.3% above the asset value and earn an average payoff of between 0.3% and 1.8% of the asset value. Although the distribution of liquidity demand does not depend on conditioning information, conditioning information helps us to predict the composition of the order flow in our data. These findings imply that variation in the composition of the order flow can be explained by empirical variation in the relative profitability of alternative order choices and movements in the common value of the asset.

The Impact of Iceberg Orders in Limit Order Books

We examine the impact of iceberg orders on the price and order flow dynamics in limit order books. Iceberg orders allow traders to simultaneously hide a large portion of their order size and signal their interest in trading to the market. We show that when market participants detect iceberg orders they tend to strongly respond by submitting matching market orders consistent with iceberg orders facilitating the search for latent liquidity. The greater the fraction of an iceberg order that is executed, the smaller is its price impact consistent with liquidity rather than informed trading. The presence of iceberg orders is associated with increased trading consistent with a positive liquidity externality, but the reduced order book transparency associated with iceberg orders also creates an adverse selection cost for limit orders that may partly offset any gains.

What Broker Charges Reveal About Mortgage Credit Risk

Prior to the subprime crisis, mortgage brokers charged higher percentage fees for loans that turned out to be riskier ex post, even when conditioning on other risk characteristics. High conditional fees reveal borrower attributes that are associated with high borrower risk, such as suboptimal shopping behavior, high valuation for the loan or high borrower-specific broker costs. Borrowers who pay high conditional fees are inherently more risky, not just because they pay high fees. We find a stronger association between conditional fees and delinquency risk when lenders have fewer incentives to screen bor- rowers, for purchase rather than refinance loans, and for loans originated by brokers who have less frequent interactions with the lender. Our findings shed light on the pro- posed QRM exemption criteria for risk retention requirements for residential mortgage securitizations.

An empirical examination of the pricing of European bond options

Abstract This paper examines the pricing of European bond options, namely options on a five year Swedish T-bond. A continuous time version of the Ho and Lee model, derived by Heath, Jarrow and Morton, and the Black and Scholes model are tested using Hansens Generalized Method of Moments. The results indicate that both models perform reasonably well. However, the Black and Scholes model exhibits a ‘time-to-maturity of the bond’ bias, not present in the Heath, Jarrow and Morton model.