Ruediger Fahlenbrach

Founder-CEOs, Investment Decisions, and Stock Market Performance

Eleven percent of the largest public U.S. firms are headed by the CEO who founded the firm. Founder-CEO firms differ systematically from successor-CEO firms with respect to firm valuation, investment behavior, and stock market performance. Founder-CEO firms invest more in research and development, have higher capital expenditures, and make more focused mergers and acquisitions. An equal-weighted investment strategy that had invested in founder-CEO firms from 1993 to 2002 would have earned a benchmark-adjusted return of 8.3% annually. The excess return is robust; after controlling for a wide variety of firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and industry affiliation, the abnormal return is still 4.4% annually. The implications of the investment behavior and stock market performance of founder-CEO firms are discussed.

Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument

Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but identifying this empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures. We develop and test an empirical framework that allows us to separate selection from treatment effects of large shareholders. Individual blockholders tend to hold blocks in public firms located close to where they reside. Using this empirical observation, we develop an instrument (the density of wealthy individuals near a firms headquarters) for the presence of large, nonmanagerial individual shareholders in firms. These shareholders have a large impact on firms, controlling for selection effects.

Why Does Fast Loan Growth Predict Poor Performance for Banks

From 1973 to 2014, the common stock of U.S. banks with loan growth in the top quartile of banks over a three-year period significantly underperforms the common stock of banks with loan growth in the bottom quartile over the next three years. The benchmark-adjusted cumulative difference in performance over three years exceeds twelve percentage points. The high growth banks also have significantly higher crash risk over the three-year period. This poor performance is explained by fast loan growth as asset growth separate from loan growth is not followed by poor performance. These banks reserve less for loan losses when their loans grow quickly than other banks. Subsequently, they have a lower return on assets and increase their loan loss reserves. The poorer performance of the fast growing banks is not explained by merger activity and loan growth through mergers is not accompanied by the same poor loan performance. The evidence is consistent with fast-growing banks, analysts, and investors failing to properly appreciate the extent to which the fast loan growth results from making riskier loans and failing to charge for these risks correctly.

How Do Investors and Firms React to an Unexpected Currency Appreciation Shock

The Swiss National Bank surprisingly announced in January 2015 that it would no longer hold the Swiss franc at a fixed exchange rate of 1.2 Swiss francs per Euro, a peg it had defended for more than three years. The Swiss franc appreciated by approximately 15% immediately after the announcement. We exploit the removal of the currency peg to study how investors and firms respond to exogenous foreign currency shocks. We find large negative announcement returns for Swiss firms with significant foreign currency exposure. Affected firms experience a drop in profitability and react by reducing capital expenditures and moving production abroad.